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ABSTRACT 
 
 
ESSAYS ON ADVERSE SELECTION AND MORAL HAZARD IN INSURANCE MARKET 
 
 
By 
 
JIAN WEN 
 
July 30, 2010 
 
 
Committee Chair: Dr. Martin F. Grace 
 
Major Department: Department of Risk Management and Insurance 
 
 
Essay One examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and 
reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse 
selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to 
identify the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary 
insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data 
from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, 
the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market 
between the affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers, and even between closely related 
affiliated insurers and reinsurers. There is no evidence indicating the presence of moral hazard in 
the reinsurance market. 
 
To address the issue of soaring property insurance premiums and coverage availability in states 
that are subject to hurricane risks, state and federal governments have not only regulated the 
private insurance market but have also intervened directly into markets by establishing 
government-funded insurance programs. With coexisting public and private insurance 
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mechanisms and price regulation, the risk of cross subsidization and a subsequent moral hazard 
problem may arise. By using data from the Florida Citizens Insurance Corporation, the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the Flood Insurance and the private homeowner insurance market 
in Florida from 1998 to 2007, the second essay examines the moral hazard problems arising from 
government regulation and involvement in the private insurance sector. In sum, the provision of 
national flood insurance is found to be positively related to the population growth in the state of 
Florida, which shows that state immigrants can take advantage of the lower cost of flood 
insurance when relocating in higher-risk areas. Further, we find that national flood insurance and 
the catastrophe fund complement the development of the private insurance sector, while the 
residual market hinders the development of private property insurance market. 
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Essay One 
 
Distinguishing Different Effects of Asymmetric Information: Evidence from 
Property and Liability Reinsurance Market 
 
 
 
 
 9
Abstract 
 
This essay examines the asymmetric information problem between primary insurers and 
reinsurers in the reinsurance industry and contributes uniquely to the separation of adverse 
selection from moral hazard, if both are present. A two-period principal-agent model is set up to 
identify the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard generated by the actions of the primary 
insurer and to provide a basis for corresponding hypotheses for empirical testing. Using data 
from the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) and A.M. Best Company, 
the empirical tests show that the problem of adverse selection exists in the reinsurance market 
between the affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers, and even between closely related 
affiliated insurers and reinsurers. There is no evidence indicating the presence of moral hazard in 
the reinsurance market.  
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1. Introduction 
Since the middle of the last century, the study of the problem of asymmetric information 
has become important in the field of economics and insurance (Akerlof, 1970; Arrow 1965; 
Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). Much progress has been made from both a theoretical and an 
empirical perspective. Before economists took the question of information transparency into 
consideration, they commonly assumed the presence of complete information. The concept of 
complete information implies that all the information is transparent and equally known to both 
parties.  Conversely, the concept of asymmetric information implies that the information known 
to one party may be unknown or only partially known or available to another. Of the two 
concepts, the latter, asymmetric information, comes closest to describing or reflecting the real 
economic world. Predictably, assuming the presence of asymmetric information could lead to 
outcomes that would differ significantly from those resulting from an assumption of complete 
information.  
Insurance pricing is a good example of this. The insurer sets the premium based on 
actuarial data on the previous loss experience within a normal population. In the long run, the 
company will break even, if the risk is at the “average” level as presumed. Unfortunately, people 
who, in fact, represent a higher-than-average risk level, may be able to purchase insurance 
coverage against their more frequent or more severe future losses at a favorable price that was 
originally based on the lower, average, risk. This disconnect may occur because insurers lack 
sufficient information on the percentage of the pool with higher risk and the exact risk levels 
represented, even though the insured is fully aware of the risk level. Therefore, this asymmetric 
information situation may lead to higher losses for the insurer.   
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The existence of asymmetric information normally entails two complementary problems: 
adverse selection and moral hazard. The term adverse selection refers to circumstances which 
permit an insured with higher risk to buy insurance at a premium calculated to service the 
average risk level. The term moral hazard refers to the tendency of insurers to exercise less 
precaution than they should, establishing inadequate incentives to control the risks represented 
by those to whom they provide coverage. Adverse selection and moral hazard both contribute to 
the potential for higher losses than the insurer may have expected.  
When asymmetric information is known to exist, the optimal risk-sharing scheme and 
pricing may well need to deviate from those that would be instituted if complete information 
were available (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). In the presence of serious asymmetric information, 
the insurer may experience a much higher loss than expected; and in the worst case, the 
insurance market itself may totally fail (Akerlof, 1970). Therefore, the detection of possible 
asymmetric information, including the discovery of previously unknown risk, has the potential to 
benefit both the insurer and the insured.  
For example, health and life insurance underwriting requires physical examination and 
applies deductibles, coinsurance and pricing tied to different risk levels of the insured. Common 
sense would conclude that such procedures would have the effect of uncovering possible risks, 
factoring these risks into the coverage, and thereby reducing the danger of asymmetric 
information. While the theoretical analysis of asymmetric information in the insurance market 
was introduced almost half a century ago, empirical testing did not appear until the 1980s. Now, 
from the examination of life, health, annuity and automobile insurance markets, we can see 
evidence that, compared to other insurance markets, life insurance has less of a problem of 
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asymmetric information due to strict requirement of physical examination to determine the risk 
status of the insured.   
As the insurance for the insurance companies, the reinsurance industry further distributes 
the risks pooled by the primary insurers. It is not unusual for reinsurance companies to be run 
nationally or internationally, which buffers the adverse effect of huge losses to the whole 
insurance market and ultimately lowers the premium paid by individuals. With the catastrophic 
events in the past decades, the property and liability reinsurance market have exhibited an 
increasing ability to absorb big losses and stabilize the whole insurance market in the U.S. 
(Cummins, 2007). Therefore the property and liability reinsurance market is not only a critical 
part of the insurance market, but also an indispensable factor in stabilizing the economy. 
However, asymmetric information existing between primary insurers and the reinsurers may still 
pose a serious threat to the reinsurance market.     
The effect of asymmetric information on the reinsurance market can be analyzed from the 
perspectives of adverse selection and moral hazard. For reinsurance, adverse selection would be 
evidenced by high-risk firms getting similar or even better terms for their reinsurance purchase 
than low-risk firms. In contrast, moral hazard exists when the primary insurance companies 
loosen their underwriting criteria, leading ultimately to higher losses than expected. Both adverse 
selection and moral hazard would make the actual loss higher than those estimated by the 
reinsurance company, with negative consequences for the insurance market.  
This examination of asymmetric information sheds light on challenges in the reinsurance 
business. Better knowledge of asymmetric information between the primary insurer and the 
reinsurer can help improve risk allocation and pricing in the reinsurance market. For the primary 
insurance company, managing risk through purchasing reinsurance is a much more complex 
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matter—due to factors such as risk diversification, progressive tax and financial needs—than risk 
management at the level of individual policy holders.  
This essay examines the asymmetric information problems between the reinsurance and 
primary companies in the property and liability reinsurance market in the U.S. Recently, Jean-
Baptiste and Santomero (2000) addressed the asymmetric information problems which affect the 
efficiency of risk allocation between the primary insurance companies and their reinsurers. They 
showed that long-term contracts between the two will improve the allocation of risk by including 
and factoring in new risk information over time. They predicted that the use of long-term 
reinsurance contracts will increase the demand for reinsurance, increase primary insurer’s profits 
and lower the probability of bankruptcy.  
Empirically, Doherty and Smetters (2005) and Garven and Grace (2007) provided the 
evidence of asymmetric information in the reinsurance market. Doherty and Smettters (2005) 
tested the potential moral hazard problem between the reinsurer and the primary company. They 
found that loss-sensitive pricing was mainly used to control moral hazard between the non-
affiliated reinsurers and insurers, while monitoring was widely used to control moral hazard 
between the affiliated reinsurers and insurers where the monitoring cost was relatively lower. 
Garven and Grace (2007) explored the adverse selection problem based on the theoretical 
predictions by Jean-Baptiste and Santomero (2000). Their findings are consistent with and 
supportive of the theoretical predictions. Nevertheless, each of these two works only focuses on 
one side of the asymmetric information issue while ignoring the existence and the effects of the 
other one.  
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For example, Doherty and Smetters (2005) assumed moral hazard as the only effect of 
the asymmetric information; Garven and Grace (2007) only attributed the effects of the 
asymmetric information to adverse selection.  
Further, an interesting research question arises: do adverse selection and moral hazard 
exist at the same time to be part of the asymmetric information problem? The answer to this 
question is the contribution of this essay, which distinguishes adverse selection from moral 
hazard, as they exist between the primary insurer and the reinsurer. The reason for separating 
these two factors of the asymmetric information is that they lead to higher losses through 
different mechanisms. Accordingly different contract features are required to correct them. 
Meanwhile, affiliated and non-affiliated reinsurers are discussed separately, as the affiliated 
reinsurers belong to one financial group and non-affiliated reinsurers are independent companies 
with respect to the primary insurer. Due to the varying relationship between reisnurers and 
insurers, asymmetric information is expected to present different patterns.  
The essay proceeds as follows: in the second section, related literature is reviewed. Then, 
the two-period principal-agent model is set up in the third section. In the fourth section, based on 
the hypothesis derived from the theoretical model, an empirical test is conducted on the panel 
data for the affiliated and non-affiliated property and liability reinsurance market from 1992 to 
2006.  
 
2. Literature Review 
A series of seminal papers (Akerlof, 1970; Borch 1962; Holmstrom, 1979; Raviv, 1979; 
Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976) built up the theoretical foundation of asymmetric information 
studies in economics. Akerlof (1970) suggested that market equilibrium may not exist, due to the 
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existence of asymmetric information between the participants, in contrast to the equilibrium that 
would be expected if complete information were available (Mossin, 1968). Furthermore, 
Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyzed the competitive market in which imperfect information, 
specifically adverse selection, was considered. They found out that low-risk individuals were 
negatively affected by the presence of high-risk individuals, while high-risk individuals benefited 
from the presence of low-risk individuals. They also found that single price equilibrium does not 
exist and that the structure and existence of a possible equilibrium depend upon particular 
assumptions. Holmstrom (1979), on the other hand, investigated the imperfect information 
problem in a principal-agent model with the consideration of moral hazard. He concluded that 
the optimal contract is second-best due to the agent’s unobserved action, but additional 
information, like monitoring or managerial accounting, will improve the efficiency of the 
contract.  
Therefore, the detection of asymmetric information and the corresponding contract 
designed to address this issue are critical to improving efficiency in the insurance market. In this 
case, the principal-agent model provides a framework for how to alleviate the agency problem, 
and, consequently, decreases the occurrence of asymmetric information. Lambert (1983) 
characterized the optimal long-term contract, designed to control the moral hazard of the agent, 
as one in which the agent’s compensation depends on not only the current period but also the 
previous period. In addition, Laffont and Tirole (1987) derived the optimal dynamic incentive 
mechanism under the possible monitoring of the agent, and they showed the existence of the 
possible continuation equilibrium.  
The empirical tests of asymmetric information on insurance markets validate and 
supplement the theoretical predictions. The empirical hypothesis against the existence of 
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asymmetric information is stated as the positive relation between the risk levels of those who 
purchase insurance coverage and the actual risk type revealed after losses occur (see Puelz & 
Snow, 1994). However, mixed results are reported in different business lines of insurance: the 
insignificance of positive relation of insurance quantity purchase and mortality risk of 
individuals in life insurance market suggested that information can be treated as complete under 
the current test (Cawley & Philipson, 1997). For the annuity market, Finkelstein and Poterba 
(2004) found a systemic relationship between the ex post mortality and the timing of annuity 
payments, consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Puelz and Snow (1994) and 
Chiaporri and Salanie (2000) reported mixed results regarding the presence of asymmetric 
information in the automobile insurance market. The prevalent explanation attributes this mixed 
evidence to the application of long-term contract and risk classification in different insurance 
business lines. Because insurance premiums are contracted over multiple terms, and factors such 
as experience rating or risk selection are used to determine the real risk type, the effects of 
asymmetric information can be moderated over time. For instance, the absence of asymmetric 
information in life insurance can be attributed as the adoption of medical examination as part of 
underwriting to reveal the true health status of the insurance applicants. 
Reinsurance is also subject to the asymmetric information problem between the insurers 
and the reinsurers. In comparison to the individual insured, the incentive for the insurer to 
purchase reinsurance is more complicated. The decision to reinsure involves issues such as risk 
management, increasing capability or the pursuit of tax benefits. Based on its own firm 
characteristics, the insurer has its own degree of demand for reinsurance. As Mayer and Smith 
(1990) pointed out, the ownership structure, firm size, geographic concentration and business 
lines concentration have significant effects on the demand for reinsurance.  
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Meanwhile, the complicated risk structure of the insurers may reflect in multiple 
dimensions in underwriting, operating and financing management. As a result, it’s costly for the 
reinsurer to collect complete information which would reveal the true risk of the insurer before 
the transaction is done. Consequently, adverse selection occurs when a high-risk firm conceals 
information and receives better terms from the reinsurers than they would have otherwise 
received. Therefore, long-term contracts and the practice of retrospective rating, which adjusts 
premiums based on the loss incurred during the previous policy period, are widely applied in the 
reinsurance industry to solve the asymmetric information problem. Jean-Baptiste and Santomero 
(2000) showed that the new information included in pricing of both future and past reinsurance 
coverage for long-term reinsurance contracts can enhance the effectiveness of risk allocation 
between the primary insurance companies and reinsurance companies. They stated three 
hypotheses: 1) Other things being equal, long-term reinsurance contracting relationships will be 
associated with higher levels of reinsurance coverage; 2) Other things being equal, long-term 
reinsurance contracting relationships will be associated with higher insurer profits; 3) Other 
things being equal, long-term reinsurance contracting relationships will be associated with lower 
levels of bankruptcy.  
Garven and Grace (2007) did empirical tests of the above hypothesis to see if there is any 
adverse selection in the reinsurance market and, further, if the asymmetric information problem 
is solved over time. With panel data consisting of U.S property-liability insurance firms, which 
reported to the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) during the period 1995 
to 2000 and A.M. Best financial ratings for insurance companies, they found evidence supporting 
the theoretical predictions by Jean-Baptiste and Santomero. These findings imply that longer 
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reinsurance relationships lead to more reinsurance coverage, higher profitability, and lower 
bankruptcy risk.  
Doherty and Smetters (2005) tested moral hazard in the reinsurance market with a multi-
period principal-agent model of the reinsurance transaction. They derived predictions on 
premium design, monitoring, loss control and insurer risk retention. They found that a loss-
sensitive premium is used to control moral hazard when insurer and reinsurer are not affiliates, 
while monitoring is emphasized when the insurer and reinsurers are affiliates.  
The problem of asymmetric information in reinsurance markets has been investigated in 
other countries besides the United States. Adam and Diocon (2006) tested the asymmetric 
information problem in the UK property-liability reinsurance market. Two relationships are 
mainly tested in their paper. One is the relationship between gross losses and the amount of 
reinsurance purchased by a primary insurance company; the other relationship examined is 
between the reinsurance premiums paid and the gross losses and reinsured claims recovered by 
the primary insurer. The latter is a demonstration of claim-contingent pricing which characterizes 
the reinsurance transaction. The Hausman endogeneity test under the Heckman two-stage model 
can separate adverse selection from moral hazard; they found that information asymmetry does 
exist in the reinsurance market between the affiliated insurers and reinsurers. Specifically, 
adverse selection exists in the automobile and third party insurance markets, and moral hazard 
appears in the miscellaneous and pecuniary insurance markets. In contrast, for the non-affiliated 
insurance companies, the claim-contingent pricing reduces the problem of asymmetric 
information.     
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3. Theoretical Model 
Based on the model proposed by Doherty and Smetters (2005), a two-year principal-
agent model is set up to capture the asymmetric information between the insurers and the 
reinsurers in the reinsurance market.   
Doherty and Smetters (2005) develop a two-period principal-agent model from which to 
derive predictions on premium design, monitoring, loss control and insurer risk retention to 
identify moral hazard in reinsurance transactions. The agent, or primary insurer, pays a premium 
tP in period of t  to the reinsurer for a reinsurance contract which is subject to a deductible (or 
“risk retention”) of tS . Under this contract, the indemnity to the primary insurer in period t  
is ],0max[ tt SL − , where tL is incurred direct loss in period t . Action a  is taken by the primary 
insurer when underwriting business, handling claims and controlling risks. The action is not 
observed by the principal, the reinsurer, whereas it is assumed that action a generates a signal 
m that is imperfectly correlated with a , but still conveys valuation information to the principal. 
Consequently, the incurred loss and signal depend on action by the primary insurer who writes 
insurance business to the insured customer directly. On the other hand, the principal, the 
reinsurer, receives premium tP in period t and indemnifies the primary insurer with 
],0max[ tt SL − if the incurred loss exhausts the “stop loss.” To reduce the moral hazard problem 
which may occur on the side of the primary insurer, the reinsurer pays a cost of c to monitor the 
primary insurer. The reinsurer picks premiums for year 1 and year 2 to maximize total profit 
subject to the primary insurer’s incentive constraint and participation constraint. The optimal 
premium structure is then derived from the first-order conditions, and then the model predicts the 
relations between the reinsurance premium and direct loss control, retrospective rating, 
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experienced rating and monitoring. Specifically, the reinsurance premium tP is predicted to be 
“negatively related to the inverse of total direct losses by the primary insurer in period 1−t  , 
negatively related to the inverse of the amount of reinsured losses in period t , negatively related 
to the inverse of the amount of total direct losses by the primary insurer in period 1−t , 
increasing in the signal of m ”( Doherty & Smetters ,2005, p 384).  
The model above only focuses on the moral hazard of the asymmetric information 
problem. To capture the possible adverse selection problem, one more signal s , which signifies 
the operation quality of the primary insurer, is incorporated into the model above in this essay. 
Basically, the signal s is expected to reveal the real risk type of the primary insurer to the 
reinsurer. Hence, a measure of the loss volatility of the primary insurer, or a measure indicating 
their overall financial capability, can provide the information relative to the risk type of the 
insurer. Compared to signal s , another signal m in the model conveys the effort exerted by the 
primary insurer to the reinsurer, and signal m  is imperfectly correlated to efforts under the 
reinsurance coverage.  
Another new contract feature considered in this model is the coverage cap, A , of the 
reinsurance contract. This is defined in the “excess of loss” reinsurance, whereby the primary 
insurer covers the amount of each claim up to the retention level and the reinsurer repays the loss 
beyond the retention level to the coverage cap to the insurer. The difference between retention 
level and the coverage cap is the actual reinsurance coverage purchased by the primary insurer.  
3.1 The Primary Insurer’s Problem 
Assume the primary insurer is strictly risk-averse, and its utility function is )(wU , 
where 0)(,0)( ''' <> wUwU , w is the surplus at the beginning of the contract. The arguments for 
this risk-averse assumption are the contexts of the progressive tax, the underinvestment problem, 
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high bankruptcy costs and asymmetric information in the reinsurance market. These market 
frictions make the insurers risk-averse even if the company is widely held by public shareholders. 
At the beginning of one period, the primary insurer pays premium P to purchase one excess-of-
loss reinsurance policy with the retention level of D , and coverage cap of A . Assume the 
incurred loss over this period is L . The amount of recovered loss payment received from the 
reinsurer depends on the amount of the incurred losses. If the incurred loss is less than the 
retention level, DL ≤  the reinsurer does not pay anything to the primary insurer. If the incurred 
loss falls between the retention level and coverage cap, ALD ≤≤  the reinsurer pays the amount 
of DL − to the primary insurer. If the actual loss is beyond the coverage cap, LA ≤  the 
obligation of the reinsurer is the amount of DA− .  
During the contract period, the primary insurer exerts an effort of e to underwrite 
business from the insured, control loss and assess the claims. We argue that this effort is able to 
generate signals to the reinsurer about real operational quality and incentives of the primary 
insurer in the sense that the performance of the primary insurer nevertheless reflects the effort it 
takes. We denote signal s as the indication of the operation quality, which is the real risk type, of 
the primary insurer. We then denote signal m as the indication of the incentive of the primary 
insurer. As a result, the conditional joint probability density function of actual loss and signals 
are represented as ),,( eLmsf .  
A two-year framework is considered. In the first year, the reinsurance premium is a 
function of actual loss, retention level, coverage cap and signals of the primary insurer’s 
effort: 11111 ,,,,()( msADLPP =• ). For the second-year pricing, the actual loss of the first year is 
also taken into account, as are the second year losses, the retention level, the coverage cap and 
the signals in the second-year period: ),,,,,()( 222221 msADLLPP =• .  
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For the simplicity of computation, a zero risk-free rate is assumed in this reinsurance model. 
Define an insurer’s end-of-period wealth,π  as a random variable. Then the insurer’s wealth as 
end of the first year is 1π  , and the wealth as end of the second year is 2π  . For 2,1=i  



<−+−−
≤<−−
≤−−
=
iiiiiii
iiiiii
iiiii
i
LAifDALPW
ALDifDPW
DLifLPW
π            (1) 
The expected utility of the insurer for two years are ))(( 11 πUE  and ))(( 22 πUE , respectively. 
So the total expected utility of the primary insurer from taking the reinsurance transaction 
is ))(())(()( 2211 ππ UEUEUE += . The calculation of expected utility by integration refers to the 
appendix. Because incurred losses depend on effort e as ),,( eLmsf , the primary insurer picks 
efforts 1e and 2e to maximize its expected utility in two years.                 
3.2 The Reinsurer’s Problem  
The reinsurer incurs a monitoring cost of 1c and 2c to analyze true risk type of the insurer 
by observing the information delivered in the two periods, respectively. The reinsurer makes the 
profit out of the premium income after deduction of loss repayments and monitoring costs1. 
Define the reinsurer’s profit iI , 2,1=i  as a random variable. Then the reinsurer’s profit in the 
first year is 1I and its profit in the second year is 2I . The profit iI is defined as follows.  



<+−
≤<+−
≤
=
iiiii
iiiiii
iii
i
LAifDAP
ALDifDLP
DLifP
I            (2) 
                                                 
1Reinsurers will monitor the primary, among which long-term contracts are usually applied. The application of 
monitoring encourages the primary insurers to take appropriate measures to control their risks, therefore reduces the 
potential losses of reisnurers. Also see Doherty (1997).  
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The reinsurer chooses the premium 1P and 2P in two years to maximize the total 
profit )()( 21 IEIEI += . The calculation of total profit by integration refers to the appendix. 
The optimization problem is to maximize the total profit of the principal, which is the 
reinsurer in this case, subject to the participation constraint and incentive constraint by the agent, 
the primary insurer. To solve this optimal problem, the optimal values of },;,{ 2121 eePP are 
obtained. The optimization problem is stated as follows.  
           I
eePP 2121 ,,,
max  
Subject to 
             UUE ≥)(                                                                                       (3) 
             0)( 1 =∂∂ eUE                                                                                  (4) 
             0)( 2 =∂∂ eUE                                                                                  (5) 
Equation (3) is the participation constraint of the primary insurer, where U the 
reservation is the expected utility of the primary insurer that it would have without reinsurance. 
Equation (4) and (5) are first-order conditions with respect to the efforts in the two periods. The 
incentive constraints ensure that the primary insurers make efforts to maximize their expected 
utility.  
To simplify the joint probability density function of actual loss ),,( eLmsf , signal s and 
m are assumed to be independent of actual loss L  as suggested by Holmstrom (1979). Further, 
signals s and m are assumed to be independent from each other, in that signal s is used to 
address adverse selection, while signal m is adopted to capture moral hazard problem, 
respectively. Therefore, the joint probability density function of actual loss is written 
as )()()(),,( eLhemgeskeLmsf = .  
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Let 21,, γγλ denote the Lagrangian multipliers for constraints (3)-(5), the first-order 
conditions are reduced as follows:  
11
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where )(' esk , )(' emg , and )(' eLh are the derivative functions of )( esk , )( emg , and 
)( eLh with respect to the effort e .  
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To make Lagrangian multipliers 21,, γγλ be positive, we make the following assumptions 
on the likelihood ratio by Lambert (1983): (1) )(/)( 1111
' eLheLh is decreasing in 1L ; (2) 
)](*)(/[)( 221122
' eLheLheLh is decreasing in 2L .  
Equations (6)-(11) define the risk-sharing structure between the primary insurer and the 
reinsurer in the two-period framework. The model predictions are similar to the ones derived by 
Doherty and Smetters (2005). For example, both models show that the reinsurance premium is 
not only related to the concurrent direct loss by the primary insurer but also to the direct incurred 
loss in the last period. However, our model uniquely incorporates the signals to reveal the 
possible adverse selection and moral hazard problem to the reinsurer over time and generate 
separate testable predictions for empirical studies. This model allows us to distinguish adverse 
selection from moral hazard, if any, in the reinsurance market2. Furthermore, the model takes 
into consideration the coverage cap in the excess-of-loss reinsurance policy, a factor which 
Doherty and Smetters (2005) does not address. The coverage cap and retention level together set 
the actual reinsurance coverage purchased by the primary insurer. The model predictions and 
derived hypothesis are discussed as follows.  
3.3 Model Predictions  
Concurrent direct loss: With the increase of the concurrent loss, 
)(/)( 1111
' eLheLh decreases based on the model assumption. According to the utility function of 
the insurer in the first period, '
1
1 U
P
U −=∂
∂ , '
1
1 U
L
U −=∂
∂ so 0
1
'
1
'
>∂
∂
∂
∂
P
U
L
U . The model shows that 
the reinsurance premium is positively related to the concurrent direct loss.  
                                                 
2 The independence of signals of adverse selection and moral hazard is assumed, and the distinctive separation of 
two effects is obtained. However, they can be correlated which is discussed later. In this case, the two effects can 
still be distinguished, but with different impacts on the reinsurance demand.  
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Signal for adverse selection: The model shows that the reinsurance premium increases 
with the observation of signal s . Over time, signal s is expected to reveal the true type of the 
primary insurer, such as its operational quality, to the reinsurer, in order to mitigate a possible 
adverse selection problem.  
Signal for moral hazard: The model suggests that reinsurance premiums increase with the 
observation of signal m . Signal m is expected to detect the effort incentive driven by the primary 
insurer with the reinsurance coverage.  
With the predictions derived from the model, we are now able to do the empirical test. 
 
4. The Empirical Analysis 
This section presents an empirical analysis based on the theoretical model above, along 
with the corresponding results. First, the empirical hypotheses are derived from the theoretical 
model and the estimated equations are constructed. Secondly, the data set used for the empirical 
analysis and the construction of testable variables are introduced. After considering the related 
econometric issues, the test results for affiliated, non-affiliated property and liability insurers and 
insurers are discussed and compared.  
4.1 Hypotheses 
From the theoretical model in section three, we derived the empirical hypothesis 
regarding reinsurance purchase and the signals of adverse selection and moral hazard. 
The variable corresponding to adverse selection is expected to reveal the true risk type of 
the primary insurer in terms of its overall operation quality and financial strength. A.M. Best 
ratings on primary insurers, are widely used to rank and compare levels of financial strength 
among insurance companies. These rankings appear as letter ratings A++, A+, A-, B+, etc., and 
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the company with A++ has highest level of financial strength. Because A.M. Best considers the 
financial capability, loss experience, operational and managerial risks into rating insurance 
companies, the financial rating can be a good indicator of the true risk type of the companies. 
The logic follows that higher rating of the insurer associates with lower risk. In the context of 
adverse selection in reinsurance market, an insurer with lower ratings is predicted to demand 
more reinsurance because of their insufficient financial capability or poor loss experience. 
Therefore, the hypothesis with respect to the adverse selection in the asymmetric information 
problem is stated as follows.  
• Hypothesis 1: Other things being equal, a lower A.M. Best financial rating on primary 
insurers is associated with higher reinsurance purchase. 
The signal of moral hazard is defined as the percentage of recovered losses in the last 
period. The logic behind this definition follows that the recovered losses from the reinsurer in the 
last period has an impact on the insurer’s incentive to purchase reinsurance next period. The 
more the insurer recovers form the reinsurance company, the higher incentive to purchase 
reinsurance. Meanwhile, the insurer may not exert more effort to control its risk than it would 
have otherwise. The hypothesis with respect to moral hazard is stated as follows: 
• Hypothesis 2: Other things being equal, a higher percentage of recovered losses in the 
previous period will be associated with higher reinsurance purchase.  
To simplify calculation, we assume that adverse selection and moral hazard exist 
independent of each other. However, we have also found that in most cases they can be 
correlated. It is reasonable to expect that a primary insurer, who conceals unfavorable risk 
information and buys reinsurance under these false pretenses, may pose serious moral hazard to 
the reinsurer. In cases where these two factors do correlate, any estimates made under the 
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assumption of independence will be biased. In case of a positive correlation, the estimates for the 
effects of adverse selection and moral hazard would be higher than they should have been 
otherwise, while the estimates would be lower than they should have been otherwise in the case 
of negative correlation.  
4.2 Estimated Equations 
Following the hypothesis above, the estimated equation is stated as:  
ti
K
j
tjij
D
tiR
ti
R
ti
D
ti
R
ti
tititi uXLRL
P
L
L
LVRATREINS ,
1
,,,15
1,
1,
14
1,
1,
13,12,1101,
1 +++++++= ∑
=−
−
−
− γβββββα    (12)                               
Where  
tiREINS , = Reinsurance purchase for the primary insurer i in year t ;  
tiRAT , = A. M. Best’s rating for the primary insurer i in year t ; 
tiLV , = Loss volatility of the primary insurer i in year t ; 
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− =Proxy for the reinsurance price in which RtiP 1, − is the ceded reinsurance premium and 
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tiL 1, − is the recovered loss for the primary insurer i in year 1−t ; 
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tiLR , =Loss ratio defined as D
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,
,  in which DtiL , is the direct loss and 
D
tiDPW , is direct written 
premium for the primary insurer i in year t ; 
tjiX ,, = The jth control variable for the primary insurer i in year t . A set of control variables 
include log of total assets, liquidity, leverage, return on equity, dummy variable for a 
stock company, product Herfindahl index, geographic Herfindahl index, percent of 
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business lines with long tail liabilities3, reinsurance sustainability index, effective tax rate, 
percentage of homeowner written premium in coastal states4, and measure of internal 
reinsurance; 
tiu ,  = error term in equation (12) for the primary insurer i in year t . 
Equation (12) is the estimation of adverse selection with the incorporation of the effect of 
moral hazard. The independent variable tiRAT ,  represents the financial strength of the primary 
insurer, whereby the higher rating indicates stronger financial ability5. Intuitively, the more 
vulnerable primary insurer with lower A.M. Best rating is more likely to purchase reinsurance to 
protect against future possible adverse events. As a result, the estimated coefficient sign of 
tiRAT , is expected to be negative with the presence of adverse selection after controlling for 
additional moral hazard. Another variable for controlling adverse selection is tiLV , which 
captures the loss volatility of the primary insurer. It is calculated as the difference of the losses 
incurred over the two years divided by the direct premiums written. Compared to A. M. Best 
ratings, this variable mainly reveals the loss experience of the company and its risk type in 
insurance operation. Higher loss volatility means this company is more risky compared to the 
overall property and liability market. Therefore, the estimated coefficient of tiLV , is expected to 
be positive in the presence of adverse selection. 
                                                 
3 We follow the definition of long tail lines by Phillips, Cummins and Allen (1998) and Garven and Grace (2007) 
and adopt the same definition as well. Long tail lines include Farmowners Multiple Peril, Homeowners Multiple 
Peril, Commercial Multiple Peril, Ocean Marine, Medical Malpractice, International, Reinsurance, Workers’ 
Compensation, Other Liability, Products Liability, Aircraft, Boiler and Machinery and Automobile Liability. 
4 The inclusion of percentage of written premiums in the coastal areas reflects the significant impact of hurricane 
risks on the homeowner insurance market. Further, reinsurance plays an indispensable role in the property insurance 
market in the coastal states.  
5 The construction of variable tiRAT , is explained in detail later in this section.  
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The percentage of recovered losses from the last period reflects the impact of moral 
hazard on the reinsurance demand. The estimated coefficient of D
ti
R
ti
L
L
1,
1,
−
− is expected to be positive 
with the presence of moral hazard.  
4.3 Econometric Issues 
Fixed Effect versus Random Effect: The individual effect can be controlled using fixed 
effect or random effect approaches. A fixed effect model assumes that the individual effect is 
correlated with the independent variables in the model, while a random effect model assumes 
that there is no correlation between the individual effect and the independent variables. Hausman 
(1978) proposes a test to check a more efficient model against a less efficient, but consistent, 
model. Under the null hypothesis, both fixed effect and random effect estimates are consistent, 
but a random effect estimate is more efficient; whereas, under the alternative hypothesis, the 
fixed effect estimate is consistent, but the random effect estimate is not consistent. In this paper 
the Hausman test shows that fixed effect model is appropriate for affiliated, non-affiliated and all 
companies together. 
Endogenous Variable: With the presence of moral hazard, the reinsurance coverage may 
make insurer take less precaution controlling risks, which leads to higher incurred losses. Hence 
the right-hand side explanatory variable of tiLR , is endogenous. It is correlated with the error 
term of the equation (12). To correct the endogeneity, the first stage estimation equation (13) is 
used:  
titi
D
tititi
D
ti DPWLRREINSREINSLR ,,241,232,221,2120, )ln( εββββα +++++= −−−      (13)                                  
           1, −tiREINS =One lag of reinsurance purchase for the primary insurer i in year 1−t ;  
ti,ε  =error term in equation (13) for the primary insurer i in year t . 
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From Wooldridge (2002), the OLS estimators will be biased if the endogenous variables 
are included in the estimated model. To conduct an endogeneity test, a set of suitable instrument 
variables (IV hereafter) is needed for this potential endogenous variable. The regression-based 
approach introduced by Wooldridge (2002) is applied. An appropriate IV needs to be correlated 
to the endogenous variable and uncorrelated with the error term in the model. Intuitively, the 
direct loss is positively related to the direct written premium by the primary insurers, and the 
direct written premium can serve as an IV per se. Therefore, log of direct written premium is 
used as one IV for loss incurred. In addition, one and two lags of reinsurance purchase are 
included in the model as one instrumental variable. This inclusion can be used to test its effect on 
the concurrent losses incurred which may arise due to moral hazard with the reinsurance 
coverage.  
The reduced form of direct incurred loss is estimated by using all the independent 
variables in the estimation (12) and four IVs as the independent variables. After the residual of 
this estimate is obtained, the dependent variable, the reinsurance purchase in the equation (12), is 
regressed on all the independent variables and the obtained residual, as well. The insignificant 
robust t-statistic of estimated coefficient for the error term indicates that the direct incurred loss 
is not an endogenous variable in the estimation and the corresponding results are unbiased. The 
corresponding p-value is 0.00 which implies that the variable of concurrent loss incurred is 
endogenous in the estimation equations, and the OLS estimators are biased. We need to apply 
IVs to fix the endogeneity issue.   
In addition, equation (13) partly reflects the potential of moral hazard on the part of the 
primary insurer. With the presence of moral hazard, the higher level of reinsurance purchase in 
the previous period will be associated with the higher level of concurrent direct loss for a 
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primary insurer if other firm characteristics are controlled. Hence, the estimated coefficient of 
lag of reinsurance purchase is expected to be positive if moral hazard does exist in the 
reinsurance market. 
Heteroskedasticity: If the error terms do not have constant variance with each observation, 
the heteroskedasticity problem arises. In this case, the OLS estimators are unbiased and 
consistent but inefficient because the assumption of the constant variance for error terms is 
violated. In the presence of hetoroskedasticity, the variance of the coefficients obtained from 
OLS tends to be underestimated, so the OLS standard error is not valid for constructing 
confidence intervals and t  statistics. To solve this problem, Weighted Least Square (WLS) 
estimators or robust standard errors are usually adopted to improve efficiency.  
In the estimation, the White test is employed to detect the possible heteroskedasticity 
problem. The White test statistics is 2261.24 and corresponding p-value is 0.00. This result 
rejects the null hypothesis that the residuals in the model are homoskedasticity. Therefore, the 
heteroskedasticity issue occurs when estimating the model, and the estimators are unbiased and 
consistent but inefficient. In addition, the normal standard errors are invalid to construct the 
confidence intervals and the t -statistics. Therefore, the robust standard errors are used instead to 
improve the estimator efficiency in the presence of heteroskedasticity. 
Individual Effect versus Pooled OLS: The error term tiu , in equation (12) can be 
decomposed as tiiti au ,, ν+= , where ia is called individual effect, ti ,ν is idiosyncratic error and 
tiu , is composite error. The individual effect is usually unobservable. If the unobserved individual 
effect is correlated with other independent variables in the model, the pooled OLS estimators are 
biased and inconsistent. If the individual effect is a random variable and is uncorrelated with 
other independent variables, the pooled OLS estimator is unbiased and consistent but inefficient. 
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As a result, the presence of the individual effect to choose the appropriate estimation method 
needs to be tested. Breusch and Pagan (1979) derive the Lagrange Multiplier (LM) test to detect 
the presence of individual effect. Based on the residuals from the equation (12), the LM test 
statistics is 5217.6, which reject the null hypothesis of the absence of individual effect. In the 
presence of individual effect, the pooled OLS estimation is not appropriate for our model.  
Overidentifying Test: To test the model identification, Anderson Canon and Cragg-
Donald tests are undertaken by using STATA code of “xtivreg2”. The small p-value of these 
tests shows the model proposed is identified.  
4.4 Data Description and Variables Construction 
A panel data set representing the property and liability reinsurance market in the United 
States from 1992 to 2006 is constructed to test the hypotheses. The data includes the reinsurance 
premium, direct loss, financial strength ratings and other firm characteristics of the primary 
insurers. The data are collected from NAIC annual statements and A.M. Best Company for the 
corresponding years. Each insurance company is required to report its underwriting business, 
claims, profitability, reserves and other required operational and financial information to the state 
commissioner every year, so the NAIC annual statements comprise an extensive and reliable 
resource for the study of the insurance and reinsurance market in the United States. A.M. Best 
Company is a private rating agency and, accordingly, the A.M. Best rating is an independent 
opinion on the company’s overall financial strength. The ratings are evaluated quantitatively and 
qualitatively based on the company’s balance sheet, operating performance and other business 
information. In the context of insurance industry, a company which is assigned a higher rating is 
believed by investors to have enough financial resources and expertise to deal with the risks it is 
facing, including underwriting risk, operational risk and default risk. Therefore, the ratings can 
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be indicators of risk status of primary insurers.  A.M. Best ratings are an indicator of financial 
strength of companies, and the higher the rating, the stronger financial ability of the company6. 
Insurance companies can be categorized as affiliated and non-affiliated, which apply 
quite different risk management strategies due to their financial structures. For example, 
affiliated insurers can diversify their risks through the use of both external and internal 
reinsurance within the group. Non-affiliated insurers only buy reinsurance from other outside 
reinsurers.  
The data on affiliated, non-affiliated insurers are collected separately. Table 3 and Table 
5 list the descriptive statistics for the affiliated, non-affiliated and all property and liability 
insurers from 1990 to 2006, respectively.  
Construction of Dependent Variable  
Previous studies apply different definitions for the reinsurance variable. For example, 
Mayers and Smith (1990), Garven and Lanmm-Tenant (2003) and Cole and McCullough (2006) 
use the following construction to measure the reinsurance purchase:  
)(int
&Re
ereinsurancassumedexternalernalwrittenpremiumDirect
ereinsuranccededExternalInternalinsurance ++=  
where “internal ceded reinsurance” refers to the intercompany pooling or non-pool reinsurance 
within affiliations. Garven and Grace (2007) use another ratio to define the reinsurance purchase:  
)(int
Re
ereinsurancassumedexternalernalwrittenpremiumDirect
ereinsurancassumedexternalereinsuranccededExternalinsurance ++
−=  
They tested adverse selection in the reinsurance market with the emphasis on unaffiliated 
insurance companies. The numerator of the ratio is the net ceded reinsurance by the primary 
                                                 
6 For more details on A.M. Best rating, see http://www.ambest.com/ratings/guide.asp 
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insurer. Therefore, this creates a continuous variable ranging from -1 to +1. A negative 
reinsurance purchase means that this primary insurer actually acts as a “reinsurer” in the market.  
Even though Garven and Grace (2007) specifically tested adverse selection for the non-
affiliates in the reinsurance market and obtained supporting evidence in line with the theoretical 
predictions, we are still interested in how the results will change if we consider the affiliation 
issue. To test the simultaneous effects of adverse selection and moral hazard in the reinsurance 
market, empirical studies for affiliation and non-affiliates are performed, respectively.  
For affiliates, the reinsurance purchase is defined as:  
ereinsurancassumedtotalwrittenpremiumDirect
emiumereinsuranccededInternalREINS +=
Pr  
For non-affiliates, the reinsurance purchase is defined as:  
ereinsurancassumedtotalwrittenpremiumDirect
emiumereinsuranccededExternalREINS +=
Pr  
Construction of Independent Variables and Control Variables 
A.M. Best Rating: The variable of jiRAT ,  is constructed from the A.M. Best financial 
strength ratings as discussed before. Table 1 lists A.M. Best rating scales and associated 
descriptions. Mayer and Smith (1990) transfer the letter scales to numerical scales from 0 to 6, 
while Doherty and Phillips (2002) convert the various A.M. Best financial strength ratings to 
numerical scores ranging from 0 to 4. If the firm is rated A++ or A+, it is assigned a score of 4, 3 
if the firm is rated A, 2 if it is rated A-, 1 if it is rated B++ or B+, and 0 if it is rated B and lower.  
Because this essay attempts to examine the effect of adverse selection on the reinsurance 
purchase by different primary insurers with different risk levels, it is more appropriate to break 
these ratings into detailed subgroups to describe the risk type of primary insurers. Consequently 
the same approach by Mayer and Smith (1990) is adopted in this essay. Accordingly, seven sub-
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groups are created from the letter scales. If the firm is rated A++ or A+, it is assigned 6; 5 if the 
firm is rated A or A-; 4 if it is rated B++ or B+; 3 if it is rated B or B-; 2 if it is rated C++ or C+; 
1 if it is rated C or C-, and 0 if it is rated D and lower. Table 2 tabulates the transformed 
numerical scales and the associated letter scales.   
Loss Volatility: Two measures of loss volatility are applied: 1) Loss volatility can be 
defined as the difference between the current losses incurred and the previous year’s losses 
incurred, divided by the current written premiums, an approach proposed by Lei and Schmit 
(2008); 2) To allow for volatility over a long time period, the second measure of loss volatility is 
calculated as the difference between concurrent losses incurred and the average losses incurred 
over the last three years, divided by the current direct written premiums. The effects of both loss 
volatility measures on the demand for reinsurance are tested and compared. The higher loss 
volatility indicates a more risky operation of the insurance company. Together with the A.M. 
Best financial ratings, loss volatility is used to reveal the insurer’s true risk type, further 
confirming the presence of adverse selection.  
Percentage of Recovered Losses in the Prior Period: As the signal of moral hazard, this 
variable is constructed as the percentage of recovered loss from the reinsurance out of the total 
losses incurred from the last year.  
Loss Ratio: The variable is calculated as 



D
ti
D
ti
DPW
L
,
, . The reinsurance purchase is related 
to the direct gross loss, DtiL ,  by the primary insurer. The sign of the coefficient of loss ratio is 
expected to be positive, which means that a greater direct gross loss will induce increased 
reinsurance purchase.  
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Reinsurance Price in Prior Period: This variable is computed as reinsurance premium 
divided by the recovered loss. The higher the reinsurance premium, the lower the amount of 
reinsurance demanded.  
Reinsurance Purchase in the Prior Period: This variable is represented as 1, −tiREINS  . In 
practice, the reinsurance usually involves a long-term contract to allow for the collection of new 
information over time to monitor the primary insurance companies. In the presence of moral 
hazard, the increased purchase of reinsurance in the previous period may reduce the managerial 
incentives of the primary insurance company to control risks, and increase the direct incurred 
loss in the next year.  
Size: The Log of the firm’s total assets is included to control the size factor of a company. 
Firms with big size are assumed to be more financially capable and expected to demand less 
external reinsurance accordingly.  
Organization Type: To control for the effect of the organization type on the demand for 
reinsurance, a dummy variable for a stock company is included. If the insurer is a stock company, 
the dummy is equal to 1; otherwise it is equal to 0. Different organization types affect the risk 
diversification of the companies. For example, a public traded firm is able to spread its operating 
risks across its numerous stockholders, while a mutual company has only limited resources to 
deal with its risks. It follows that reinsurance is in higher demand for mutual companies than for 
stock companies when diversifying risks efficiently.  
Liquidity: Liquidity of a primary insurance company measures its capacity to settle 
claims in a timely manner. Lower liquidity implies more demand for reinsurance is needed to 
relieve tight financial constraints.  
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Leverage: Leverage describes how much debt is included in the total assets. A higher 
leverage ratio means a higher dependence on the debt out of the total assets. A firm with higher 
leverage is expected to demand more reinsurance since it need the external resources to boost its 
underwriting capabilities.  
Return on Equity: The return on the equity measures how much return a primary 
insurance company earns on its equity. A negative relation between the return on equity and 
reinsurance demand is expected because a profitable firm is able to handle their risks more easily 
without much reinsurance coverage.  
Product Herfindahl index: This variable is used to capture the product diversity of an 
insurance company. Product Herfindahl index is defined as∑
=
n
l
l
TDPW
DPW
1
2)( , where lDPW denotes 
the direct premiums written from business line l and TDPW is the total direct premiums written 
for an insurance company. The smaller the index, the more diversified the business lines of the 
company. An index of 1 means this company has no diversification in its products, with all its 
business in one line.  
Geographic Herfindahl index: This variable captures the geographic diversification of an 
insurance company’s operations. The Geographic Herfindahl index is defined as∑
=
50
1
2)(
s
s
TDPW
DPW , 
where sDPW  is the direct premiums written in state s and TDPW is the total direct premiums 
written for an insurance company. The smaller the index, the more geographically diversified the 
company. An index of 1 means this company has no diversification in its business locations, 
concentrating all its business on one state.  
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Percentage of long tail business lines: From the previous literature (for example, Garven 
& Grace, 2007), we learn that the existence of long tail business lines increases a primary 
insurer’s demand for reinisurance. In this essay, this variable is included as one of the control 
variables used to predict the reinsurance demand. 
Percentage of direct written premiums in coastal areas: The catastrophic risk exposures 
and insurance coverage in the coastal areas pose severe challenges to the operation of insurers.  
Reinsurance is highly demanded for the insurers who underwrite such hurricane risks in the 
coastal states to combat the tremendous losses. Therefore the percentages of direct written 
premiums in coastal states, such as Florida, Texas, Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Mississippi, are included to be explanatory variables in the model.  
Measure of Internal Reinsurance: The variable of “Internal” is defined as 
ereinsurancassumedexternalereinsuranccededexternal
ereinsurancassumedernalereinsuranccededernalInternal −
−= intint as in Garven and Grace 
(2007). This ratio is the percentage of the net internal ceded reinsurance out of the net external 
ceded reinsurance. It is expected that the higher the ratio, the less the demand for external 
reinsurance. Internal reinsurance is not available to non-affiliated insurers, as discussed earlier.  
Contract Sustainability: The contract sustainability, which depicts how frequently 
insurers change reinsurers, reflects an important feature of a long-term reinsurance contract. 
Garven and Grace (2007) showed that this variable is positively associated with the external 
reinsurance purchase. The variable is defined as the percentage of premiums ceded over a three-
year period to external reinsurers which are present in all three years. In the analysis, fifteen 
three-year windows are considered: 1990-1992, 1991-1993, 1992-1994, etc. Hence value of 
sustainability of 1992 is based on 1990-1992 windows.  
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Effective Tax Rate: To control the effect of tax on the reinsurance demand, the variable of 
effective tax rate is constructed as
ti
ti
BTNI
NI
,
,1− , where NI is after-tax net income and BTNI is 
before-tax net income.  
4.5 Estimation Results  
Primary insurers in the reinsurance market are categorized into affiliated and non-
affiliated companies. Because of their different managerial structures, affiliated and non-
affiliated insurers tend to use reinsurance as a risk management tool at different ways. For 
affiliated insurers, in addition to any reinsurance they may purchase from other non-affiliated 
insurers, they can cede part of their risk to the other companies in the group with which they are 
affiliated. In this scenario, reinsurers from the same group possess or have access to more 
information about the ceding companies, and thus have more control over the risk management 
process. Consequently, we would expect the nature of the information problem between 
affiliated insurers and reinsurers to be different from that between non-affiliated insurers and 
reinsurers.  
Empirical analysis is undertaken at two levels. First, the demands for total reinsurance for 
affiliated and non-affiliated insurers are tested respectively, in which two measures of loss 
volatility are used alternatively to test the robustness of the model. Second, the reinsurance 
purchases for affiliates are analyzed individually to see if there is any different information 
problem. Further, depending on how much reinsurance is bought from affiliated reinsurers, the 
data are divided into three subgroups and reinsurance demand of affiliated insurers is examined 
in detail.  
4.5.1 Empirical Results for Affiliated Property and Liability Insurers 
Adverse Selection 
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First, the total reinsurance demand for affiliated insurers is analyzed. Hypothesis 1 
suggests a negative relationship between A.M. Best ratings and the external reinsurance purchase. 
The regression results with two definitions of loss volatility are summarized in Table 6 and Table 
7, respectively. The fixed effect model results show that the A.M. Best ratings have a significant 
and negative effect on the purchase of external reinsurance at 1% significance level as reported 
in Table 6A and 7A. This negative association with the reinsurance purchase is robust to the 
different loss volatility measures. In this case, the A.M. Best rating serves as an ordinal index. 
The magnitude of this coefficient is -0.013, which only implies the higher the rating, the lower 
the external reinsurance purchase all else being equal, since A. M. Best rating is an ordinal index. 
The results show that neither of the coefficients of loss volatility measures is statistically 
significant. The negative coefficient of the A.M. Best rating supports Hypothesis 1 which states 
that there is adverse selection in the reinsurance transaction. The coefficients for the loss ratio in 
two cases are significantly positive, implying that the insurers with higher loss ratio purchase 
more total reinsurance. However, the findings suggest that adverse selection exists in reinsurance 
transactions initiated by affiliated insurers, which runs counter to the common expectation or 
speculation. Affiliated insurers are expected to suffer fewer information problems because they 
have the opportunity to buy reinsurance within the same group. The reasoning would be that, 
with more information available, adverse selection could disappear between the affiliated 
insurers and reinsurers. So, to understand this more accurately, I decompose the total reinsurance 
purchases into purchases from affiliated reinsurers and purchases from non-affiliated reinsurers, 
and then performed a detailed analysis.  
Table 8 lists the regression results of reinsurance demand of the affiliated insurers from 
affiliated, non-affiliated and all reinsurers. The column under the title of “affiliated reinsurers” 
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includes the effects of all the independent variables on the reinsurance purchased from affiliated 
reinsurers. The column in the middle shows the effects on reinsurance purchases from outside 
non-affiliated reinsurers and the effects on the total reinsurance demand are listed in the last 
column. The loss volatility definition two is used in this scenario. The results show that A.M 
Best ratings are not statistically significant in explaining reinsurance purchases between the 
affiliated insurers and reinsurers. On the contrary, for non-affiliated insurers and reinsurers, A.M. 
Best ratings are shown to be significantly and negatively related to the reinsurance demand of -
0.034. The findings suggest that the insurers with lower A.M. Best ratings would like to seek 
more reinsurance from the reinsurers outside of their group. Loss volatility, another indicator for 
adverse selection, presents opposite effects for affiliated and non-affiliated reinsurers. When the 
insurers and reinsurers are affiliated in one group, the estimated coefficient of the loss volatility 
is -0.038, implying that 1 percent increase of loss volatility is associated with 3.8 percent 
decrease of reinsurance demand from its own financial group. When considering reinsurance 
from outside of the group, the coefficient of loss volatility is estimated to be 0.031, which 
suggests that 1 percent increase of loss volatility is associated with 3.1 percent increase of 
reinsurance demand from the affiliated reinsurers. Therefore, the evidences above suggest that 
adverse selection problem exists between affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers as 
expected, and is not found between affiliated insurers and reinsurers within a financial group. 
Some affiliated insurers choose to transfer most of their risks to their affiliated companies 
within their group, but other affiliated insurers may cede most premiums to non-affiliated 
reinsurers. Consequently, an information problem may be present in different ways for those 
affiliated insurers. According to the percentage of ceded premiums paid to affiliated reinsurers, 
three subgroups are created. Table 9A summaries the regression results for affiliated insurers 
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with more than 75 percent ceded premiums paid to affiliated reinsures; Table 9B lists the results 
with more than 50 percent ceded premiums paid to affiliated reinsurers; Table 9C summarizes 
the results with less than 20 percent ceded premiums paid to affiliated reinsurers. For the 
affiliated insurers which transfer most of their risks to their affiliated members, an adverse 
selection problem is presented with the significantly negative coefficient of A.M. Best ratings 
and the positive coefficient of loss volatility (see Table 9A). For the affiliated insurers which 
mostly buy reinsurance from non-affiliated companies, there is no evidence showing the 
existence of adverse selection (see Table 9C). This comparison indicates that information 
asymmetry is still a problem even within a single group, especially when affiliated insurers cede 
most of their premiums to their affiliated reinsurers.  
In summary, there is supporting evidence of the presence of adverse selection between 
affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers. Nevertheless, when affiliated insurers purchase 
most of their reinsurance from their affiliated reinsurers, there is still an adverse selection 
problem.  
Moral Hazard 
Recall Hypothesis 2 states that the percent of recovered losses in the previous year is 
positively associated with the reinsurance purchase with the presence of moral hazard. From 
Table 6A we can see that the estimated coefficient of the percent of recovered losses in the 
previous period is significantly positive. The coefficient of 0.091 implies that 1 percent increase 
of percent of recovered losses from the last period is associated with around 0.1 percent increase 
in reinsurance demand. With the changed measure of loss volatility, the percentage of recovered 
losses in the prior period is no longer statistically significant as shown in Table 7A. In the first 
stage estimation, the estimated coefficient for the one and two lag of reinsurance purchase are 
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significantly positive to the loss ratio, which means the higher the reinsurance purchase of 
previous years the higher the loss ratio in the current period. When affiliated insurers cede 
premiums to non-affiliated reinsurers, the estimated coefficients of the percent of recovered loss 
in the last year is 0.414, which is statistically significant at 1 percent level, as shown in Table 8. 
Overall, it is not clear if there is a moral hazard problem for affiliated insurers based on these 
mixed results. Table 9A, 9B, and 9C list regression results for affiliated insurers in three 
subgroups. The estimated coefficients of lag of recovered losses are not significantly positive in 
these cases, which does not support the hypothesis of the existence of moral hazard for affiliated 
insurers.  
In summary, there is no consistent supporting evidence of the existence of moral hazard 
for affiliated insurers. One possible explanation could be that affiliated insurers still manage their 
risks effectively and diligently even after transferring part of their risks to affiliated reinsurers, 
because they have consistent interest within a financial group. 
Estimation of Other Control Variables 
Reinsurance-specific factors, sustainability index, the reinsurance price in the last period 
and internal reinsurance percentage, have different effects on the demand for reinsurance. As 
predicted, the percentage of internal reinsurance is negatively and significantly correlated to the 
demand for external reinsurance. Affiliated insurers will demand less external reinsurance once 
they take part in an internal insurance risk management pool or other similar arrangements. 
Surprisingly, the estimated coefficient for reinsurance price is significantly positive. One 
possible explanation could be that the affiliated insurer retains the “good” risks for its own group, 
and purposely cedes the “bad” risks to external reinsurers with less consideration of price. 
However, the reinsurance sustainability index has no significant effect on the demand for 
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reinsurance, which also can be attributed to the dependence on the internal reinsurance 
arrangements among the group.  
Other firm-specific factors also have effects on the demand for the affiliated insurers. The 
estimated coefficients of loss ratio and leverage are significantly positive as expected. Higher 
loss and higher leverage encourage the insurer to buy more reinsurance to diversify risks and 
stabilize business performance. As expected, log of total assets and the geographic Herfindahl 
index are negatively related to the demand for reinsurance. Stronger financial capability and 
geographical diversification increase the insurers’ own ability to control risks, reducing the 
demand for external reinsurance coverage. Interestingly, the estimated coefficients of the 
percentage of homeowner written premiums in Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Mississippi are significantly negative, while the estimated coefficients for states of 
Florida and Texas are insignificant.    
4.5.2 Empirical Results for Non-Affiliated Property and Liability Insurers 
The regression results for non-affiliated insurers are presented in the middle column in 
Table 6A and 7A. Recall that Hypothesis 1 states that the lower A.M. Best ratings are associated 
with higher reinsurance demand with the presence of adverse selection. The loss volatility is 
expected to be positively related to the reinsurance purchase to diversify insurers’ risks. From 
Table 6A, we can see that the estimated coefficient for the A.M. Best rating is significantly 
positive, which implies that the insurers with higher ratings purchase more reinsurance. The 
estimated coefficient of loss volatility is significantly negative. This evidence shows that more 
stable non-affiliated insurers with better ratings are associated with the higher demand for 
reinsurance, which rejects the null hypothesis of existence of adverse selection for non-affiliated 
insurers.  
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In terms of moral hazard, the mixed results are presented in Table 6A and 7A when two 
loss volatility measures are used alternatively. The estimated coefficient of the percentage of the 
recovered losses out of the total losses incurred is not statistically significant in Table 6A, while 
it is significantly positive of 0.003 when second loss volatility definition is applied in Table 7A. 
Taking the relation of loss ratio and the reinsurance purchase in the last period in the first stage 
examination, the relationship is not significantly positive. Overall, no consistent supporting 
evidence is found on the existence of adverse selection or moral hazard for the non-affiliated 
insurers in the property and liability reinsurance market.  
The regression results also show that reinsurance sustainability index, loss ratio, leverage, 
liquidity and percentage of homeowner-written premiums in Florida are positively related to the 
purchase of reinsurance. As tested in Garven and Grace (2007), the long-term reinsurance 
relationship is related to the higher purchase of reinsurance, and the positive coefficient 
estimation of sustainability index is consistent with their findings. As expected, the non-affiliated 
insurer with higher leverage purchases more reinsurance. Besides, the product Herfindahl index 
and geographic Herfindahl index are negatively related to the reinsurance demand, which is 
consistent with the results by Garven and Grace (2007). Once insurers have diversified their risks 
in product lines and geographic distributions, the need for reinsurance is decreased. Since 
homeowner insurance in the Florida market faces huge catastrophic hurricane risks, insurers in 
this market demand more reinsurance. The estimated coefficient of the percentage of 
homeowner-written premiums in Florida in the regression equation is significantly positive, 
which indicates that the underwriting of homeowner insurance in Florida increases the demand 
for reinsurance for the non-affiliated insurers.  This result is opposite to the findings for the 
affiliated insurers in the coastal states, which indicates the business line of homeowner insurance 
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is insignificant or is significantly negative to the reinsurance purchase. From this comparison we 
could infer that affiliated and non-affiliated insurers apply reinsurance in different ways to 
diversify catastrophic hurricane risks. The non-affiliated insurers present a strong demand for 
external reinsurance for their homeowner insurance business in the high risk areas, while the 
affiliated insurers may rely on other financial capabilities within a group rather than the external 
reinsurance in this case.   
 4.5.3 Regression Results for All Property and Liability Insurers 
To test the asymmetric information for the whole reinsurance market, the regression is 
run on the panel data including all the affiliated and non-affiliated property and liability insurers 
from 1992 to 2006. There is no supporting evidence on the presence of adverse selection or 
moral hazard problem in the reinsurance market.  
From Table 6A we can see that the estimated coefficient of A.M. Best rating is not 
statistically significant, while the loss volatility is shown to be statistically significant and 
negatively related to reinsurance purchase. With the second loss volatility measure, this variable 
presents a significantly positive relationship to the external reinsurance demand which is shown 
in Table 7A. These mixed findings fail to support the null hypothesis 1 of the existence of 
adverse selection in the reinsurance market.  
In terms of moral hazard, the estimated coefficients for the lag of recovered losses ratio is 
not statistically significant in Table 6A and 7A. In the first stage regression, the estimated 
coefficients of reinsurance purchases in the last period are 0.095 in Table 6A, which is 
statistically significant and positive. This may suggest moral hazard problem arises because the 
purchase of reinsurance in the last period looses the primary insurers’ incentives to control risks, 
leading to a higher loss ratio in the current period.  However, this finding is not robust to the 
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changes of loss volatility measure, and this estimated coefficient turns out to be insignificant in 
Table 7A. From these mixed evidence we may infer that the moral hazard problem does not 
prevail in the reinsurance market.  
Among the control variables included, loss ratio and leverage are positively related to the 
demand for the reinsurance as expected. Product Herfindahl index, geographic Herfindahl index 
and percentage of homeowner written premium in Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, South 
Carolina and Mississippi are negatively related to reinsurance demand, if all insurers are 
considered. The regression results for all the insurers in the reinsurance market are more similar 
to the results for the affiliated insurers, where the affiliated insurers account for 40 percent of all 
insurers.  
 
5. Conclusion 
As an effective risk management tool, reinsurance meets the corporate demand for 
insurance by diversifying risks, obtaining expertise from the reinsurer, increasing capacity and 
lowering taxes. Thus the reinsurance market is an important and supplementary part of the 
primary insurance market. However, the asymmetric information problem may exist between the 
reinsurer and the primary insurer, and such a problem may damage the insurance market.  
Based on an extended theoretical model, this paper empirically tests the asymmetric 
information problem in the property and liability insurance market by separating adverse 
selection from moral hazard.  Using the panel data from NAIC and A.M. Best Company, adverse 
selection is shown to exist between affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers. When 
affiliated insurers mostly use reinsurance within their groups, adverse selection problems arise 
among those group members. For non-affiliated insurers, there is no supporting evidence found 
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on the existence of asymmetric information including adverse selection or moral hazard. Overall, 
the results provide supporting evidence of the presence of adverse selection and mixed evidence 
of moral hazard in the reinsurance market. While the findings are consistent with the results of 
Garven and Grace (2007), a detailed investigation is needed. It is interesting that the adverse 
selection does exist between affiliated insurers and non-affiliated reinsurers, even in an affiliated 
financial group which is contrary to the initial expectations. However, there is no adverse 
selection issue among non-affiliated insurers and reinsurers. These phenomena may be explained 
by the long-term reinsurance contracts between the non-affiliated insurers and outsider reinsures 
which reveal the risk type of insurers over time. For affiliated insurers and reinsurers within a 
financial group, the lack of such risk detection for ceding companies nevertheless lead to this 
asymmetric information problem. On the other side, moral hazard problem is not found in the 
reinsurance market no matter in the affiliated or non-affiliated insurers, which may suggest that 
reinsurers control the moral hazard problem by monitoring or loss-sensitive premiums. The 
results imply that more attention should be paid to the asymmetric information between affiliated 
insurers and reinsurers within a financial group.  
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Table 1 
A. M. Best Financial Strength Rating Categories 
 
Category
A++, A+ (Superior); A, A- (Excellent); 
B++, B+ (Good)
B, B- (Fair); 
C++, C+ (Marginal); C, C- (Weak), 
D (Poor); 
E (Under Regulatory Supervision);
F (In Liquidation); 
S (Rating Suspended)
Data sources: http://www.ambest.com/ratings/guide.asp
Secure
Vulnerable
Associated Description
 
 
Table 2 
Constructed Numerical Scales and Associated Letter Scales 
 
Letter Scale Numerical Scales
A++, A+ (Superior) 6
A, A- (Excellent) 5
B++, B+ (Good) 4
B, B- (Fair) 3
C++, C+ (Marginal) 2
C, C- (Weak) 1
D (Poor) 0
E (Under Regulatory Supervision) 0
F (In Liquidation) 0
S (Rating Suspended) 0
See Mayer and Smith (1990)  
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Table 3. Descriptive Statistics for the Affiliated Property and Liability Insurers
Variables
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Reinsurance Purchase 4,077               0.209 0.209 0.000 1.000
A.M.Best Ratings 4,077               5.027 1.238 0.000 6.000
Loss Volatility Definition One1 4,077                 -0.006 0.330 -1.998 0.997
Loss Volatility Definition Two2 2,535                 0.162 1.672 -69.360 3.145
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses 3,197               2.676 17.611 0.000 870.864
Reinsurance Sustainability Index 4,077               0.098 0.217 0.000 1.000
Loss Ratio 4,077               0.566 0.374 0.017 6.637
Lag of Reinsurance Price 3,197               0.798 1.381 0.002 26.585
Internal Reinsurance Percentage 4,077               2.248 11.347 -48.507 135.345
Log of Total Assets 4,077               18.179 4.186 6.666 24.930
Stock Indicator 4,077               0.893 0.310 0.000 1.000
Return on Equity 4,077               8.394 14.388 -49.500 98.800
Leverage 4,077               4.517 2.942 0.000 34.100
Liquidity 4,077               1.592 1.591 0.035 9.999
Effective Tax Rate 4,024               0.209 0.254 0.000 1.000
Product Herfindahl Index 3,306               0.405 0.252 0.082 1.000
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index 4,077               0.183 0.192 0.030 1.000
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Florida 4,077                 0.408 2.401 0.000 79.660
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Texas 4,077                 0.233 2.838 0.000 100.000
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in AL, LA, MC, NC and MS 4,077                 0.465 2.235 0.000 61.186
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines 4,077               0.603 0.352 0.000 1.000
1. Loss Volatility Definition One = (Lt
D- Lt-1
D)/(DPWt)
2. Loss Volatility Definition Two = (Lt
D- (Lt-1
D+Lt-2
D+Lt-3
D)/3)/(DPWt)
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics  for the Non-Affiliated Property and Liability Insurers
Variables
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Reinsurance Purchase 5,064               0.286 0.211 0.000 1.000
A.M.Best Ratings 5,064               3.752 1.803 0.000 6.000
Loss Volatility Definition One 5,064               0.023 0.215 -1.887 0.989
Loss Volatility Definition Two 2,971               0.032 0.295 -8.232 1.489
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses 4,009               1.755 12.110 0.001 550.955
Reinsurance Sustainability Index 5,064               0.103 0.200 0.000 0.999
Loss Ratio 5,064               0.493 0.276 0.015 7.518
Lag of Reinsurance Price 4,009               1.330 1.842 0.006 29.078
Internal Reinsurance Percentage N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Log of Total Assets 5,063               15.596 3.840 5.413 22.051
Stock Indicator 5,064               0.448 0.497 0.000 1.000
Return on Equity 5,064               6.494 13.822 -49.300 93.900
Leverage 5,064               4.015 3.013 0.000 49.500
Liquidity 5,064               1.812 1.351 0.000 9.999
Effective Tax Rate 4,912               0.164 0.229 0.000 1.000
Product Herfindahl Index 4,890               0.549 0.288 0.117 1.000
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index 5,064               0.713 0.342 0.035 1.000
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Florida 5,064                 0.039 0.694 0.000 28.772
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Texas 5,064                 0.027 0.464 0.000 11.431
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in AL, LA, MC, NC and MS 5,064                 0.044 0.593 0.000 11.006
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines 5,064               0.634 0.346 0.000 1.000
2. Loss Volatility Definition Two = (Lt
D- (Lt-1
D+Lt-2
D+Lt-3
D)/3)/(DPWt)
1. Loss Volatility Definition One = (Lt
D- Lt-1
D)/(DPWt)
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Table 5. Descriptive Statistics for the Property and Liability Insurers
Variables
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Reinsurance Purchase 9,141               0.252 0.213 0.000 1.000
A.M.Best Ratings 9,141               4.321 1.699 0.000 6.000
Loss Volatility Definition One 7,804               0.014 0.380 -24.957 3.202
Loss Volatility Definition Two 5,506               0.092 1.157 -69.360 3.145
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses 7,804               2.600 20.633 0.000 975.168
Reinsurance Sustainability Index 9,141               0.101 0.208 0.000 1.000
Loss Ratio 9,141               0.526 0.325 0.015 7.518
Lag of Reinsurance Price 7,804               1.116 1.764 0.002 29.078
Internal Reinsurance Percentage 9,141               1.076 7.761 -48.507 135.345
Log of Total Assets 9,140               16.748 4.199 5.413 24.930
Stock Indicator 9,141               0.646 0.478 0.000 1.000
Return on Equity 9,141               7.342 14.108 -49.500 98.800
Leverage 9,141               4.239 2.992 0.000 49.500
Liquidity 9,141               1.714 1.467 0.000 9.999
Effective Tax Rate 8,936               0.185 0.242 0.000 1.000
Product Herfindahl Index 8,196               0.491 0.283 0.082 1.000
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index 9,141               0.477 0.388 0.030 1.000
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Florida 9,141                 0.204 1.695 0.000 79.660
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in Texas 9,141                 0.119 1.929 0.000 100.000
Percentage of Homeowner Written 
Premium in AL, LA, MC, NC and MS 9,141                 0.232 1.570 0.000 61.186
Affiliation indicator 9,141               0.446 0.497 0.000 1.000
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines 9,141               0.620 0.349 0.000 1.000
1. Loss Volatility Definition One = (Lt
D- Lt-1
D)/(DPWt)
2. Loss Volatility Definition Two = (Lt
D- (Lt-1
D+Lt-2
D+Lt-3
D)/3)/(DPWt)
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Second Stage Regression 
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.013            
(0.005)***
0.009              
(0.003)***
0.004              
(0.003)
Loss Volatility Definition One -0.013             
(0.014)
-0.045           
(0.016)***
-0.031           
(0.009)***
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses 0.091               
(0.016)***
0.0009            
(0.0005)
0.0001           
(0.002)
Reinsurance Sustainability Index -0.014             
(0.011)
0.016              
(0.010)*
0.003             
(0.007)
Loss Ratio 0.091               
(0.016)***
0.173              
(0.030)***
0.151             
(0.016)***
Lag of Reinsurance Price 0.013               
(0.003)***
0.001              
(0.001)
0.004              
(0.001)***
Internal Reinsurance Percentage -0.001            
(0.003)***
-0.002 
(0.0003)***
Log of Total Assets -0.072            
(0.025)**
-0.274           
(0.230)***
-0.121           
(0.018)***
Stock Indicator 0.002               
(0.030)
-0.011            
(0.016)
-0.014           
(0.014)
Return on Equity 0.001               
(0.0002)**
0.0002            
(0.0002)
0.0003           
(0.0001)**
Leverage 0.011               
(0.001)***
0.009              
(0.001)***
0.009             
(0.001)***
Liquidity
-0.003 (0.003)
0.017 
(0.004)***
0.003             
(0.002)
Effective Tax Rate -0.015             
(0.010)
-0.006           
(0.010)
-0.011 
(0.007)
Product Herfindahl Index 0.003               
(0.028)
-0.130           
(0.032)***
-0.066           
(0.021)***
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index -0.073            
(0.034)***
-0.047           
(0.018)**
-0.074           
(0.014)***
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida 0.001               
(0.001)
0.010 
(0.006)* 0.001 (0.002)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas
-0.006 (0.004)
-0.013           
(0.012)
-0.005           
(0.004)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
-0.019            
(0.003)***
0.008              
(0.027)
-0.014           
(0.003)***
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines 0.006               
(0.016)
0.001              
(0.013)
0.004             
(0.010)
Affiliation indicator -0.013           
(0.025)
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.001               
(0.0004)***
0.006              
(0.0006)***
0.002             
(0.0004)***
Table 6A. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Property and 
Liability Insurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
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Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.205               
(0.066)***
-0.035           
(0.026)
0.095              
(0.031)***
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.135               
(0.063)**
-0.047           
(0.025)*
0.030             
(0.030)
One Lag of Loss Ratio 0.823               
(0.032)***
0.381              
(0.014)***
0.555             
(0.016)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written 0.083               
(0.016)**
0.163              
(0.010)***
0.091             
(0.009)***
F-stat F(409,1790)  
=1.75
F(540,2652)    
=4.39
F(964,4864)   
=16.42
Observations 2,236 3,226 5,524
R-squared 0.154 0.101 0.126
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
Log of Total Assets -0.072            
(0.025)***
-0.274           
(0.030)***
-0.121           
(0.018)***
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
1. Fixed effect model on panel data is used for affiliated, non-affiliated and all property and liability 
insurers based on Hausman test.
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not 
shown in this table. 
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Variables
Expe. 
Sign
Affi. 
Sign
Non-affi. 
Sign
All P/L 
Sign
Signal of Adverse Selection
A.M.Best Ratings - - +
Loss Volatility Definition One + - -
Signal of Moral Hazard 
Lag of Recovered Losses Ratio + +
Reinsurance-specific Factors
Reinsurance Sustainability Index + +
Lag of Reinsurance Price - + +
Internal Reinsurance Percentage - - -
Firm-specific Factors
Loss Ratio + + + +
Log of Total Assets1 - - - -
Stock Indicator -
Return on Equity - + +
Leverage + + + +
Liquidity - +
Effective Tax Rate +
Product Herfindahl Index - - -
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index - - - -
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida + +
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas +
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, NC, 
SC and MS + - -
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines +
Instrumental Variables for Loss Ratio
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase + + +
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase + + -
One Lag of Loss Ratio + + + +
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written + + + +
1. This is the marginal effect measured at the mean. 
Table 6B. Comparison of Expected Coefficients Signs and Regression Results
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Second Stage Regression 
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.037           
(0.010)***
0.008              
(0.004)**
-0.002           
(0.003)
Loss Volatility Definition Two 0.005             
(0.022)
0.038              
(0.021)*
0.032              
(0.010)***
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses -0.0001         
(0.0003)
0.003              
(0.001)***
0.0001           
(0.0001)
Reinsurance Sustainability Index -0.031           
(0.021)
0.017              
(0.010)*
0.0005           
(0.008)
Loss Ratio 0.123             
(0.037)***
0.015              
(0.038)
0.045             
(0.018)**
Lag of Reinsurance Price -0.003           
(0.002)
0.0005           
(0.001)
0.002             
(0.001)
Internal Reinsurance Percentage 0.002             
(0.001)***
-0.001           
(0.0004)***
Log of Total Assets -0.199          
(0.057)***
-0.328           
(0.034)***
-0.188           
(0.021)***
Stock Indicator 0.035              
(0.058)
-0.023           
(0.017)
-0.010           
(0.015)
Return on Equity 0.001             
(0.0004)***
0.0005           
(0.0002)**
0.0004           
(0.0002)***
Leverage 0.006             
(0.003)**
0.007              
(0.001)***
0.007             
(0.001)***
Liquidity 0.055             
(0.009)***
0.016              
(0.005)***
0.012             
(0.003)***
Effective Tax Rate -0.031          
(0.017)*
-0.016           
(0.010)
-0.017           
(0.007)**
Product Herfindahl Index -0.136          
(0.054)**
-0.113           
(0.036)***
-0.040           
(0.023)*
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index -0.204          
(0.067)***
-0.037           
(0.019)**
-0.062           
(0.014)***
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida -0.0001         
(0.004)
0.006              
(0.072)
-0.0005         
(0.002)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas 0.008             
(0.007)
-0.018           
(0.011)
-0.002            
(0.004)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
-0.002          
(0.009)***
0.033              
(0.052)
-0.003           
(0.005)***
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines -0.067           
(0.034)**
-0.004           
(0.013)
0.004             
(0.010)
Affiliation indicator -0.023            
(0.021)
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.004             
(0.001)***
0.007             
(0.0007)***
0.004             
(0.0004)***
Table 7A. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Property and 
Liability Insurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
 
 
 62
 
Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.113             
(0.103)
-0.053           
(0.029)*
0.068             
(0.072)
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.141              
(0.125)
-0.007           
(0.028)
-0.017           
(0.071)
One Lag of Loss Ratio 0.231             
(0.031)***
0.382              
(0.018)***
0.267             
(0.018)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written -0.067           
(0.045)
0.022              
(0.012)*
0.032             
(0.021)
F-stat F(351,1363)   
=1.78
F(474,2120)    
=5.24
F(808,3537)   
=2.19
Observations 1,749 2,627 4,381
R-squared 0.121 0.104 0.149
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
Log of Total Assets -0.199          
(0.057)***
-0.328           
(0.034)***
-0.121           
(0.018)***
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not 
shown in this table. 
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
1. Fixed effect model on panel data is used for affiliated, non-affiliated and all property and liability 
insurers based on Hausman test.
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
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Variables
Expe. 
Sign
Affi. 
Sign
Non-affi. 
Sign
All P/L 
Sign
Signal of Adverse Selection
A.M.Best Ratings - - +
Loss Volatility Definition Two + + - +
Signal of Moral Hazard 
Lag of Recovered Losses Ratio + +
Reinsurance-specific Factors
Reinsurance Sustainability Index + +
Lag of Reinsurance Price - +
Internal Reinsurance Percentage - - -
Firm-specific Factors
Loss Ratio + + +
Log of Total Assets1 +/- - - -
Stock Indicator -
Return on Equity - + + +
Leverage + + + +
Liquidity - + + +
Effective Tax Rate + -
Product Herfindahl Index - - -
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index - - - -
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida +
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas +
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, NC, 
SC and MS + - -
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines +
Instrumental Variables for Loss Ratio
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase + + -
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase +
One Lag of Loss Ratio + + + +
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written + +
1. This is the marginal effect measured at the mean. 
Table 7B. Comparison of Expected Coefficients Signs and Regression Results
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Second Stage Regression 
Variables
Affiliated 
Reinsurers
Non-
Affiliated 
All 
Reinsurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.013           
(0.011)
-0.034            
(0.007)***
-0.037           
(0.010)***
Loss Volatility -0.038          
(0.022)*
0.031              
(0.016)**
0.005              
(0.022)
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses -0.003          
(0.001)**
-0.001            
(0.001)
-0.0001         
(0.0003)
Reinsurance Sustainability Index -0.013            
(0.015)
-0.031            
(0.021)
Loss Ratio 0.026             
(0.037)
0.133              
(0.026)***
0.123             
(0.037)***
Lag of Reinsurance Price -0.0001         
(0.0004)
0.011              
(0.004)**
-0.003           
(0.002)
Internal Reinsurance Percentage -0.001            
(0.001)***
0.002             
(0.001)***
Log of Total Assets -0.256           
(0.062)***
-0.082            
(0.040)**
-0.199           
(0.057)***
Stock Indicator 0.030             
(0.060)
0.056              
(0.041)
0.035             
(0.058)
Return on Equity 0.001             
(0.0004)***
0.001              
(0.0002)***
0.001             
(0.0004)***
Leverage -0.005           
(0.003)***
0.008              
(0.002)***
0.006             
(0.003)**
Liquidity 0.040             
(0.009)***
0.018              
(0.007)***
0.055             
(0.009)***
Effective Tax Rate -0.022           
(0.017)
-0.013              
(0.012)
-0.031           
(0.017)*
Product Herfindahl Index -0.162          
(0.058)***
0.017               
(0.039)
-0.136           
(0.054)**
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index -0.063           
(0.075)
-0.114            
(0.078)**
-0.204           
(0.067)***
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida 0.0001           
(0.004)
0.001               
(0.002)
-0.0001          
(0.004)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas 0.010             
(0.007)
-0.001            
(0.005)
0.008             
(0.007)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
0.005              
(0.011)
-0.006             
(0.007)
-0.002           
(0.009)***
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines -0.071          
(0.034)**
0.038               
(0.024)
-0.067           
(0.034)**
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.004             
(0.001)***
0.002              
(0.0007)**
0.004             
(0.001)***
Table 8. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Affiliated Property 
and Liability Insurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
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Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.010             
(0.151)
0.414              
(0.192)**
0.113              
(0.103)
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.234             
(0.167)
-0.190            
(0.192)
0.141             
(0.125)
One Lag of Loss Ratio 0.216             
(0.035)***
0.233              
(0.030)***
0.231             
(0.031)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written -0.084           
(0.056)
-0.61               
(0.045)
-0.067           
(0.045)
F-stat F(311,1090)   
=1.64
F(351,1363)   
=1.79
F(351,1363)   
=1.78
Observations 1,434 1,749 1,749
R-squared 0.168 0.105 0.121
Variables
Affiliated 
Reinsurers
Non-
Affiliated 
All 
Reinsurers
Log of Total Assets -0.256          
(0.060)***
-0.082            
(0.040)**
-0.199           
(0.057)***
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
1. Fixed effect model is used for the affiliated insurers cede to affiliated, non-affiliated and all reinsurers 
based on Hausman test.
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not 
shown in this table. 
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
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Second Stage Regression 
Variables
Affiliated 
Reinsurers
Non-Affiliated 
Reinsurers
All 
Reinsurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.057           
(0.018)***
-0.012                 
(0.004)***
-0.054           
(0.019)***
Loss Volatility 0.102              
(0.056)*
0.022                  
(0.012)*
0.138            
(0.058)**
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses -0.025           
(0.002)***
0.001                   
(0.001)
-0.021           
(0.002)
Reinsurance Sustainability Index 0.006                   
(0.007)
0.048              
(0.033)
Loss Ratio 0.087             
(0.040)**
0.015                    
(0.008)*
0.099              
(0.042)**
Lag of Reinsurance Price -0.001            
(0.002)
0.005                   
(0.003)*
0.001             
(0.002)
Internal Reinsurance Percentage -0.001                
(0.0001)***
0.002            
(0.001)***
Log of Total Assets -0.181           
(0.097)*
-0.003                 
(0.021)
-0.084           
(0.100)
Stock Indicator -0.013            
(0.089)
0.006                  
(0.020)
0.046             
(0.093)
Return on Equity 0.0005           
(0.0008)
0.0001                  
(0.0001)
0.001             
(0.001)
Leverage -0.004           
(0.006)
0.007                   
(0.001)***
0.004             
(0.006)
Liquidity 0.050            
(0.012)***
0.007                   
(0.003)***
0.060             
(0.013)***
Effective Tax Rate -0.071           
(0.026)***
-0.001                 
(0.006)
-0.060           
(0.027)**
Product Herfindahl Index -0.156            
(0.107)
-0.055                 
(0.024)**
-0.106           
(0.110)
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index 0.372            
(0.163)**
-0.097                
(0.035)***
0.279            
(0.164)*
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida -0.016           
(0.010)
0.002                   
(0.002)
-0.001           
(0.010)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas 0.017             
(0.032)
-0.005                 
(0.007)
0.009             
(0.033)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
0.014             
(0.016)
-0.003                 
(0.004)
0.028            
(0.017)*
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines -0.171           
(0.059)***
0.021                   
(0.013)*
-0.161           
(0.061)***
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.003             
(0.002)
-0.0001                
(0.00004)
0.001              
(0.002)
Table 9A. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Affiliated Property 
and Liability Insurers with More than 75% Ceded Premium Paid to Affiliated Reinsurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
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Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase -0.172           
(0.127)
0.575                  
(0.396)
-0.111            
(0.117)
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.143             
(0.132)
-1.115                
(0.337)***
0.018              
(0.138)
One Lag of Loss Ratio -0.507            
(0.056)***
-0.486                
(0.056)***
-0.520           
(0.056)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written 0.178             
(0.069)***
0.154                   
(0.065)**
0.161              
(0.068)**
F-stat F(160,318)    
=6.61
F(218,548)         
=3.01
F(222,555)     
=2.93
Observations 502 513 513
R-squared 0.585 0.293 0.549
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
Log of Total Assets -0.181           
(0.097)*
-0.003                
(0.021)
-0.084             
(0.100)
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
1. Fixed effect model is used for the affiliated insurers cede to affiliated, non-affiliated and all reinsurers 
based on Hausman test.
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not 
shown in this table. 
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
 
 68
Second Stage Regression 
Variables
Affiliated 
Reinsurers
Non-Affiliated 
Reinsurers
All 
Reinsurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.024           
(0.013)*
-0.018                
(0.005)***
-0.035           
(0.014)**
Loss Volatility 0.012              
(0.050)
-0.017                 
(0.019)
0.014             
(0.051)
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses -0.017             
(0.001)***
0.003                   
(0.001)**
-0.012           
(0.001)***
Reinsurance Sustainability Index -0.002                 
(0.009)
-0.054           
(0.025)**
Loss Ratio 0.014             
(0.035)
0.010                    
(0.013)
0.018             
(0.035)
Lag of Reinsurance Price -0.0003          
(0.001)
0.006                   
(0.004)
-0.002           
(0.002)
Internal Reinsurance Percentage -0.001                
(0.0002)***
0.002            
(0.001)***
Log of Total Assets -0.321            
(0.071)***
-0.014                 
(0.027)
-0.216            
(0.072)
Stock Indicator -0.003           
(0.063)
0.003                  
(0.024)
0.041             
(0.064)
Return on Equity 0.0005            
(0.0006)
0.0003                 
(0.0002)
0.0003            
(0.0006)
Leverage -0.002             
(0.004)
0.009                   
(0.002)***
0.008             
(0.004)**
Liquidity 0.045             
(0.009)***
0.009                   
(0.004)**
0.055              
(0.010)***
Effective Tax Rate -0.043            
(0.020)**
-0.012                  
(0.008)
-0.047           
(0.021)**
Product Herfindahl Index -0.023           
(0.080)
-0.072                 
(0.029)**
-0.013           
(0.079)
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index -0.146             
(0.101)
-0.109                  
(0.038)***
-0.265          
(0.102)***
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida 0.002              
(0.004)
0.005                   
(0.002)***
0.011            
(0.004)***
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas 0.011            
(0.009)
-0.005                 
(0.004)
0.002             
(0.010)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
0.005             
(0.013)
0.003                  
(0.005)
0.017             
(0.013)
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines -0.150           
(0.041)***
0.023                    
(0.016)
-0.132            
(0.042)***
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.005              
(0.001)
0.0003                 
(0.0005)
0.004              
(0.001)***
Table 9B. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Affiliated Property and 
Liability Insurers with More than 50% Ceded Premium Paid to Affiliated Reinsurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
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Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase -0.070             
(0.182)
0.020                   
(0.448)
-0.027             
(0.167)
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.204              
(0.194)
-.154                     
(0.413)
0.203              
(0.200)
One Lag of Loss Ratio -0.313            
(0.050)***
-0.313                 
(0.050)***
-0.318            
(0.049)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written -0.091           
(0.084)
-0.088                 
(0.079)**
-0.096           
(0.081)
F-stat F(218,548)     
=3.01
F(222,555)          
=2.93
F(222,555)     
=2.96
Observations 799 812 812
R-squared 0.397 0.218 0.380
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
Log of Total Assets -0.321           
(0.071)***
-0.015                 
(0.027)
-0.216             
(0.072)***
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
1. Fixed effect model is used for the affiliated insurers cede to affiliated, non-affiliated and all reinsurers 
based on Hausman test.
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not shown 
in this table. 
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
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Second Stage Regression 
Variables
Affiliated 
Reinsurers
Non-Affiliated 
Reinsurers
All 
Reinsurers
A.M.Best Ratings -0.005            
(0.004)
-0.024                  
(0.010)**
-0.029           
(0.010)***
Loss Volatility -0.004           
(0.006)
0.011                    
(0.021)
-0.014           
(0.022)
Lag of Ratio of Recovered Losses 0.004            
(0.002)**
0.0001                  
(0.0002)
0.0001           
(0.00001)
Reinsurance Sustainability Index -0.013                 
(0.019)
-0.014            
(0.019)
Loss Ratio 0.001              
(0.007)
0.039                    
(0.018)**
0.042              
(0.182)**
Lag of Reinsurance Price 0.0001            
(0.0002)
0.002                    
(0.005)
0.002              
(0.005)
Internal Reinsurance Percentage 0.005                   
(0.002)***
0.005             
(0.002)***
Log of Total Assets -0.042            
(0.021)**
-0.099                 
(0.062)
-0.102           
(0.064)
Stock Indicator -0.004           
(0.023)
0.070                    
(0.054)
0.072             
(0.056)
Return on Equity 0.00001          
(0.0001)
0.001                    
(0.0004)***
0.001              
(0.0004)***
Leverage 0.004            
(0.001)***
0.008                   
(0.003)***
0.010              
(0.003)***
Liquidity 0.007             
(0.007)
0.028                    
(0.012)**
0.035             
(0.013)***
Effective Tax Rate -0.004           
(0.006)
-0.020                  
(0.017)
-0.018            
(0.018)**
Product Herfindahl Index -0.046           
(0.019)**
0.004                  
(0.051)
-0.035           
(0.052)
Georgraphic Herfindahl Index -0.040             
(0.030)
-0.136                
(0.058)**
-0.149           
(0.060)**
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Florida -0.003           
(0.003)
-0.004                   
(0.005)
-0.006             
(0.005)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in Texas -0.005           
(0.002)***
0.003                  
(0.006)
0.001             
(0.006)
Percentage of Homeowner Written Premium in AL, LA, 
NC, SC and MS
0.005             
(0.004)
-0.006                  
(0.007)
-0.005             
(0.007)
Percentage of Long Tail Business Lines -0.006           
(0.009)
0.045                   
(0.030)
-0.042           
(0.030)
Square of Log of Total Assets 0.001              
(0.0004)*
0.002                    
(0.001)
0.002             
(0.001)
Table 9C. Estimated Coefficients on Reinsurance Purchase for the Affiliated Property and 
Liability Insurers with Less than 25% Ceded Premium Paid to Affiliated Reinsurers
Dependent Variable: Reinsurance 
Purchase
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Continued
First Stage Regression
One Lag of Reinsurance Purchase -0.135            
(0.963)
0.162                   
(0.237)
0.064             
(0.228)
Two Lag of Reinsurance Purchase 0.421              
(0.766)
0.025                  
(0.229)
0.183              
(0.191)
One Lag of Loss Ratio 0.398             
(0.066)***
0.466                   
(0.043)***
0.466            
(0.043)***
One Lag of Log Direct Premium Written 0.067              
(0.118)
-0.002                 
(0.067)
0.003              
(0.067)
F-stat F(114,284)    
=0.73
F(165,531)          
=0.86
F(165,531)     
=0.87
Observations 431 731 731
R-squared 0.141 0.155 0.154
Variables Affiliation
Non-
Affiliation
All P/L 
Insurers
Log of Total Assets -0.042           
(0.021)**
-0.099                 
(0.062)
-0.102             
(0.064)
Marginal Effects (Measured at the Means)
5. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively. 
2. Regression results of year dummies are not reported in this table.
3. The regreesion results of other instrumental variables included in the first stage regression are not shown 
in this table. 
4. Regression results are shown as coefficient and standard deviation. The figures on the top are the 
estimated coefficients and the figures in the parenthesis are standard deviations.
Endogeneous Variable: Loss Ratio
1. Fixed effect model is used for the affiliated insurers cede to affiliated, non-affiliated and all reinsurers 
based on Hausman test.
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Appendix 
The expected utility of a primary insurer from taking reinsurance transactions in two 
years is as follows:  
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The first part, which integrates from zero to 1D for the actual loss, is the primary insurer’s 
utility if the primary insurer retains the actual loss to itself; the following integral between 1D and 
1A is the primary insurer’s utility with the recovered loss of 11 DL − by the reinsurer; the third 
part integrated from 1A to the infinity is the primary insurer’s utility with the recovered loss of 
11 DA − by the reinsurer; the effort 1e is subtracted from the expected utility for the first year to 
obtain the net expected utility. The next integral part is the calculation for the expected utility of 
the primary insurer for the second year. 
The total profit for a reinsure in two years is:  
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The first part, which integrates from zero to 1D , is the reinsurer’s premium income if the 
reinsurer makes no payment to the insurer. The second integral between 1D and 1A is the 
reinsurer’s profit when it pays 11 DL − to the primary insurer and its income becomes 111 DLP +− . 
The third part integrated from 1A to the infinity is the reinsurer’s profit if the reinsurer pays 
11 DA −  to the primary insurer and the reinsurer’s income is 111 DAP +− . The monitoring cost 
1c is deducted from the expected profit for the first year to obtain the net expected profit. The 
next integral part is the calculation for the expected profit for the second year. 
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Essay Two 
 
Moral Hazard under Government Intervention: Evidence from Florida 
Homeowner Insurance Market 
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ABSTRACT 
To address the issue of soaring property insurance premiums and coverage availability in 
states that are subject to hurricane risks, state and federal governments have not only regulated 
the private insurance market but have also intervened directly into markets by establishing 
government-funded insurance programs. With coexisting public and private insurance 
mechanisms and price regulation, the risk of cross subsidization and a subsequent moral hazard 
problem may arise. By using data from the Florida Citizens Insurance Corporation, the Florida 
Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, the National Flood Insurance and the private homeowner insurance 
market in Florida from 1998 to 2007, this essay examines the moral hazard problems arising 
from government regulation and involvement in the private insurance sector in Florida. In sum, 
the provision of national flood insurance is found to be positively related to the population 
growth in the state of Florida, which shows that state immigrants can take advantage of the lower 
cost of flood insurance when relocating in higher-risk areas. Further, we find that national flood 
insurance and the catastrophe fund complement the development of the private insurance sector, 
while the residual market hinders the development of private property insurance market.  
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1. Introduction 
Hurricane Andrew and the severe 2004-2005 storm seasons dramatically changed 
Florida’s property insurance market. Private insurers have responded to the changed market 
environment by restricting the supply of coverage and increasing prices. Under political pressure 
from voters, both legislators and insurance regulators became concerned about how to provide 
sustainable and affordable insurance to property owners. Therefore, government intervention has 
taken different approaches, focusing on price regulation and as well as the use of government-
funded insurance programs such as the National Flood Insurance Program (Flood Insurance),7 
the Citizens Property Insurance Corporation (Florida Citizens), and the Florida Hurricane 
Catastrophe Fund (CAT Fund). This essay answers the question of how well government 
intervention has worked by examining the effects of public policies on demographic changes and 
the homeowner insurance market in Florida, which has significant implications for public policy 
studies and insurance market analysis under catastrophic risks. 
The population of Florida has grown rapidly since the 1980s at a rate significantly above 
the national growth rate, with the immigration accounting for about 85 percent of the increase 
(Economics and Demographic Research, 2009). In addition to economic prosperity and nice 
weather, other factors that may contribute to immigration to Florida are examined within the 
context of insurance. In sharp contrast to the higher insurance premiums charged by private 
insurers, the relatively lower cost of the residual, or high risk, market (in a risk adjusted sense) 
and flood insurance may encourage people to relocate to the state and to high risk areas. This 
essay examines the interactions between government insurance programs and the demographic 
changes in the last decade.   
                                                 
7 The NFIP is funded by the federal government.  It is not a program supported by the state of Florida.  The NFIP 
predates Florida's increased hurricane incidence.  However, it fills in coverage that is not provided by the private 
market nor by any other state program. 
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In the Florida homeowner insurance market, the introduction of government insurance 
programs, such as the Florida Citizens, the Flood Insurance, and the CAT Fund, is meant to fill 
the coverage gap left by private insurers. However, the government's involvement may induce 
different types of inefficiencies, such as crowding-out effect and moral hazard.  Crowding out is 
any reduction in private consumption or investment that occurs because of an increase in 
government spending. In this paper, it means the supplanting of private insurance coverage by 
the coverage provided by governments. Moral hazard refers to the tendency of insurers to 
exercise less precaution than is socially optimal by establishing inadequate incentives to control, 
underwrite or manage the risks of homeowners.  
By using data on the Florida Citizens, the CAT Fund, the Flood Insurance and 
homeowner insurance in Florida from 1998 to 2007, this essay examines the moral hazard 
problem arising from government regulation and involvement in the private insurance sector. In 
sum, the provision of national flood insurance is found to be positively related to population 
growth in the state of Florida, which shows that new residents have taken advantage of the lower 
cost of flood insurance when relocating in higher-risk areas. In addition, we find that national 
flood insurance and the catastrophe fund complement the development of the private insurance 
sector, while the residual market discourages the property insurance market. Moreover, the 
evidence shows that new entrants to the Florida homeowner insurance market take on excessive 
exposures, which may be beyond the insurers’ capacities to bear risk. Thus, the moral hazard 
problem exists in which some less liquid and less capable8 insurers take more insured exposures 
as a result of subsidies from the state government. Finally, this essay tests how government 
                                                 
8 Liquidity and capability are the two issues here. Capacity, surplus and reinsurance can be increased by the 
subsidies received, such as takeout bonuses, grants and the support of the guaranty association, from governments.  
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intervention and involvement have influenced the provision of insurance in the private market in 
Florida. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 summarizes the evolution of 
homeowner insurance market and government involvement in managing hurricane risks in the 
past two decades. The economics of government regulation and intervention are analyzed in the 
subsequent section. Section 4 develops the hypotheses for empirical tests and reports the results, 
which is followed by a conclusion in Section 5.  
 
2. Evolution of the Florida Homeowner Insurance Market 
2.1 After Hurricane Andrew  
The frequency and severity of both natural and man-made disasters have increased 
substantially in recent years (Insurance Information Institute, 2008). Natural catastrophes include 
events such as earthquakes, hurricanes and floods. Man-made disasters refer to terrorism, 
explosions and aviation collisions, etc. Figure 1 plots top 12 most costly disasters in the United 
States history. From this figure we can see ten of the twelve most expensive disasters of all types 
were caused by hurricanes, and eight of ten most expensive hurricanes in US history have 
occurred in the past five years. The state of Florida, surrounded by Gulf of Mexico and Atlantic 
Ocean, has been repeatedly struck by hurricanes in the past three decades. Eight of the ten most 
costly hurricanes ever to make landfall in U.S. history hit Florida from 1980 to 2006, causing 
more than $60 billion ( in 2007 dollars) insured losses (Insurance Information Institute, 2008). 
Figure 2 plots Florida’s ten costliest hurricanes and total insured losses from 1980 to 2007. Most 
of hurricanes have occurred in the past fifteen years, with a few in the 1980s. Since there is a 
difference between the risk of hurricanes and their actual occurrence, the occurrence of more 
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hurricanes in the past fifteen years in Figure 2 is the evidence of increased risk. The upward 
trend has imposed tremendous challenges to property insurers, along with the rapidly population 
growth and economic development in the coastal areas in recent years.  
2.1.1 Market Structure 
Since Hurricane Andrew in 1992, significant changes had taken place in the Florida’s 
property insurance market. Market concentration, barriers to entry and exit and insurers’ 
geographic diversification are several important aspects of insurance market structure. 
Concentration not only affects market performance and competition, but also signifies insurers’ 
vulnerability to severe losses from catastrophes. Greater concentration implies that some insurers 
have larger amounts of exposures to catastrophe losses. Concentration ratios at the top firms’ 
market shares, such as top four-firm (CR4), eight-firm (CR8) or twenty-firm (CR20), and 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) are normally used to measure the concentration level of a 
market. HHI is the sum of the squared market shares of all firms in the market and can range 
from 0 to 10,000 (equal to a 100% market share by one insurer). Higher indices reflect greater 
market concentration, which may enhance efficiency through the economy of scale. Less 
concentration, on the other hand, could promote competition as well as greater risk 
diversification.  
Table 2 shows the homeowners insurance market concentration in Florida from 1992 to 
2007. From the table we can see that CR4 was 59.3 percent and HHI was 1440 as of 1992, 
indicating that the Florida homeowner insurance market was relatively concentrated in the year 
Hurricane Andrew occurred. The market concentration had remained stable until middle of the 
1990s’, and the combined market share for top insurer groups decreased thereafter. The 
combined market share of top four groups (CR4) fell from 59.3 percent in 1992 to 36 percent in 
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2007, while CR20 decreased from 85.2 percent to 65.9 percent in 2007.  Also, the HHI index fell 
significantly from 1440 to 612 in 2007. This suggests that there is a greater dispersion of 
exposures covered by insurers in Florida fifteen years after Hurricane Andrew, which signifies a 
greater diversification of risks among insurers in Florida homeowner insurance market.  
The changes of leading insurers’ market shares in Florida in 1992, 2003, 2005 and 2007 
are summarized in Table 3. The market share of the largest two insurers, State Farm and Allstate 
decreased from 50.8 percent in 1992 to 26.1 percent in 2007. While big insurers had retrenched 
from the Florida homeowner insurance market, the other relatively smaller insurance companies 
took on more exposures in this market. For example, AIG was ranked 8th in 2007 from rank of 
53rd in 1992, with a market share increase from 0.2 percent to 2.5 percent. Southern Farm Bureau 
also significantly increased its penetration to Florida’s homeowner insurance market. The change 
of market concentration indicates that some smaller or new insurers see opportunities to grow 
and hopefully prosper in the market, while other big insurers see danger and need to retrench 
because of their high exposures subject to hurricane risks.  
According to the Florida Office of Insurance Regulation (FLOIR), 40 insurers have 
entered the Florida property insurance market since 2005. Most of the new entrants in the market 
are small regional or single-state companies. Klein (2009a) demonstrated this by looking at the 
ratio of an insurer’s Florida homeowners premiums to its combined homeowners insurance 
premiums in all states. In 1992, the mean Florida/Countywide premium ratio was 6.6 percent and 
the median ratio was 18.4 percent among insurers writing homeowners insurance in Florida. In 
2007, the mean ratio had increased to 63.2 percent and the median ratio had increased to 90.3 
percent; 42 of the 92 insurer groups in the Florida homeowners insurance market wrote 100 
percent of their premiums in Florida.  Those regional insurers are subject to catastrophe risk due 
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to the lack of risk diversification. Poe and Tower Hill groups are good examples. Poe was hit 
hard in 2004 and 2005 storm seasons and became insolvent in 2006. The liquidation generated 
approximately $988 million in payments by the Florida Insurance Guaranty Association for 
46,162 claims for Poe’s policyholders (Florida Insurance Association, 2007). Tower Hill was 
struck by 2004 and 2005 storm seasons as well and was downgraded by A. M. Best Company.  
Homeowners had difficulties in finding insures to provide coverage and paying increased 
premiums due to the restructuring of insurance market exposed to hurricane risk. Since some 
insurers retrenched from the market, homeowners needed to find new insurers to underwrite their 
coverage, and others were forced into the residual market. Also prices increased significantly, 
especially in the high-risk coastal areas. Meanwhile, many policyholders had to accept higher 
deductibles (1 percent to 5 percent of their dwelling coverage limit) to be covered in voluntary 
market coverage and make their premiums more affordable (Insurance Information Institute, 
2008)  
Prices  
Prior to Hurricane Andrew in 1992, insurers paid little attention to the risk posed by 
hurricanes, so insurance was relatively cheap and readily available. The insurers did not use 
catastrophe models and did little to control their catastrophe exposures. Hurricane Andrew was a 
wake-up call to the insurance industry. Using new and relatively crude catastrophe models to 
estimate their risks, insurers sought to raise their rates and adjust their exposures to reflect the 
new reality.  
Many insurers have filed and implemented substantial price increases to reflect the higher 
degree of risk and reinsurance cost after Hurricane Andrew (Klein, 2008). In addition, premiums 
in the coastal areas are as expected to be significantly higher and experienced larger rate 
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increases than interior areas within the state because of the additional risk brought by coastal 
exposures.  To measure the sub-state differences and changes in prices among counties, the 
average rates per $1000 of coverage by county are calculated. Though this approach still 
confounds other policy terms with rates, it is less affected by changes in the amount of insurance.  
I employed this approach with county-level data available for Florida in 1997, 2000, 
2003, 2006 and 2007, and the results of representative counties are plotted in Figure 3 and Figure 
4. Monroe, Dade and Franklin represent the high risk areas in Florida, while Leon and Clay are 
the representative counties in the interior areas within the state. From 1997 to 2000, Monroe 
experienced the greatest increase from its rate of $18.98 to $28.95, and its rate fell to $15.16 in 
2003. One reason for this trend is that Hurricane Andrew in 1992 produced $10.6 billion in 
underwriting losses, which made the cumulative insurers’ profit negative from 1992 to 2003 
(NAIC Report on Profitability by Line by State, 2006). Other counties in the coastal areas, such 
as Dade and Franklin, had relatively small rate increases during this period. Leon and Clay, 
which are exposed to less catastrophic risks, had lower rates around $2.50 for $1000 coverage 
which remained stable after Hurricane Andrew occurred.  The striking results reflect the high 
level of risk in coastal areas which includes the Florida Keys, and insurers’ reassessment to 
hurricane risks. Right After the property insurance industry made even until 2003, insurers 
experienced huge losses again in the 2004-2005 storm seasons. As a result, high price increases 
were demanded by insurers, especially to the insureds in hurricane-prone zones. For example, 
homeowners insurance rate per $1000 coverage in Monroe doubled in 2006 to around $35 from 
2003. The rate increased a little bit to $37 in 2007. For the other interior counties in the states 
relative to the coastal areas, the average rate per $1000 had kept stable during the period.  
Profitability 
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Profitability reflects the overall performance of a firm in a market. Indicators of 
profitability include loss ratios, underwriting profit, profits on insurance transactions (PIT), 
return on net worth. Each measure has its own advantages and disadvantages, revealing specific 
financial aspects of a firm. Underwriting gains (losses) after Hurricane Andrew to 2007, as a 
base to measure profitability, are presented first. The analysis of PIT and return on net worth 
during this period follows to examine the profitability of Florida homeowner insurance market.  
Figure 6 and Figure 7 respectively plot the underwriting gains (losses) and accumulative 
underwriting gains (losses) of the Florida homeowner insurance market from 1992 to 2007. The 
graph clearly tells us that the tremendous underwriting losses of $10.50 billions stroke the 
insurance industry in Florida, which took nine years to make even until 2003. The underwriting 
analysis focuses on the insurers’ performance on their principle business, providing coverage to 
inured risks, while ignoring other financial activities, such as investment income.   
Taking into account of investment income, profit on insurance transactions (PIT) and 
return on net worth provide more financial information on the performance of insurance industry. 
Those two measures are obtained from National Association Insurance Commissioners (NAIC) 
profitability annual reports. PIT reflects expenses, taxes and investment income, as well as losses, 
attributable to the underwriting of a particular line of insurance in a state. The return on net 
worth includes investment income attributable to insurers’ surplus, as well as profits on 
insurance transactions. It also requires the formula-based allocation of surplus by line and state. 
The high PIT and return on net worth indicate high profitability of a firm. Table 4 lists PIT and 
return on net worth of Florida insurance industry in the line of homeowner multiple perils from 
1985 to 2007. In 1992, the PIT and return on net worth were -657.4 percent and -714.9 percent, 
respectively. There were still negative profits and return on net worth in 1993 due to the 
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continuing claims payment after Hurricane Andrew. From 1994 to 2003, positive profits were 
generated with the average of 20 percent of PIT during this period without huge catastrophe 
losses. This observation suggests that the property insurance industry in Florida is significantly 
influenced by catastrophe events which may cause billions of insured losses, and profitability is 
closely linked to the climate changes and associated hurricane strikes.  
2.1.2 Regulation and Public Involvement 
As we have discussed above, Hurricane Andrew dramatically changed the Florida 
homeowner insurance market in terms of market structure, availability of insurance coverage and 
insurance price. Facing big challenges posed by the future potential catastrophic losses, insurers 
restricted their exposures in high risk areas and filed for rate increases. Hence, the voluntary 
market shrank -- residents had difficulty obtaining insurance coverage for their properties.  
Further, state regulators were reluctant to allow prices to rise.  This in turn created an availability 
crisis as insurers reduced their presences in high risk areas.  To fix this market failure, and 
provide the availability of insurance coverage to property owners, state regulation of prices and 
market exit, and public insurance entry into the private market have become the norm in the 
Florida property insurance market. Besides rate regulation, which artificially lower the cost of 
insurance, state facilities also lower insurance cost as well as seek to increase the availability of 
insurance.  
Insurance regulatory functions can be divided into two primary categories: solvency 
regulation and market conduct regulation. Solvency regulation aims to protect policyholders 
against the risks that insolvent insurers fail to meet their financial obligations. Market conduct 
regulation seeks to maintain fair and reasonable prices, products and trade practices. Dealing 
with the unavailability of coverage and price spikes, legislators and regulators in Florida imposed 
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the binding constraints on the market conduct of insurers, with the result being price suppression 
(prices below actuarially fair value) and compression (difference between high and low risk 
areas). With the strict price regulation, the state still saw continued availability problems and 
thus decided to increases its presence by establishing a state-owned company to provide 
insurance to the very high risk areas and to set up a fund to provide reinsurance with below-
market premiums to primary insurers.  
Price Regulation 
 Price regulation has significant implications for the insurers’ ability to charge what they 
believe to be adequate rates, which in turn, can affect the supply and demand of insurance. 
Pricing constraints can be divided into two categories: price suppression and price compression. 
Price suppression refers to a ceiling on the overall rate level that insurers can charge, while price 
compression reduces the rate differentials across various geographic areas of the state, normally 
between high and low risk areas. The two kinds of price regulations are closely related. 
Regulators intend to cap rates in high risk areas, while they keep the relatively stable rates in low 
risk areas. As a result, price compression may lead to an overall rate level that is inadequate to 
cover the total cost of risk.  
After Hurricane Andrew, regulators resisted large immediate rate increases and only 
allowed insurers to gradually raise rates over the decade. Figure 8 lists the Insurance Service 
Office (ISO) advisory loss cost filings in Florida for the period of 1991 to 2000. The ISO is a rate 
advisory organization which provides advisory prospective loss cost, including incurred losses as 
well as loss adjustment expenses. Figure 8 presents the indicated rates, filed rates and 
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implemented rates9 in respective years. Prior to Hurricane Andrew, the ISO filed for a 3.3 
percent decrease in 1991 and 2.2 percent decrease in 1992, and regulators approved both rate 
decreases. In 1995, the ISO filed for a rate increase of 171.1 percent to incorporate catastrophe 
loss estimates. The regulators only approved 48.7 percent increase. The same trend continued in 
1996 that the ISO filed an increase of 77.5 percent and the regulators only allowed a rate increase 
of 23.2 percent. Until 2000, increased rates were believed to reflect actual losses cost that the 
ISO filed a rate decrease of 2.8 percent. However, the regulator imposed a 4.7 percent decrease. 
This suggests that regulators in Florida suppressed rates under the actuarially fair costs. At the 
same time, price compression prevailed for most of the decade, and rates in high risk areas were 
more constrained than in low risk areas (Muslin, 1996). Price compression worsened supply-
availability problems because insurers were concerned about substantial rate inadequacy (Grace, 
Klein & Kleindorfer, 2004).  
However, the rate suppression conflicts the regulators’ attempts to sustain an adequate 
availability of coverage. Insurers are reluctant to take on risk exposures by employing suppressed 
rates under actual costs, and they are forced to do so as they are constrained by a moratorium 
enacted after Hurricane Andrew. The moratorium only allowed insurers to shed exposures 
through cancellation and non-renewals initiated by insured, unless insurers negotiated with 
insurance regulators, and it ended on June 1, 2001. After the moratorium expired, the policy 
termination increased as insurers reduced their risk exposures in high risk areas. Consequently, 
the residual market has been rapidly growing while voluntary market shrank under regulatory 
price suppression and compression. 
The Residual Market 
                                                 
9 The indicated rate is the comparable rate that ISO calculates based on the actuarially fair cost; the filed rate refers 
to the rate insures file to the regulation authority; the implemented rate pertains the rate that ISO approves and 
implement.  
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State-run residual market mechanisms are important components of public policies 
towards catastrophe risks dealing with the coverage availability problem. The residual market 
provides insurance coverage to property owners who are unable to buy insurance from the 
voluntary market. Residual market mechanisms include assigned risk plans, windstorm and 
beach pools, joint underwriting associations, and reinsurance pools. As a secondary source of 
coverage, the residual market should charge adequate rates and remain relatively small. When 
deficits incur, the residual market assesses against all insurers in relation to their voluntary 
market premiums for relevant lines of insurance, which means that the voluntary market bears 
more risks than the policies they write. In such case, insurers are discouraged to enter and 
encouraged to exit the market that leads to a shrinking market. Consequently, these mechanisms 
provide coverage at the expense of development of the voluntary market.  
In November 1993 after Hurricane Andrew, the Florida Residential Property and 
Casualty Joint Underwriting Association (JUA) was established to provide coverage to 
homeowners who were unable to obtain coverage from the voluntary market. The plan extended 
to certain commercial property coverage (apartments and condos) in 1995 (Marlett & Eastman, 
1998). Figure 9 presents the policies numbers and exposures of the JUA from 1993 to 2002. 
From the graph we can see that the JUA had grown rapidly with the peak of 850,000 policies in 
1995 and exposures of $78 billions in 1996. An aggressive depopulation had been undertaken to 
shed the JUA to a shadow of its former itself. As of 2001, it only had 67,230 policies. Since the 
insurers, who took out of the JUA, only committed to provide coverage for three years, the 
improvement had reversed after 2000. The policies JUA wrote climbed to 110,700 by the end of 
2002 (Insurance Information Institute, 2008). Moreover, these policies concentrated in the 
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coastal areas of the state, like Dade, Broward, Monroe and Palm Beach counties. It suggests that 
a significant portion of catastrophe risk is insured through the state-sponsored mechanism.  
The Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association (FWUA) assumed the wind risk for 
many homes in coastal areas in Florida. Figure 10 plots the policy numbers and exposures of the 
FWUA from 1990 to 2000. FWUA continued to grow until 1998. It peaked at more than 500,000 
policies and $91.1 billions in exposures at the end of 1998. It declined marginally to 398,222 
policies by the end of January 2003, although exposures were even higher at $108.5 billion 
(Insurance Information Institute, 2008).  
Due to Florida’s unique exposures to hurricane risk, the Florida legislators created the 
Florida Citizens to secure the availability of property insurance coverage to Florida residents, by 
merging the JUA and the FWUA and on May 4th, 2002. The Florida Citizens provides full 
coverage or wind coverage for residential properties, and has experienced a significant growth in 
the recent years. Figure 11 plots Florida Citizens exposures from 2002 to 2008. The exposures of 
Florida Citizens jumped to $408.80 billions in 2006 as many property owners were not able to 
obtain insurance coverage from voluntary markets after the storm seasons 2004-2005. As of 
September 30th, 2009, the Florida Citizens had 636,139 personal lines account policies and 
419,160 high risk account policies.10 The total number of the Florida Citizens policies has fallen 
from its high of 1.4 million in October 2000 to under 1.1 million in September, 2009.  
Florida regulators have sought to depopulate the Florida Citizens by encouraging small 
insurers to take policies out the Florida Citizens. The FLOIR had approved the takeout policies 
from the Florida Citizens by 17 insurers as of January 10th, 2009. The term “approved” refers to 
the potential number of policies that may be removed by an insurer based on a consent 
agreement with the FLOIR. The Florida Citizens reports that 1.3 million policies have been 
                                                 
10 Information obtained from Florida Citizens’ website at http://ww.citizensfla.com 
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removed since 2003, with 765,219 policies removed since 2005. However, the depopulation 
scheme is open to questions as the new small insurers are not financially strong with only limited 
amounts of capital. The insolvencies cost of those companies will ultimately fall back on 
consumers and taxpayers through the state’s guaranty fund.  
The Florida Citizens incurred large funding shortfalls of $1.6 billion for 2004 and over $2 
billion in 2005. The 2004 deficit resulted in a 6.8 percent surcharge on all homeowners 
premiums in the state. To cover 2005 shortfall, $715 million was appropriated by the Florida 
legislature to reduce the Florida Citizens’ assessments. The remainder of the deficit will be 
collected over a 10-year period in “emergency assessment” on premium written statewide that 
will be passed on as surcharges to policyholders.  
Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 
The CAT Fund was created by Florida legislature in 1993 after Hurricane Andrew, which 
is tax-exempt and provides catastrophe reinsurance to participating insurers in the state. The 
CAT Fund is funded by premiums paid by the participating insurers and investment income, and 
it can apply emergency assessment if necessary to repay debt. The emergency assessment applies 
to all business lines except workers’ compensation, accident and health, medical malpractice and 
national flood insurance premiums.  
The CAT Fund was faced with a shortfall in resources to reimburse insurers from the 
2005 hurricane season, and issued $1.35 billion in revenue bonds in 2006. An emergency 
assessment of 1 percent for approximately six years on all policies issued or renewed after 
January 1, 2007 was levied to finance the post-event bonds. Since the CAT Fund’s cash balance 
for paying claims had been exhausted, the CAT Fund took steps in 2006 and 2007 to create 
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liquidity for paying future claims by issuing pre-event liquidity financings of $2.8 billion in July 
2006 and $3.5 billion in October 2007 (Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund, 2007).  
There is a significant debate about the function and economic feasibility for CAT Fund, 
the state-sponsored mechanism. The proponents contend that the CAT Fund is helpful to fill a 
supply gap in private reinsurance market at a lower price. On the other hand, the opponents are 
concerned with “crowding out” private reinsurance and financial shortfall which leads to 
assessment on all the policyholders across the state. In the latter case, this state CAT Fund may 
raise the cross subsidization issue, and further moral hazard problem in the insurance market. 
National Flood Insurance Program 
 There are a couple of federal insurance programs to cover risks which private insurers 
are reluctant or unable to cover, including national flood insurance, crop insurance and terrorism 
insurance. Due to its vulnerability to hurricane risks, the Florida residents have benefited a lot by 
participating in the national flood insurance program to cover the flood risk which is excluded 
from the regular homeowner insurance.  
Administered by Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Flood Insurance 
provides federally backed flood insurance, which is not provided by private insurers, to 
homeowners, renters and business by requiring the participating communities to enforce 
floodplain management ordinances to reduce flood losses. Currently there are around 20,000 
communities have joined this program nationwide.  
Guaranty Fund 
To provide security and honor claim payment to insureds in case of insurers become 
insolvent, the Florida Guaranty Association (FIGA) was established to process covered claims 
underwritten by insolvent or liquidated insurers in the state. The FIGA funding comes from four 
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sources: estate distribution, recoveries from CAT Fund, investment income and assessment from 
member companies. The FIGA is partly funded by assessment on property liability insurance 
premiums in the state which are limited to 2 percent annually. While no assessment has been 
levied in some years free of catastrophic losses, full 2 percent of assessments were applied after 
Hurricane Andrew in 1992 and 2004-2005 tropical storm seasons. For Hurricane Andrew, not 
only 2 percent of property-casualty insurance premiums were assessed, but additional 2 percent 
were borrowed to cover its capacity shortfall. It took five years for FIGA to pay off all its debts 
from Hurricane Andrew. FIGA has been processing the outstanding claims received as a result of 
five insolvencies in the 2004 and 2005 hurricanes, and claims from catastrophe losses accounted 
for 60 percent of open claims by end of 2008 (FIGA, 2008).  
The funding schemes of guaranty association reveal its financial vulnerability to 
catastrophe in Florida and the spread-out risks to all insurers and insured and taxpayers. From 
this mechanism, the insolvent or liquidated insurers transfer their obligations to state-run 
program, which ultimately adversely affect the benefits of various stakeholders. 
2.2 Evolvement of Legislation  
Hurricane Andrew devastated the insurance industry in the state, and Florida Department 
of Insurance found that the existing rules and regulations inadequate to address the extraordinary 
circumstances.  The insurance commissioner and representatives from large insurers worked 
together closely to find appropriate recovery solutions (Florida Department of Insurance, 1993). 
A series of emergencies rules were filed to deal with the claims and stabilize the market. The 
department of insurance issured a total of 27 emergencies rules in 1992 and 30 in 1993, which 
showed a strong hands-on approach adopted by regulators (Mittler, 1997). For instance, 
emergency rule 4ER92-11 established procedures for the withdrawal of any insurance company 
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from the state of Florida and it mandated that at least 90 days prior to commencing any steps 
directed toward withdrawal, an insurance company must file a written statement of intent 
containing details of the reasons for its actions. Emergency rule 4ER92-15 activated JUA on a 
temporary basis to provide residential property coverage to policyholders of insurers that became 
insolvent as a result of Hurricane Andrew (Florida Department of Insurance, 1994).  
Since 1992, a number of state legislature and special sessions were passed to address the 
property insurance crisis (Florida House Committee on Insurance, 1993, 1995; Florida Senate 
Committee on Banking and Insurance, 1997). The fist legislation, House Bill No. 33-A, took 
effect on December 15, 1992. The bill contained three important elements. First, it ratified the 
emergency fix established by the department of insurance when the legislature activated JUA; 
Second, it authorized certain municipalities and counties to issue up to $500 million in tax free 
municipal bonds to fund the shortfall in the FIGA caused by the storm-related insolvencies Third, 
JUA was created to be an insurer of last resort for persons unable to obtain coverage in the 
voluntary market (Florida House Committee on Insurance, 1993; Mittler, 1997).  
The legislature changed the property insurance market in the state. The CAT Fund was 
established after enactment of the 1993 law with a tax exemption. Thereby the fund has grown 
without having to pay taxes on its receipt of annual premiums and investment earnings, 
estimated to be 35 percent of the total (Florida House Committee on Insurance, 1995). The CAT 
Fund is designed to provide cheaper reinsurance to insurers, and insurers are expected to lower 
premiums charged to insureds due to the CAT Fund coverage. Another issue was about insurers’ 
intention to cancel or non-renew policies in high risk counties, and the moratorium phase-out 
was set up and extended. The moratorium, which took effect on November, 14, 1993, prohibited 
an insurer from canceling or non-renewing more than 5 percent of its homeowners’ policies in 
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the state in any 12-month period and 10 percent of its policies in any county (Florida House 
Committee on Insurance, 1995).  
Over the evolvement and enactment of legislation over a decade after Hurricane Andrew, 
the government-run insurance programs, such as the Florida Citizens, have contributed to the 
restoration of the market while arguably become competing to the private insurance sectors 
(Klein, 2008). 2007 legislature further acerbated the situation. It expanded the CAT Fund 
coverage for the 2007, 2008 and 2009 seasons, and provided an additional amount of CAT 
coverage of up to $10 million dollars at a 50 percent of premiums discount to small and new 
insurers. Eligible insurers for such coverage purchase included limited apportionment companies 
that began writing business in 2007 and insurers approved to participate in 2006 or 2007. 
Accordingly, insurers are expected to file their rates reflecting the savings or reduction in loss 
exposure due to the expanded CAT Fund.  The legislature also rescinds the approval rate 
increase that took effect January 1, 2007 and required Citizens to provide refunds to persons who 
have paid this rate. It also imposed up to a 10 percent of premium assessment on all 
nonhomestead policyholders if a deficit occurs until 2008 (Florida Office of Insurance 
Regulation, 2008).  
With the presence of big catastrophic hurricane risks as well as regulation and legislature 
favorable to residents, the demographic changes in Florida has exhibited the trend which will be 
introduced in the following section.  
2.3 Population Growth Influenced by the Risks, Insurance and Regulation 
As we discussed above, the regulation on property insurance market subject to 
catastrophe hurricane risks has significantly impacted the private market by largely expanding 
government-run insurance programs. Subsidization from low risk areas to high risk areas at the 
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expense of tax-payers’ money may arise in the case. Perceiving the government’s generous 
financial support to hurricane-prone zones, the residents and/or migrants to Florida may have 
stronger incentives to take advantage of this favorable public policy by moving to such areas 
without bearing the corresponding risks.  
Since the 1980s, the state of Florida has experienced rapid population growth 
significantly above the national population growth rate. The National Ocean and Atmosphere 
Administration (2008) documented the largest rate of population change 1980 to 2003 occurred 
in coastal counties. Flagler County located in the southeast of Florida increased 470 percent, 
followed by Osceola County at 318 percent during the period. As the office of Economics and 
Demographic Research (EDR) reported, the state growth rates were nearly 33 percent and 23.5 
percent in the ’80s and ’90s, respectively. From 2000 to 2009, Florida’s population grew by 17.7 
percent over the eight-year period to 18,851,975. Currently, Florida remains the fourth largest 
state behind California, Texas and New York (EDR, 2009).  
Natural population increase and migration contribute to population increase. Natural 
increase refers to the difference between births and deaths, while domestic and international 
migration also contribute to population growth. According to the EDR’s Florida demographic 
summary, in the period from April 1, 2000, to April 1, 2008, the natural increase accounted for 
14.4 percent of Florida’s growth, and net migration accounted for 85.6 percent. Further about 
35.2 percent of Florida’s total net migration is due to international migration estimated by the 
Census Burea, which could be explained by the labor force movement from Mexico and South 
America countries to Florida due to its economic prosperity and convenient location. Generally, 
big cities in the coastal areas that offer plenty of job opportunities, such as Miami and Palm 
Beach, have attracted more immigrants to relocate there. In terms of age, the population aged 85 
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and older has grown fastest in the last two decades, increasing by 61.2 percent during the ’90s 
and forecasted to increase by 55.8 percent between 2000 and 2010 (EDR, 2009). Florida has 
increasingly become a “retirement magnet” as a migratory destination for retirees in recent 
decades (Frey, 2003).  
The above statistics show that the population in Florida has been growing significantly 
over the past decades whereas migration plays an important role to the population growth. With 
respective to hurricane risks, the availability of insurance coverage and insurance price has been 
a big issue for both migrants and residents. In this case, the government regulation or financial 
support to insureds may have effect on individuals’ decision – stay or move in or move out of 
Florida. There is great deal of literature on the effect of public policies on population growth or 
migration, which will be introduced in the flowing section.  
 
3. Economics of Government Regulation and Intervention 
3.1 Competitive Market and Market Failure 
In economic theory, a perfect competitive industry requires large numbers of sellers and 
buyers, a homogeneous commodity, free entry and exit, perfect information, and prices 
determined by the interaction of supply and demand. In the long-run equilibrium state of a 
competitive industry, the marginal cost of production is equal to the price, economic profits are 
zero; and each firm operates at the lowest unit cost.  Thus, resources are employed at maximum 
production efficiency under competition.  Competition decentralizes and disperses power 
between buyers and sellers. The resource is allocated through the interaction of supply and 
demand on the market, and not through the conscious exercise of power held in private hands 
(e.g., under monopoly) or government hands (i.e., under state enterprise or government 
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regulation). Hence, competitive market processes solve the economic problem impersonally, and 
not through the personal control of entrepreneurs or bureaucrats. A competitive market system 
sets no barriers for entries and exits, which entails freedom of opportunity for individuals. 
Individuals can freely choose what to trade, only constrained by their own talents, abilities and 
financial capitals (Scherer, 1979).  
In reality perfect competition can not be realized, but “workable competition” can be 
attained, which functions well and provides most of the benefits of a perfect competition 
(Scherer, 1979). A workably competitive market generally is characterized by numerous sellers 
and buyers, low entry and exit barriers, good information, and the absence of artificial 
restrictions on competition. Workable competition reasonably approximates the conditions for 
perfect competition to the degree that little regulation is required to achieve an efficient 
allocation of resources (Scherer & Ross, 1990). Cummins and Weiss (1991) analyzed the 
structure and conduct of property-liability insurance industry and showed that this market is 
competitively structured, with numerous firms competing for business in most lines and low 
entry barriers.  
However, market failures occur under certain market conditions, such as market power, 
externalities, incomplete information, transaction costs, etc. (see Bator, 1958; Williamson, 1971). 
In the context of insurance industry, given its relatively lower market concentration and lower 
entry barriers (Cummins & Weiss, 1991), market failures include severe asymmetric information 
problems and principal-agent conflicts, which imply that the information problems arguably are 
the industry’s most important market imperfections11.  
Asymmetric information problems exist when one party to a transaction have superior 
information that the other does not have. Insurance consumers, particularly individuals and 
                                                 
11 See Pauly (1968), Pauly (1974), and Akerlof (1970), Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976).  
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households, face significant challenges in judging the financial conditions of insurers due to their 
limited knowledge and lack of professional expertise. Also, some individuals may have difficulty 
properly understanding the complex insurance contracts and products. On the other hand, 
insurance consumers have better information about their risks, and high risk buyers have more 
incentives to purchase insurance, which adverse selection problem arises. The insurance market 
may fail in this case (Akerlof, 1970). 
Principal-agent problems arise when insurance consumers have difficulty monitoring and 
controlling the behavior of insurers after they purchase policies and pay premiums. The insurer 
might make high risk investments that are hazardous to policyholders’ interests by failing to 
fulfill its obligations to policyholders. In case of insurer insolvency, it is very difficult for 
policyholders to recover funds or force the insurer to meet its obligations. Moreover, the problem 
can be exacerbated because of unequal resources and bargaining power between insurers and 
individual consumers.  
Besides incomplete information, market power can also lead to market failure. Market 
power is the ability of one or a few sellers (or buyers) to influence the price of a product or 
service. In the insurance context, for instance, one or several big insurers in certain business lines 
could exercise collusion price to consumers for excessive returns, which leads to an inefficient 
allocation of resources and harm consumers’ benefits.  
To fix the above market failures, theories of regulation and governmental interference 
have been proposed and applied to enhance economic performance, which will be introduced in 
the next part.  A detailed review of these theories may not be necessary, but it is important to 
understand the implications to stakeholders in insurance markets, including insurers, 
policyholders, legislators and regulators. 
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3. 2 Theories of Government Regulation 
Economic analysis of government regulation has proceeded rapidly12. There are several 
explanations for regulation, each mirroring a facet of reality. One is the "pubic interest theory", 
where regulation is required to correct matters and serve the public interest in case market 
failures occur (see Bonbright, 1961). In the insurance context, the public interest argues that the 
regulation of insurer solvency is used to address the inefficiency caused by costly information 
and agency problem (Munch & Smallwood, 1981). Insurers have diminished incentives to 
maintain a high level of financial safety because their personal assets are not at risk for unfunded 
obligations to policyholders that would arise from insolvency.  It is costly for policyholders to 
assess an insurer’s financial condition. Insurance is a technical and complicated subject, and the 
true financial strength of an insurance company can only be determined by expert examination. 
There is also embedded principle-agent problem – insurers can increase their risk after 
policyholders have purchased policy and paid premiums.   
A second hypothesis states that regulation occurs because there are well-organized vested 
interests expecting to benefit from regulation (see Jordan, 1972; Peltzman, 1976; and Stigler, 
1971). This "interest group pressure" theory suggests that regulation is acquired by groups with 
their own interests and is designed and operated primarily for groups’ benefit. Under this 
scenario, regulators are motivated to maximize political support rather than economic efficiency. 
Meier (1988) further set up a model to explain the ideological motivation of regulators. In his 
model of the political economy of insurance regulation, he hypothesized that the insurance 
industry should favor regulatory policies that benefit it and oppose policies that restrict it. Meier 
observed that the insurance industry is not a monolith and that different segments of the 
insurance may have different views with respect to certain regulatory issues. The ability of the 
                                                 
12 For example, see Alfred (1970), and Schmalensee (1979).  
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industry to influence regulation is hypothesized to be a function of its political resources, 
including its size and wealth.  
 Insurance is important to the welfare of the individuals, households, firms and the overall 
economy, and it warrants close government attention. It also implies that the public interest 
should be the paramount consideration in guiding government intervention, though regulators are 
also influenced by political factors. Hence, the rationale for government intervention in case of 
market failures is based on promoting or restoring economic efficiency. Optimal regulation 
should be directed by an ideal set of policies that attempt to replicate the conditions of a 
competitive market and maximize social welfare.  
Another aspect of insurance regulation in practice is how social preferences impact the 
public policy used to enhance efficiency in a free market economy. For example, the public 
would prefer lower premiums in general regardless the real risk status. Lower prices suppressed 
by regulation might benefit consumers in the short-run until firms leave the market and the 
supply of insurance contracts. This artificially-induced unavailability of insurance seems against 
the public interest in the long-run, but there is strong political support for low prices. In this 
sense, the regulation or public polices influenced by voters or special interest groups may 
diverge from the economic rationale, resulting adverse consequences or “government failures”.  
3.3 Potential Problems Caused by Regulation and Intervention 
Not all market failures may be corrected by government regulation and intervention. The 
crowding out effect is one of inefficiencies caused by government intervention in the market, 
which means government spending will crowd out private enterprises. If government spending is 
financed through tax increases, that will reduce individuals’ after-tax income and then reduce 
their spending.  If government spending is through borrowing, the higher government demand 
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for saving will drive up interest rates which, in turn, will thwart private investment. In the 
insurance markets, the establishment of government insurance programs, such as residual 
markets and state-run insurance providers, can make private firms exit the market if the 
government providers sell below the actual costs. Thus, private insurers with higher capital costs 
and other expenses are unable to provide a competitive price and are forced to leave the market.  
Another potential problem induced by government intervention is cross subsidization, 
which pertains to the practice of charging higher prices to one group to subsidize lower prices for 
another group. Faulhaber (1975) analyzed the issue of cross-subsidization in enterprises with 
economies of joint production. He found that subsidization of prices in an otherwise competitive 
market would lead to inefficient entry and instability of the joint enterprises. The Florida 
insurance residual market provider, the Florida Citizens is a good example in this case. To make 
insurance coverage available to every applicant, the state of Florida provides protection in the 
form of subsidized prices to high risk residents who are either unable to purchase insurance from 
voluntary market or are reluctant to pay private market prices. The Florida Citizens has been 
established to help alleviate availability problems and, in some cases, to charge relatively lower 
prices to its policyholders. When the Florida Citizens losses exceed its claims-paying capacity in 
a single year, it is required by state law to impose a statewide assessment on most lines of 
business in the state. By law, insurers my recoup the amount from all policyholders as part of the 
homeowners insurance rate-making process in the state,13 where low risk policyholders subsidize 
the high risk policyholders.  Also, state general revenue funds may be appropriated to offset the 
                                                 
13 To cover 2004’s shortfall, Citizens imposed a 6.8 percent surcharge on policyholders, amounting to about $100 
per $1500 in premiums (Insurance Information Institute, 2008).  
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deficit.14  This divergence of price and cost leads to inefficiency with the suboptimal allocation 
of resources.  
A moral hazard problem may also arise with the provision of government insurance 
programs as well. Hansen and Imrohoroglu (1992) studied the potential welfare loss of 
unemployment insurance with liquidity constraints and moral hazard. The authors found that if 
the replacement ratio can be arbitrarily set, insureds may incur moral hazard by choosing not to 
work with the coverage of unemployment insurance. As a result, unemployment insurance can 
be actually harmful to the economy rather than improve it. Pauly (1974) analyzed conditions to 
attain the competitive equilibrium when both provision and competitive marketing of 
supplementary coverage are permitted to exist side by side. Since “supplementary purchases 
raise the probability of loss and hence raise the expected loss of the purchaser within the public 
program as well as the loss in any private insurance”, a premium for public insurance should be 
assessed on those who buy supplementary coverage, even if the public insurance were provided 
through general taxes. Using this reasoning, a moral hazard problem may arise in the Florida 
homeowner insurance market where state-run and private reinsurance coexist in the market at the 
same time. Further, catastrophe reinsurance is sold by the state and available for all insurers to 
purchase at lower prices compared to other private reinsurance in the market. With reinsurance 
purchased from the Florida CAT Fund at relatively lower costs, insurers are expected by 
legislators and regulators to provide more coverage to insureds at lower prices (Florida House 
Committee on Insurance, 1995; Florida Senate Committee on Banking and Insurance, 1997; 
Florida Office of Insurance Regulation, 2008).While possibly crowding out private reinsurance, 
the provision of the low cost reinsurance fund may encourage insurers, which are not at good 
                                                 
14 To offset Citizens’ 2005 deficit, hurricane insurance bill (SB 1980) was passed by the state legislature in May 
2006, provided for a $715 million appropriation of state general revenue dollars to the fund (Insurance Information 
Institute, 2008). 
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financial conditions, to enter or stay in a risky market. Thus, we see the possibility of state-
funded insurance programs induced moral hazard.  
3.4 Migration and the Effect of Public Programs 
A number of studies have examined the incentives for population, and specifically the 
relationship between the migration and public policies (for example, Conway & Houtenville, 
1998; Davies, 2001; Sjaastad, 1962; Rosenzweig & Wolpin, 1988). Human migration has its 
costs and returns, and it can be treated as a means in promoting efficient resource allocation 
when it is related to correct income disparities (Sjaastad, 1962). Money returns and non-money 
returns, such as climate, cultural environment, could attract people to move to another county or 
state across the country.  
In terms of money returns, the public policies or programs, which may influence income 
or benefits received by residents, may impact people’s decision to relocate. For example, 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1988) employed a conditional logit approach to estimate the model of 
interstate migration in the United States from 1986 to 1996. They found that the variables of 
population, distance, per capital income and unemployment rate had effects on the population 
migration. It is worth noticing that the coefficients of per capital income and unemployment rate 
changed substantially over the study period according to findings. In addition, Conway and 
Houtenville (1998) investigated whether elderly migrants were affected by state fiscal policies 
and discussed the possible consequences. In their model, the migration flows were estimated as a 
function of the states’ amenities, cost of living composition of government spending and 
alternative specification of the tax system. They concluded that elderly migration was influenced 
by state fiscal policy. In the context of the migration to Florida, this paper attempts to analyze the 
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effect of the government-run insurance programs on the demographic change over the study 
period. 
In sum, the residual market and government intervention in the Florida’s homeowner 
insurance markets, which are applied to correct the alleged private insurance market’s failure, 
may induce different types of inefficiencies, such as crowding-out of private risk bearing 
activities, cross subsidies and moral hazard.  In the next section I propose the hypothesis to 
analyze the effects of price regulation and government intervention on the private insurance 
market and demographic movements. Further, we assess the interaction of private markets and 
government regulation empirically in the next section.          
 
4. Empirical Tests 
4.1 Hypotheses 
The significant growth in population and economic development in coastal areas 
arguably have been attributable to the increases in hurricane losses in recent years. In certain 
high risk areas, however, subsidized homeowner insurance and flood insurance are readily 
available in the market to property owners at a lower cost. Migrants, who perceive the benefits of 
government insurance, could have more incentives to move to higher risk areas because 
insurance premiums are below their social costs. This selectivity trend may indicate the “moral 
hazard” which arises among migrants due to the favorable public policy. Hence, Hypothesis I is 
derived as follows:  
Hypothesis I: Migration to Florida's high risk areas is positively associated with 
subsidies from government insurance programs.  
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With respective to insurers in private insurance market, the presence of government-run 
program, such as the Flood Insurance and the CAT Fund, may entail moral hazard problem in the 
market. Rather than measure risks actuarially and take on appropriate amount of risks with 
adequate surplus, insurers may be encouraged to over-underwrite risks beyond their capacities. 
In contrast to the goal of correcting market failure by government intervention, inefficiency is 
caused in this case. Therefore, Hypothesis II is stated as follows:  
Hypothesis II: Insurers in the private sector assume more risks in hurricane-prone areas 
with the provision of the CAT Fund and Flood Insurance. 
Meanwhile, the Florida Citizens may “crowd-out” the private insurers due to its lower 
subsidized premiums. Compared to the CAT Fund and the Flood Insurance, the presence of the 
Florida Citizens could decrease the insurance purchase from private insurers. So Hypothesis II is 
proposed to estimate insurers’ overall market responses to the public policies in the Florida’s 
homeowner insurance market subject to huge catastrophic losses.  
4.2 Data 
A panel data covering private property insurance companies, government-run insurance 
programs and demographic changes in Florida from 1997 to 2007 is constructed to test the 
hypotheses established above.  
The Florida population information by county by year is obtained from the Florida 
Demographic Estimating Conference and Florida Demographic Forecast, 15 and then the 
population growth is calculated accordingly. Since net migration accounted for 85.6 percent of 
total population growth of Florida from April 2000 to April 2008 (EDR, 2009) and information 
on net migration is not available at county level, the population growth rate is applied to reflect 
the demographic changes in counties across Florida during the study period. Florida population 
                                                 
15 See http://edr.state.fl.us/conferences/population/demographic.htm 
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in 2000 and 2007 and homeowner insurance exposures in 2007 are presented in Table 6. We see 
that Flagler, Sumter and Osceola are the three fastest-growing counties, with growth rates of 87.8 
percent, 68.3 percent and 40.6 percent respectively. Monroe County, which is the southwestern 
most county in Florida which includes the Florida Keys, has experienced negative population 
growth of -0.8 percent from 2000 to 2007. However, Palm Beach, a county on the South Eastern 
coast, has the growth rate of 14 percent, increasing from 1.1 million to 1.3 million. In sum, 
significant population growth has been observed for some counties relatively far away from 
costal zones, while population has decreased for some places most close to the oceans. It may 
imply that the potential huge losses from hurricanes hamper the population growth in some risky 
areas. With the county income data from Bureau of Economic Analysis in the Department of 
Commerce,16 per capital income at county level in Florida is calculated.  
The QUASR database provides homeowner insurance information by firm by county 
from 1997 to 2007. The phrase of QUASR is the abbreviation of the QUArterly Supplementary 
Reports, which are prepared by the insurers doing business in Florida and reported to the state's 
Office of Insurance Regulation.17 Homeowner insurance direct written premiums, exposures and 
policy numbers in force by firm, by county and by year within the study period are available in 
the database. The market share of Florida Citizens in terms of exposures, direct written 
premiums and policy numbers in force are calculated accordingly.  
The CAT Fund reinsurance purchase by private insurers, which is measured by the 
percentage of CAT Fund reinsurance out of the total reinsurance purchases, is computed from 
annual reports by NAIC for each insurer in each year. In the dataset, the mean of CAT Fund 
purchase is 8.3 percent, suggesting an insurer on average cedes 8.3 percent of its business 
                                                 
16 See http://www.bea.gov/regional/reis/ 
17 See http://www.floir.com/pdf/qsr_1b.pdf.  
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portfolio to the CAT Fund, leaving almost 90 percent of business to the private reinsurance 
market.18 In terms of Flood Insurance in Florida, the information on the direct written premiums, 
policy numbers in force, the amount of coverage, claims numbers and the amount paid by county 
by year are obtained from Federal Emergency Management Agency that operates the program.  
To control for firm characteristics, firm-specific variables of assets, return on equity, 
liquidity and leverage ratios are collected from A.M. Best Company.19 The amount of assets 
signals the size of an insurance company; return on equity indicates the profitability of a firm; 
liquidity refers to the ability of an asset to be converted into cash quickly and without a price 
discount; leverage measures the ability of a firm to meet its financial obligations.  
This is a three-dimensional dataset at firm, county and year levels, which allows the 
empirical tests to be applied from different perspectives. The variable definitions and data source 
are listed in Table 5, and the descriptive statistics of variables will be discussed in the following 
part.  
4.3. Estimated Equations 
With the panel data on insurance companies, private and government insurance purchases 
and claims in the Florida homeowners insurance market from 1997 to 2007, the proposed 
hypotheses on the effect of government regulation and intervention on the private insurance 
sector, i.e. if there are any moral hazard problems related to public policies, are tested below.  
• Hypothesis I Test - Estimated Equations (1) – (3) 
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18 It is important to note that the NAIC data does not allow one to separate reinsurance purchases by line of primary 
business or by state of primary insurance sales.  Thus, we look at the percentage of reinsurance from the Florida 
CAT fund as being solely from Florida risks.    
19 Since NAIC annual reports do not directly provide financial ratios of insurers, such as return on equity, liquidity 
and leverage, in annual reports, we use these ratios from A.M. Best Company, which computes financial ratings and 
ratios based on the specified formula.  
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where tiPG , = Population growth in county i at year t ; ti
EXPFC , = Market share of Florida 
Citizens in exposures in county i in year t ; tiDPWFC , is the market share of Florida Citizens in 
direct written premiums in county i in year t ; tiPIFFC , is the market share of Florida Citizens in 
policy numbers in force in county i  in year t ;  1, −tiCOVFI = Log of flood insurance coverage in 
county i in year 1−t ; 1, −tiDPWFI = Log of flood insurance direct written premiums in county i in 
year 1−t ; 1, −tiPIFFI = Log of flood insurance policy numbers in force in county i in year 1−t ; 
1D = Dummy variable for South Atlantic area; 2D = Dummy variable for Gulf Coast area; 3D = 
Dummy variable for Panhandle area; tiIncome , = Per capital county income for county i in year t ; 
tiCrime , = Non-violent crime rate for county i in year t . ti ,ε = Error term for county i in year t ; 
The population migration in Florida is of our interest to test the possible effects of public 
policies in the property insurance on the demographic changes subject to catastrophic hurricane 
risks. Further, net migration rates for each county in the state could be appropriate measures for 
such demographic changes due to the potential subsidization between high and low risk areas in 
this case. The net migration rate, however, is not available at county level, so the population 
growth rate is used instead in my study because the migration accounted for 85.6 percent of 
population growth from April, 2000 to April, 2008 according to Economic Demographic 
Research (EDR, 2009). As discussed in section 3, a number of studies examined the incentives 
for population growth, and specifically the relationship between the migration and public 
policies (for example, Conway & Houtenville, 1998; Davies, 2001; Sjaastad, 1962; Rosenzweig 
 108
& Wolpin, 1988).  Some economic and societal measures were examined to be related to the 
population migration, such as per capital income, unemployment rate and tax rate. Since the 
empirical test in this paper is designed at the county level with an intention to see the 
microstructure of migration in Florida especially between high and low risk areas, the 
corresponding variables at county level are therefore needed. In terms of unemployment and tax 
rate, such variables are only available at state level. To approximate these economic measures, 
the non-violent crime rate at county level is adopted instead.  
The participation of the Florida Citizens and Flood Insurance are measured by direct 
written premiums, exposures and policy numbers in force, which are included in regressions (1) 
– (3) respectively. Risk area dummies indicate the relatively catastrophic risk level of a county 
with respective to its distance to oceans. Figure 5 shows the territories for each risk area in the 
state map of Florida, and Table 1 lists the counties which belong to each risk area. Table 7.1 
summarizes the descriptive statistics of variables included in equations (1) – (3). There are 670 
observations in total for 67 counties from 1998 to 2007. The maximum population growth rate in 
Florida is 13.3 percent, while it can be as low as -4.4 percent. The Florida Citizens accounts for 
35 percent of the total homeowners insurance market at maximum and does not cover some 
certain counties, resulting an average market share of around 2 percent. Flood insurance 
coverage, exposures and policy numbers in force are taken logarithm to make commensurable to 
other variables in regression equations. To control for population size, these three variables are 
normalized by population. On average, per capital county income is around $14602 and the non-
violent crime rate per 100 population is around 7 percent.  
Recall that Hypothesis I states that population migration, which is reflected by population 
growth, is positively related to the provision of government insurance programs, such as the 
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Florida Citizens and the Flood Insurance, with the presence of moral hazard problem. Thus, the 
coefficients of Florida Citizens and Flood Insurance are expected to be positive, which suggests 
that people are inclined to move to hurricane-prone areas with subsidized insurance provided by 
state or federal governments. Moreover, the positive coefficients of risk area dummies indicate 
that these high-risk areas are different from the interior parts of the Florida state.20 
In terms of potential moral hazard problem in the private market related to government 
regulation and intervention, risky insurers, especially which are less liquid and more leveraged, 
are hypothesized to aggressively underwrite homeowners insurance with the presence of Flood 
Insurance and CAT Fund. Therefore, the estimated equations for Hypothesis II are stated as 
follows:  
• Hypothesis II Test - Estimated Equations (4) – (6) 
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where tikEXPHO ,, = Log of exposures of homeowners insurance for insurer k in county i  in year 
t ; tikDPWHO ,, = Log of direct written premiums of homeowners insurance for insurer k in county 
i in year t ; tikEIFHO ,, = Log of policy numbers in force of homeowners insurance for insurer k in 
                                                 
20 South Atlantic, Gulf Coast and Panhandle areas are defined as high risk areas whereby the rest of areas refer to the 
interior part. See Table 1 for risk area categories definition.  
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county i in year t ; tiEXPFC , = Market share of the Florida Citizens in exposures in county i in 
year t ; tiDPWFC , = Market share of the Florida Citizens in direct premium written in county i in 
year t ; tiPIFFC , = Market share of the Florida Citizens of policy numbers in force in county i in 
year t ; 1, −tiCOVFI = Log of the Flood Insurance coverage in county i in year 1−t ; 1, −tiDPWFI = Log 
of the Flood Insurance direct written premiums in county i in year 1−t ; 1, −tiPIFFI = Log of the 
Flood Insurance policy numbers in force in county i in year 1−t ; 1, −tkPTCF = Percentage of the 
CAT Fund reinsurance purchase out of total reinsurance for insurer k in year t ; tiAPCT , = Proxy 
of homeowners insurance price which is calculated as total premiums divided by total coverage 
in county i in year t ; tikAP ,, = Proxy of insurer k ’s homeowners insurance price which is 
calculated as premiums divided by coverage for insurer k in county i in year t ; tiIncome , = 
Control variable for county i at year t ; 1D = Dummy variable for South Atlantic area; 2D = 
Dummy variable for Gulf Coast area; 3D = Dummy variable for Panhandle area; tkSize , = Log of 
total assets for insurer k  in year t ; tkROE , = Net income to equity for insurer k  in year t ; 
tkLeverage , = Debt to capital for insurer k  in year t ; tkLiquidity , = Proportion of liabilities 
covered by cash and short-term investment for insurer k  in year t ; tik ,,ε = Error term for insurer 
k in county i  in year t .  
The lags of the Flood Insurance and the CAT Fund from previous periods are adopted in 
the regressions, because the effects of those two programs on the demand for homeowners 
insurance are perceived to pass to the next period. For example, property owners make their 
decisions whether and to whom to purchase homeowners insurance based on the historical claim 
payments records of Flood Insurance in their communities.  
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The variables indicating government interventions, including the Florida Citizens market 
shares, the Flood Insurance and the CAT Fund purchase, are applied to examine the effects on 
insurers’ risk-taking behaviors in the homeowners insurance market. Commensurately, the 
exposures, direct written premiums and policy numbers in force of the Florida Citizens are 
employed into regressions (4) – (6), respectively. In equation (4), the variable of tiAPCT , proxies 
the homeowner insurance price as total direct written premiums divided by total exposures 
insured for a county in a year. It measures an average level of insurance premium at a county 
level. The firm characteristics of size, return on equity, leverage and liquidity are applied as 
control variables. 
 As suggested by the crowding-out effect of the residual market, the coefficients on 
Florida Citizens are expected to be negative, which means the residual market hinders the 
development of the private sector. In terms of state funded catastrophe reinsurance, it is expected 
to increase the coverage availability by private insurers as it provides relatively “cheaper” 
reinsurance and reduces the underwriting costs of primary insurers. The provision of flood 
insurance is expected to be positively associated with the amount of Florida’s homeowner 
insurance for the flood insurance can be complements of homeowner insurance. The inclusion of 
firm factors, such as leverage and liquidity, are able to reflect what kind of firms are taking more 
risk exposures in the market under government subsidy and involvement. Firms with lower 
leverage and higher liquidity signify their sound financial capability, and will restore the market 
competition and enhance efficiency which perfectly meets the goal of government’s regulation. 
If firms with higher leverage and lower liquidity are observed to aggressively underwrite high 
risks by filling coverage gaps left by other big retrenching insurers and ceding business to 
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catastrophe fund at lower premiums, we may infer that government intervention and cross 
subsidization entails moral hazard problem in the market.  
Table 7.2 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables in equations (4) – (6). The mean 
of the CAT Fund purchase is 8.3 percent for a firm, which shows that, on average, insurers 
obtain most of reinsurance coverage from the private market. The variable of Citizens market 
shares appear to be volatile, since the mean of market share in exposures is 1.5 percent with the 
standard deviation of 4.4 percent. Further, the maximum Citizen market share in exposures is 33 
percent. The market share in direct written premiums and policy numbers in force follow the 
similar pattern, which implies that some counties with high hurricane risks are more covered by 
the Florida Citizens compared to other counties.  
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Results of Hypothesis I Test  
Recall that Hypothesis I states that migration to Florida high risk areas are positively 
associated with a subsidy from government programs, such as the Florida Citizens and the 
National Flood Insurance Program. With lower premiums provided by the government insurance 
programs in relatively high risk areas, people could obtain homeowners insurance coverage at 
lower prices. Then residents could be more attracted to relocate to Florida’s high risk areas all 
other things being equal. With the inadequate insurance premiums and increasing exposures in 
these areas, the homeowners insurance market may incur devastating losses once hurricanes hit 
the state. In the extreme case, the private market may collapse and the government takes over the 
market.  
The relationship between the population growth, the provision of the Florida Citizens and 
the Flood Insurance in the Florida homeowners insurance market are examined from 1998 to 
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2007. The empirical tests are performed at three levels: exposures, direct written premiums and 
policy numbers in force. Table 8.1 summaries the empirical results when the Florida Citizens 
market share in exposures and the Flood Insurance coverage are taken into account as the 
explanatory variables. Four random effect models with various sets of explanatory variables are 
applied according to Hausman test and presented in order. In Model A1 the variable of the Flood 
Insurance coverage is statistically significant with the estimated coefficient of 0.385, while 
Model A2 uses the lag of Flood Insurance coverage instead which shows a smaller effect on the 
population increase. The results can be explained as 1 percentage increase of the Flood Insurance 
coverage is associated with around 0.04 percent of population increase overall all others being 
equal. To control the population size effect, the Flood Insurance coverage is normalized by 
dividing the population. The coefficients of the normalized Flood Insurance coverage and the 
corresponding lag variable are still statistically significant as shown in Model C and D, which 
reconfirms that the provision of government programs is positively related to the population 
increase in the state of Florida. The Citizens market share in exposures, however, is not 
statistically significant to population changes in all four models as shown in Table 8.1. In 
addition, the control variable of income is statistically significant, and positively related to the 
population increase, which is consistent with the previous literature. Thus, the higher the income 
per capital, the higher the population growth rate is. In three scenario tests, the coefficients of the 
dummy of the South Atlantic area are significantly negative, which implies that the South 
Atlantic area experiences a low rate of population growth compared to the inner areas of Florida 
during the study period.  
Table 8.2 provides the regression results when the government intervention is measured 
as direct written premiums. Model B1-B4, fixed effect or random effect models based on 
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Hausman test, are applied taking account into the direct written premiums of Flood Insurance, 
normalized direct written premiums and lags of those two variables, respectively. Among the 
four measures of the Flood Insurance provision, only the lag of the Flood Insurance direct 
written premiums is statistically significant and positively related to the population growth. The 
estimated coefficient is 0.253, which means that 1 percent increase of Flood Insurance premium 
in the previous year is associated with 0.003 percent of population growth. Table 8.3 shows the 
results when the Citizens market shares in policy numbers and Flood Insurance policy numbers 
in force are examined. In this case, only the variable of Flood Insurance policy numbers is 
statistically significant, and the positive coefficient implies a positive relationship between the 
Flood Insurance policy numbers and population growth.  
To look into the county effect on the population growth in detail in line with other 
variables of interest, 67 counties are included in the regression to examine the specific effect of 
each county on the population growth. The omitted (or default) county in the regression is set to 
Miami-Dade County, and the other 66 counties are created as dummy variables. Table 8.4 
provides the estimated coefficients on county population growth rate with county dummies. The 
same as previous tests, lag of the Flood Insurance coverage and the corresponding normalized 
variable are significantly positive, even to a large extent, at 1.18 and 1.399. The variable of 
income is positively associated with the population growth as well. With respective to the county 
dummies, surprisingly, most coefficients are statistically significant and positive, which means 
that these counties experience a higher population growth compared to Miami-Dade.  
As discussed above, a couple of factors, such as the existence of residual insurance and 
Flood Insurance, can contribute to the population changes upon the occurrence of hurricanes. A 
“structural break” of growth rate before and after hurricanes, therefore, is expected in such 
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circumstances. The effects on population growth rates of Florida two years before and after 
2004-2005 hurricane seasons are examined accordingly by using Chow test. The results vary 
with or without inclusion of county dummies. When county dummies are omitted from other 
explanatory variables, the structural break does not exist by failing to reject the null hypothesis 
that effects of explanatory factors on growth rates are same before and after hurricane seasons. 
The addition of county dummies, however, generates a contrary result that suggests independent 
variables have different effects on growth rates before and after hurricanes.  
In sum, the supportive evidences on Hypothesis I are found that migration within Florida 
is associated with the National Flood Insurance Program during the study period because the 
estimated coefficients of the variable of Flood Insurance are statistically significant and positive. 
Meanwhile, the presence of the Florida Citizens does not impose the significant effect on the 
population growth.  
4.4.2 Results of Hypothesis II Test  
Hypothesis II states that insurers in the private sector assume more risks in hurricane-
prone areas with the provision of the CAT Fund and the Flood Insurance. This test is designed to 
examine the effects of government-funded insurance programs on the risk-taking behaviors of 
property insurance companies in Florida from 1998 to 2007. Table 8.5 provides the estimated 
coefficients on homeowner insurance exposures when the Citizens market share, CAT Fund 
purchases and Flood Insurance coverage are taken into account. Models D1 to D4 account for the 
explanatory variables of Flood Insurance coverage, normalized Flood Insurance coverage and 
lags of Flood Insurance coverage. All four models show that the presence of the Citizens is 
negatively related to the homeowner insurance exposures, and the provision of the CAT Fund 
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and the Flood Insurance are positively associated with the private homeowners insurance 
exposures covered.  
The estimated coefficient of the Citizens market share in terms of exposures is 
statistically significant and negative at -0.014, which means that 1 percent of Citizens expansion 
will reduce the private market in terms of exposures by 0.014 percent all others being equal. 
None of the previous literature, to my best knowledge, has empirically examined the effect of the 
residual market on the private sector, although a number of scholars indicate that the Florida 
Citizens has become more and more aggressive in its pricing and has discouraged the 
development of the private market (Grace & Klein, 2007; Klein, 2008). The state-funded 
reinsurance program, the CAT Fund, plays a significant role in boosting the private insurance 
market as 1 percent of catastrophe fund purchase leads to 14 percent increase in exposures 
covered all others being equal. The results also show that national flood insurance supplements 
the development of the homeowner insurance market to a lesser extent compared to the 
catastrophe fund. The insurance price variable at the county level, which is defined as 
homeowner insurance premiums divided by exposures by county, is statistically significant and 
negative when the regressor of the Flood Insurance coverage is normalized by population. The 
higher the price charged in a county, the lower the insured exposures.   
 County income is shown to be positively associated with homeowner insurance 
exposures, which suggest that wealthy counties have more exposures covered. In addition, 
Kuneuther et al (2009) showed that the income elasticity was positive for homeowners insurance 
in Florida. Firm characteristic variables describing firms’ financial capacity and stability, such as 
assets and leverage, show a positive effect on the insurers’ underwritten exposures. Higher 
leverage ratio implies firms borrow more debts to finance their business and may encounter 
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financial problems when they fail to repay the debts on time. In this sense, the firms with higher 
leverage ratio can be regarded as financially risky insurers. Therefore, the evidence that the 
variable of leverage ratio is positive to exposures covered shows that risky firms aggressively 
underwrite in the market with the provision of government insurance programs. This finding 
supports the hypothesis of moral hazard problem arising from insurers. With respect to location 
effects, the South Atlantic area is statistically different from the interior parts of the state, and has 
a negative relationship with the homeowner insurance exposures. 
Table 8.6 summarizes the regression results on homeowner insurance direct written 
premiums. The variables of the Flood Insurance premiums, lag of the Flood Insurance premiums, 
normalized and lag of normalized Flood Insurance are included in Model E1 to E4 respectively. 
The presence of the CAT Fund and the Flood Insurance are tested to be statistically significant 
and positive to the homeowner insurance premiums. With respective to firms’ characteristics, the 
variables of size, return on equity, leverage and liquidity are shown to be statistically significant. 
While the size, return on equity and leverage are positively related to the homeowner insurance 
premiums, the variable of liquidity is negatively associated with the homeowner insurance 
premiums. Since liquidity captures how rapidly firms convert assets into cash, lower liquidity 
indicates the insurers may have  difficulty in paying claims caused by catastrophic losses when 
they are not able to convert assets into cash quickly. Hence, the negative relationship between 
the liquidity and the homeowner insurance premiums implies that firms with lower liquidity, 
surprisingly, are underwriting more homeowner insurance. This finding supports the hypothesis 
of moral hazard problem that risky insurers adversely underwrite more homeowner insurance 
with the provision of government insurance programs, such as the CAT Fund and the Flood 
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Insurance. Table 8.7 presents the results when the homeowner insurance policy numbers in force 
are examined in regressions, which generate similar results as shown in Table 8.6.  
To examine the specific effects of each county on homeowner insurance, 66 county 
dummies are included in the empirical tests.  The regression results are presented in Table 8.8, 
Table 8.9 and Table 8.10. The omitted county is Miami-Dade, and the estimated coefficients of 
each county show the relative effect on the homeowner insurance purchase with respect to 
Miami-Dade. To be concise, eight counties from four risk categories in the state are selected, and 
the estimated coefficients of these representative counties are reported in the tables. As reported 
in Table 8.8, the estimated coefficients of County Clay and Volusia in North Atlantic area, 
Sarasota in Gulf Coast, and Franklin in Panhandle area are statistically significant and positive to 
the homeowners insurance exposures. It implies that more exposures are likely to be covered in 
these areas in the state of Florida relative to Miami-Dade. This finding is consistent with the 
observation of Klein (2008) that insurers had retrenched from the hurricane-prone zones after 
catastrophic losses in the last two decades. The pattern, however, is not obvious when 
homeowner insurance premiums and policy numbers in force are considered. In sum, the county 
effect on the homeowner insurance seems to be mixed in this case.  
To investigate the specific firm effect on the private insurance market, firm dummies are 
included in the regression analysis. There are 254 firms in the dataset in total, which were in 
business in Florida from 1997 to 2007. State Farm is set as the omitted firm, and the other 253 
firms are denoted as dummies. Table 8.11 presents the estimation results with the selected 
counties and firms’ dummies. Four representative insurers are chosen based on the firm size and 
the time they are in business: 1) Allstate Insurance Company, a big insurer; 2) Lumbermens 
Mutual Casualty Company, a medium-sized company; 3) Merastar Insurance Company, new 
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entrant since 2000; and 4) Auto Club South Insurance Company, a new insurer since 2005. 
Allstate shows no statistically significant effect on the homeowners insurance exposures 
compared to State Farm, which could be explained by the similar big size of those two firms. 
The estimated coefficients of Lumbermens and Auto Club are statistically significant and 
positive, implying those two insurers are more willing to underwrite business in Florida 
compared to State Farm. It is worth noticing that, as a regional insurer with a short business 
history, Auto Club aggressively underwrites in hurricane-prone areas.   
From the empirical results, the Florida Citizens is observed to compete with the private 
insurance market by reducing the homeowner insurance market to a limited extent. The provision 
of government-run insurance programs has promoted the expansion of the insurance market in 
Florida partly as hoped by regulators and legislators. Meanwhile, less liquid insurers and new 
insurers in the market seek to underwrite more homeowner insurance in the market with the 
subsidy from the government, where moral hazard may be the case.   
 
5. Conclusion 
The state of Florida has suffered from a number of large hurricane losses for years. How 
to provide stable and sustainable insurance to property owners in the state has been of interest to 
legislators and regulators. Florida Citizens, as well as other government-funded insurance 
programs, such as the CAT Fund and the Flood Insurance, were established to address the issue 
of coverage availability. This essay examines the effects of those public policies on Florida’s 
population growth and the private insurance market from 1998 to 2007 by setting up two 
hypotheses and carrying on empirical tests,. The supporting evidence suggests that the public 
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policies, which impose heavy insurance regulation and involvement in the private market, may 
create moral hazard problems in the homeowner insurance market in Florida.  
To test the effect of public policies on the people’s incentives to move to high-risk areas, 
the migration to Florida is hypothesized to be positively associated with the implementation of 
government insurance, such as the Florida Citizens or the Flood Insurance. Due to the major 
contribution of migration to population growth and data limitation, the annual population growth 
rates by county in Florida are used instead. I find that the provision of the Flood Insurance is 
positively associated with the population growth in the state of Florida, while the coefficient of 
Citizens is not statistically significant. The risk of flood is excluded from the residential 
insurance policies because of its “uninsurable” characteristics, but the insurance coverage for 
such risk is critical to the financial security of residents in hurricane-prone areas in Florida. By 
providing Flood Insurance to property owners in the high risk zones, the federal government fills 
the gap which may however entail cross subsidization between high and low risks. The results 
suggest that flood insurance lures more people to live in higher-risk areas than they would 
otherwise, which could be explained by moral hazard problem that migrants take advantage of 
subsidized insurance provided by the federal government at lower premiums.  
In terms of homeowner insurance market, private insurance companies are hypothesized 
to assume more risks in the hurricane-prone areas with the provision of the CAT fund and the 
Flood Insurance, while the Citizens may compete with the development of the private market. 
The results show that the CAT fund and the Flood Insurance are positively associated with the 
exposures of insurers, and the Florida Citizens is negatively related to the underwriting of 
insurers. Besides, the income elasticity of homeowners insurance demand is positive, which is 
consistent with the previous literature. The location of counties, however, does not have strong 
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effect on the risk-taking behavior of private insurers. However, insurers with less liquidity and 
high leverage are found to underwrite more homeowner insurance, which imposes a severe moral 
hazard issue in the homeowner insurance market. Meanwhile, some new entrants, small regional 
insurers, to the market are found to aggressively write business compared to the big insurance 
companies such as Allstate and State Farm. These new players have filled the coverage gap left 
by the retrenching companies as expected to insurance regulators and legislatures, but their lack 
of underwriting experiences and financial capability may make them fail to meet their 
obligations when hurricane strikes the state of Florida.  
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Figure 1 
 Insured Losses of 12 Costliest Disasters in U.S. History 
(2007 $Billions) 
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Sources: ISO/PCS; AIR Worldwide, RMS, Eqecat; Insurance Information Institute inflation 
adjustments, 2008. 
 
Figure 2 
Insured Losses* of Florida's 10 Costliest Hurricanes,  
1980 – 2007 (2007 $Billions) 
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*Florida losses only 
Sources: Insurance Information Institute inflation adjustments, 2008. 
Figure 3 
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Comparison of Homeowners Insurance Rate per $1000 by County 
Florida: 1997, 2000 and 2003 
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Figure 4 
Comparison of Homeowners Insurance Rate per $1000 by County 
Florida: 2003, 2006 and 2007 
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Figure 5 
Florida State County Map 
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Figure 6 
Underwriting Gains (Losses) of Florida Homeowner Insurance*  
1992-2007 ($Billions) 
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*Does not include Citizen Property Insurance Corporation 
Source: Insurance Information Institute  
 
 
Figure 7 
Accumulative Underwriting Gains (Losses) of Florida Homeowner Insurance* 
1992-2007 ($Billions) 
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*Does not include Citizen Property Insurance Corporation 
Source: Insurance Information Institute 
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Figure 8 
ISO Loss Cost Filings: Florida Homeowners Insurance 
1991, 1992, 1995, 1996 and 2000 
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Figure 9 
Florida Residential Property and Casualty Joint Underwriting Association 
Policy Numbers and Exposures from 1993 to 2000 
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Figure 10 
Florida Windstorm Underwriting Association  
Policy Numbers and Exposures: 1990 - 2002 
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Figure 11  
Florida Citizens Exposures to Losses (Billions) 
2002-2008 
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*Florida Citizens data, as of March 31, 2007. 
**As of April, 30, 2008.  
Source: PIPSO; Florida Citizens; Zurich American Insurance Co; Insurance Information Institute 
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Areas Number Counties 
North Atlantic area 15
Baker, Bradford, Brevard, Clay, Duval, Flagler, Lake, Nassau, Orange, 
Osceola, Putnam, Seminole, St. Johns, Union, Volusia
South Atlantic area 8
Broward, Dade, Indian River, Martin, Monroe, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, St. 
Lucie
Gulf Coast area 22
Alachua, Charlotte,Citrus, Collier, Desoto,Dixie, Gilchrist, Glades, Hardee, 
Hendry, Hernando, Highlands, Hillsborough, Lee,Levy, Manatee, Marion, 
Pasco, Pinellas, Polk, Sarasota, Sumter
Panhandle area 22
Bay, Calhoun, Columbia, Escambia, Franklin, Gadsden, Hamilton, Holmes, 
Jackson, Jefferson, Lafayette, Leon, Liberty, Madison, Okaloosa, Santa 
Rosa, Suwannee, Taylor, Wakulla, Walton, Washington
Risk Areas Categories in Florida 
 
 
 
 
Year CR4 CR8 CR20 HHI
1992 59.3% 70.9% 85.2% 1,440     
1993 59.5% 71.6% 85.6% 1,438     
1994 60.0% 71.9% 86.7% 1,236     
1995 60.2% 72.2% 87.4% 1,406     
1996 57.5% 71.5% 87.0% 1,266     
1997 50.0% 63.8% 82.9% 1,046     
1998 51.3% 64.9% 83.1% 920        
1999 50.1% 62.7% 80.0% 846        
2000 48.0% 61.2% 78.7% 776        
2001 47.5% 60.1% 78.4% 783        
2002 46.4% 59.2% 79.6% 829        
2003 45.0% 59.9% 81.7% 839        
2004 44.9% 61.4% 83.8% 832        
2005 42.2% 60.0% 78.7% 714        
2006 39.2% 54.5% 75.6% 695        
2007 36.0% 48.5% 65.9% 612        
Source: NAIC Financial Database; author's calculation
Homeowners Insurance Market Concentration
Forida: 1992-2007
Table 2
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Rank DPW MS(%) Rank DPW MS(%)
State Farm 1 1,560,467,341  22.0% 1 1,175,850,317 20.7%
USAA 2 379,397,010     5.4% 6 253,944,356    4.5%
Tower Hill 3 321,833,252     4.5% 4 285,914,090    5.0%
Allstate 4 288,283,830     4.1% 2 495,663,212    8.7%
Nationwide 5 250,339,974     3.5% 5 274,916,784    4.8%
Liberty Mutual 6 239,255,396     3.4% 7 172,170,305    3.0%
ARX Holding Corp Grp 7 217,663,690     3.1% 12 116,834,632    2.1%
AIG 8 175,568,026     2.5% 10 119,271,708    2.1%
Universal Ins Grp 9 173,729,567     2.5% 15 81,510,111      1.4%
Chubb & Son 10 164,855,442     2.3% 9 124,290,363    2.2%
Hartford 11 133,295,258     1.9% 12 117,478,875    2.1%
Travelers 12 109,165,275     1.5% 8 124,905,507    2.2%
Southern Farm Bureau 13 108,252,804     1.5% 16 78,785,158      1.4%
21st Century Holding Grp 14 100,481,479     1.4% 17 77,513,454      1.4%
Zurich 15 91,934,700       1.3% 19 65,032,155      1.1%
Homewise 16 75,028,968       1.1%
Cypress Holdings Grp 17 74,980,353       1.1% 20 62,995,348      1.1%
Allianz 18 74,980,353       1.1% 22 54,853,987      1.0%
GeoVera Holdings Inc Grp 19 71,529,892       1.0% 13 111,695,287    2.0%
Northern Capital Grp 20 56,019,026       0.8%
Rank DPW MS(%) Rank DPW MS(%)
State Farm 1 901,469,903     23.4% 1 653,427,313    30.5%
USAA 3 201,975,410     5.2% 3 95,171,018      4.4%
Tower Hill 13 73,239,148       1.9%
Allstate 2 437,218,328     11.4% 2 436,329,616    20.3%
Nationwide 4 192,647,854     5.0% 5 88,595,495      4.1%
Liberty Mutual 8 122,342,962     3.2% 12 32,534,992      1.5%
ARX Holding Corp Grp 15 65,451,493       1.7%
AIG 11 78,866,913       2.0% 53 3,771,785        0.2%
Universal Ins Grp
Chubb & Son 9 101,325,909     2.6% 6 62,874,910      2.9%
Hartford 10 93,951,838       2.4% 9 49,288,247      2.3%
Travelers 7 135,849,259     3.5% 4 89,664,452      4.2%
Southern Farm Bureau 14 68,017,879       1.8% 71 1,781,096        0.1%
21st Century Holding Grp 25 19,446,950       0.5%
Zurich 20 38,742,883       1.0% 50 3,404,647        0.2%
Homewise 
Cypress Holdings Grp 18 50,992,727       1.3%
Allianz 19 47,652,724       1.2% 26 11,658,623      0.5%
GeoVera Holdings Inc Grp
Northern Capital Grp
Source: NAIC Financial Database; author's calculation
Name 
2003 1992
2007 2005
Name 
Table 3
Changes in Leading Insurers' Market Share
Florida -- 1992, 2003, 2005, 2007
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Table 4 
Year
Profit on Insurance 
Transactions
Return on Net 
Worth
1985 -5.3% -4.8%
1986 3.2% 13.1%
1987 8.7% 22.3%
1988 5.7% 17.0%
1989 5.6% 16.2%
1990 4.3% 13.3%
1991 0.5% 6.9%
1992 -657.4% -714.9%
1993 -19.9% -16.1%
1994 21.8% 35.4%
1995 6.0% 13.1%
1996 22.0% 33.6%
1997 22.2% 31.5%
1998 22.1% 29.3%
1999 22.1% 28.6%
2000 23.1% 31.3%
2001 15.2% 23.1%
2002 19.1% 29.0%
2003 23.3% 35.7%
2004 -172.7% -183.3%
2005 -62.0% -53.4%
2006 27.4% 31.1%
2007 29.6% 39.0%
Average -27.6% -22.7%
Source: NAIC
Profitability of Florida Homeowner Insurance 
1985-2007
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Table 5  
Variables Descriptions and Data Source  
 
Variable Lable Definition Source
Population Growth in Percentage PG Population growth rate in percentage Florida Demographic Database
HO Exposures HOEXP Log of  exposures of homeowner insurance QUASR database by Florida OIR
HO Premiums HODPW Log of direct written premiums of 
homeowner insurance 
QUASR database by Florida OIR
HO Policy Numbers HOPIF Log of policy numbers in force of 
homeowner insurance 
QUASR database by Florida OIR
Citiznes Market Share in Exposures FCEXP Florida Citizens' market share in exposures  NAIC financial database
Citizens Market Share in Premiums FCDPW Florida Citizens' market share in direct 
written premium
 NAIC financial database
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers FCPIF Florida Citizens' market share in policy 
numbers in force
 NAIC financial database
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage PTCF The percentage of FHCF purchase out of 
total reinsurance arrangements
 NAIC financial database
Flood Insurance Coverage FICOV Log of coverages of flood insurance FEMA
Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums FIDPW Log of direct written premiums of flood 
insurance 
FEMA
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers in Force FIPIF Log of policy numbers in force of flood 
insurance 
FEMA
Flood Insurance Coverage Normalized by 
Population
FICOV Log(coverages of flood 
insurance/population)
FEMA
Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums 
Normalized by Population
FIDPW The direct written premiums of flood 
insurance divided by population
FEMA
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers per 100 
Population
FIPIF The policy numbers in force of flood 
insurance per 100 population 
FEMA
Price Proxy at Firm Level AP Homeowner insurance direct written 
premiums divided by exposures for a firm
NAIC financial database
Price Proxy at County Level APCT Homeowner insurance direct written 
premiums divided by exposures in a 
county
NAIC financial database
Per Capital County Income Income County income divided by population Regional Economic Information 
System, Bureau of Economic Analysis, 
U.S. Department of Commerce
Crime Rate per 100 Population Crime Index crime and offense per 100 
population
Florida Department of Law 
Enforcement*
Size Size Log of toal assests of a firm A.M. Best Company
Return on Equity ROE Net income divided by equity of a firm A.M. Best Company
Leverage leverage Consolidated balance sheet debt-to-capital 
ratio (unadjusted)**
A.M. Best Compnay
Liquidity Liquidity Current liquidity measured as the 
proportion of liabilities covered by 
encumbered cash and unaffiliated 
investments***
A.M. Best Company
*http://www.fdle.state.fl.us/Content/FSAC/Data---Statistics-(1)/UCR-Offense-Data/UCR-Offense-Data.aspx, accessed May 30, 2009
**http://www.ambest.com/ratings/methodology/operatingleverage.pdf, accessed May 30, 2009 
***http://www.ambest.com/ratings/pcbirpreface.pdf, accessed May 30, 2009  
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Table 6 
County 2000 Census
2007 
Estimate
Percent 
Change %
Amount of Insurance 
in Force 2007 County 2000 Census
2007 
Estimate
Percent 
Change %
Amount of Insurance 
in Force 2007
Alachua 217,955 247,561 13.6% 17,827,240,280 Madison 18,733 19,944 6.5% 276,895,382
Baker 22,259 25,623 15.1% 1,348,378,811 Manatee 264,002 315,890 19.7% 798,725,451
Bay 148,217 167,631 13.1% 12,586,771,068 Marion 258,916 325,023 25.5% 37,737,346,676
Bradford 26,088 29,055 11.4% 1,133,397,020 Martin 126,731 143,737 13.4% 29,899,253,925
Brevard 476,230 552,109 15.9% 57,082,266,488 Miami-Dade 2,253,779 2,462,292 9.3% 21,138,801,053
Broward 1,623,018 1,765,707 8.8% 115,290,869,824 Monroe 79,589 78,987 -0.8% 893,437,140
Calhoun 13,017 14,477 11.2% 550,949,311 Nassau 57,663 69,569 20.6% 7,793,853,621
Charlotte 141,627 164,584 16.2% 24,066,309,445 Okaloosa 170,498 196,540 15.3% 18,701,002,644
Citrus 118,085 140,124 18.7% 16,814,847,331 Okeechobee 35,910 39,030 8.7% 2,454,039,365
Clay 140,814 184,644 31.1% 18,641,380,452 Orange 896,344 1,105,603 23.3% 110,868,392,437
Collier 251,377 333,858 32.8% 49,525,058,778 Osceola 172,493 266,123 54.3% 26,710,935,648
Columbia 56,513 65,373 15.7% 3,638,539,542 Palm Beach 1,131,191 1,295,033 14.5% 133,911,245,419
DeSoto 32,209 33,983 5.5% 100,454,591,030 Pasco 344,768 434,425 26.0% 41,572,776,403
Dixie 13,827 15,808 14.3% 2,031,871,749 Pinellas 921,495 944,199 2.5% 80,612,478,554
Duval 778,879 897,597 15.2% 577,614,299 Polk 483,924 581,058 20.1% 51,908,243,583
Escambia 294,410 311,775 5.9% 72,740,574,134 Putnam 70,423 74,799 6.2% 4,070,010,021
Flagler 49,832 93,568 87.8% 19,968,192,375 St. Johns 123,135 173,935 41.3% 14,156,310,578
Franklin 9,829 12,249 24.6% 13,080,503,792 St. Lucie 192,695 271,961 41.1% 44,357,891,298
Gadsden 45,087 49,398 9.6% 594,290,097 Santa Rosa 117,743 142,144 20.7% 48,831,600,512
Gilchrist 14,437 17,106 18.5% 2,311,470,770 Sarasota 325,961 387,461 18.9% 29,996,924,818
Glades 10,576 11,055 4.5% 799,006,340 Seminole 365,199 425,698 16.6% 25,781,710,716
Gulf 14,560 16,815 15.5% 524,942,963 Sumter 53,345 89,771 68.3% 9,003,517,248
Hamilton 13,327 14,705 10.3% 746,673,324 Suwannee 34,844 39,608 13.7% 2,013,769,854
Hardee 26,938 27,520 2.2% 456,693,400 Taylor 19,256 22,516 16.9% 1,016,728,303
Hendry 36,210 39,651 9.5% 1,148,293,667 Union 13,442 15,722 17.0% 444,515,319
Hernando 130,802 162,193 24.0% 1,758,620,277 Volusia 443,343 508,014 14.6% 46,818,533,388
Highlands 87,366 98,727 13.0% 18,060,699,830 Wakulla 22,863 29,417 28.7% 1,791,589,546
Hillsborough 998,948 1,192,861 19.4% 9,149,914,909 Walton 40,601 57,093 40.6% 4,763,219,424
Holmes 18,564 19,464 4.8% 112,445,467,925 Washington 20,973 23,719 13.1% 1,182,885,047
Indian River 112,947 139,757 23.7% 745,802,728 Total 15,982,824 18,680,367 16.9% 1,632,443,885,844
Jackson 46,755 50,416 7.8% 16,880,820,302
Jefferson 12,902 14,494 12.3% 2,457,765,219
Lafayette 7,022 8,215 17.0% 925,876,518
Lake 210,527 286,499 36.1% 271,354,636
Lee 440,888 615,741 39.7% 35,517,372,279
Leon 239,452 272,896 14.0% 75,154,288,189
Levy 34,450 40,045 16.2% 23,603,547,362
Liberty 7,021 7,772 10.7% 2,024,996,007
Source: QUASR database from Florida Office of Insurance Regulation
Florida Demographic database.
Florida Population and Exposures by County
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics in Regression Equations 
 
Table 7.1 Descriptive Statistics for Equations (1) – (3) 
Variable
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Population Growth in Percentage 670                    2.337 1.889 -4.395 13.302
Citizens Market Share in Exposures 670                    1.543 4.265 0.000 32.633
Citizens Market Share in Premiums 670                    2.540 5.666 0.000 39.340
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers 670                    2.017 5.036 0.000 35.900
Flood Insurance Coverages 670                    19.823 2.681 13.842 25.207
Flood Insurance Premiums 670                    13.986 2.465 8.419 18.784
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 670                    8.002 2.484 2.639 12.960
Flood Insurance Coverages Normalized by 
Population 670                    8.386 1.629 5.026 11.488
Flood Insurance Premiums Normalized by 
Population 670                    34.416 55.213 0.620 436.913
Flood Insurnace Policy Numers per 100 Population 670                    8.087 16.117 0.180 365.967
Income 670                    25.841 8.665 12.572 59.390
Crime Rate per 100 Population 670                    7.028 2.986 0.000 24.581  
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics for Equations (4) – (6) 
Variable
Number of 
Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum
HO Exposures 52,313               15.679 2.607 0.000 24.061
HO Premiums 53,710               10.135 2.600 0.000 18.738
HO Policy Numbers 53,684               3.460 2.408 0.000 11.271
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage 35,303               8.289 15.643 0.000 100.000
Citizens Market Share in Exposures 55,736               1.492 4.428 0.000 32.633
Citizens Market Share in Premiums 55,736               2.338 5.734 0.000 39.340
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers 55,736               1.859 5.113 0.000 35.900
Flood Insurance Coverages 55,729               20.350 2.520 13.842 25.207
Flood Insurance Premiums 55,729               14.465 2.330 8.419 18.760
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 55,729               8.532 2.354 2.639 12.960
Flood Insurance Coverages Normalized by 
Population 55,611               8.570 1.557 5.026 11.488
Flood Insurance Premiums Normalized by 
Population 55,611               35.075 50.182 0.620 436.913
Flood Insurance Policy Numers per 100 Population 55,611               8.762 15.204 0.180 365.967
Price Proxy at County Level 55,729               0.003 0.003 0.000 0.043
Price Proxy at Firm Level 52,809               0.117 10.047 0.000 181.600
Income 55,729               15.055 1.609 11.540 18.255
Size 21,898               19.220 4.114 7.015 24.358
Return on Equity 21,898               6.708 14.358 -48.600 53.100
Leverage 21,898               5.234 3.868 0.300 32.700
Liquidity 21,898               1.383 1.260 0.230 9.999
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Table 8.1  
Random Effects Estimates of Government Intervention Measured in terms of Exposures, 
1998-2007 
Dependent variable is County Population Growth Rate in Percentage terms 
 
Independent Variables
Random-Effect 
Model A1   
Random-Effect 
Model A2
Random-Effect 
Model A3
Random-Effect 
Model A4
Citizens Market Share in Exposures -0.009                  
(0.017)
-0.009        
(0.019)
-0.001                 
(0.018)
-0.008                 
(0.019)
Flood Insurance Coverage 0.385                  
(0.134)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage 0.354                  
(0.139)**
Flood Insurance Coverage Normalized by 
Population
0.315                    
(0.128)**
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage Normalized by 
Population
0.379                    
(0.132)***
Income -0.335                   
(0.217)
-0.290                 
(0.224)
0.029                    
(0.136)
0.005                    
(0.140)
Crime Rate 0.026                    
(0.030)
0.008                   
(0.033)
0.025                    
(0.030)
0.009                    
(0.033)
Dummy for South Atlantic area -1.183                  
(0.662)***
-1.932                 
(0.677)***
-1.851                 
(0.665)***
-2.014                 
(0.681)***
Dummy for Gulf Coast -0.432                 
(0.485)
-0.511                  
(0.496)
-0.420                  
(0.485)
-0.507                   
(0.497)
Dummy for Panhandle area -0.737                 
(0.521)
-0.780                 
(0.532)
-0.750                  
(0.520)
-0.811                   
(0.534)
Observations 670 603 670 603
R-squared 0.1792 0.1857 0.1779 0.1885
1. The estimation of fixed and random effects are based on Hausman test.  
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in the table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8.2  
Fixed and Random Effects Estimates, Government Intervention Measured in terms of 
Direct Written Premiums, 1998-2007 
Dependent variable is County Population Growth Rate in Percentage terms 
 
Independent Variables
Fixed-Effect 
Model B1   
Random-Effect 
Model B2
Fixed-Effect 
Model B3   
Random-Effect 
Model B4
Citizens Market Share in Direct Written Premiums 0.007                  
(0.016)
-0.007                   
(0.018)
0.002                    
(0.016)
-0.008                  
(0.018)
Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums -0.121                  
(0.292)
Lag of Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums 0.253                   
(0.131)*
Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums 
Normalized by Population
0.001                    
(0.003)
Lag of NFIP Premiums/Population 0.004                    
(0.003)
Income 0.468                    
(0.952)***
-0.118                   
(0.201)
0.178                    
(0.128)
0.171                    
(0.130)
Crime Rate 0.041                   
(0.032)
0.008                    
(0.033)
0.021                    
(0.030)
0.005                    
(0.033)
Dummy for South Atlantic area -1.886                 
(0.686)***
-1.589                 
(0.698)**
-1.845                 
(0.713)***
Dummy for Gulf Coast -0.589                  
(0.507)
-0.386                  
(0.506)
-0.512                 
(0.516)
Dummy for Panhandle area 0.839                   
(0.541)
-0.729                  
(0.544)
-0.834                  
(0.555)
Observations 670 603 670 603
R-squared 0.0854 0.1549 0.1029 0.1184
1. The estimation of fixed and random effects are based on Hausman test.  
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in the table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8.3  
Fixed and Random Effects Estimates, Government Intervention Measured in terms of 
Policy Numbers in Force, 1998-2007 
Dependent variable is County Population Growth Rate in Percentage terms 
 
Independent Variables
Fixed-Effect 
Model C1   
Random-Effect 
Model C2
Fixed-Effect 
Model C3   
Random-Effect 
Model C4
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers -0.001                  
(0.016)
-0.008                 
(0.018)
0.005                  
(0.013)
-0.007                  
(0.018)
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 0.266                   
(0.121)**
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 0.115                   
(0.125)
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers Normalized by 
Population in Percentage
0.001                    
(0.004)
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 
Normalized by Population in Percentage
-0.004                   
(0.004)
Income -0.153                 
(0.194)
0.038                    
(0.199)
4.103                    
(0.946)***
0.188                    
(0.129)
Crime Rate 0.022                    
(0.030)
0.003                    
(0.033)
0.042                    
(0.031)
0.005                    
(0.033)
Dummy for South Atlantic area -1.665                  
(0.772)***
-1.760                
(0.679)***
-1.623                  
(0.688)**
Dummy for Gulf Coast -0.460                  
(0.487)
-0.498                   
(0.500)
-0.454                   
(0.511)
Dummy for Panhandle area -0.100                  
(0.249)
-0.801                   
(0.536)
-0.759                   
(0.549)
Observations 670 603 670 603
R-squared 0.1614 0.1496 0.0852 0.1073
1. The estimation of fixed and random effects are based on Hausman test.  
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in the table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8.4  
Estimated Coefficients on County Population Growth Rate with County Dummies 
1998 - 2007 
 
 
Independent Variables Model A5 Model A6 Model B5 Model C5
Citizens Market Share in Exposures 0.012                    
(0.018)
0.005                    
(0.020)
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage 1.180                  
(0.400)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage Normalized by 
Population
1.399                    
(0.496)***
Citizens Market Share in Direct Written Premiums 0.007                   
(0.016)
Lag of Flood Insurance Direct Written Premiums -0.121                  
(0.291)
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers 0.005                   
(0.016)
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy Numbers 0.220                   
(0.202)
Income 3.100                   
(1.001)***
3.499                   
(1.073)***
4.166                  
(0.952)***
3.899                   
(0.965)***
Crime Rate 0.054                   
(0.031)*
0.037                    
(0.065)
0.041                    
(0.032)
0.044                   
(0.031)
Dummy for County Clay 16.145                  
(2.770)***
14.293                  
(3.041)***
13.277                 
(2.819)***
14.050                  
(2.670)***
Dummy for County Volusia 8.642                   
(1.767)***
7.483                   
(1.959)***
7.465                  
(1.791)***
7.709                   
(1.728)***
Dummy for County Broward 0.578                    
(0.596)
-0.081                   
(0.683)
0.924                    
(0.585)
0.840                   
(0.587)
Dummy for County Monroe 10.615                
(2.915)***
7.431         
(3.421)***
11.008         
(2.915)***
10.834         
(2.911)***
Dummy for County Hendry 21.609          
(4.357)***
18.894                
(4.870)***
18.259                 
(4.404)***
18.986                
(4.268)***
Dummy for County Sarasota 14.474                
(2.506)***
12.893                
(2.802)***
13.172                
(2.555)***
13.455                 
(2.480)***
Dummy for County Franklin 24.335                
(5.358)***
20.021                
(6.161)***
24.385                
(5.400)***
24.344                
(5.374)***
Dummy for County Leon 13.453                 
(2.521)***
12.182                
(2.743)***
9.377                   
(2.458)***
10.375                
(2.267)***
Observations 603 603 603 603
R-squared 0.5924 0.5965 0.5866 0.5872
1. Miam-Dade is set as the default county in the regression. The other eight county dummies from four risk territories
    as reported: 1) North Atlantic area: Clay and Volusia; 2) South Atlantic area: Broward and Monroe; 3) Gulf Coast area:
   Hendry and Sarasota; 4) Panhandle area: Franklin and Leon. Most of the remaining county dummies which are not
   reported are statistically significant. 
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 145
Table 8.5  
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Exposures 
1998-2007 
 
Model D1 Model D2 Model D3 Model D4
Citizens Market Share in Exposures
-0.014                  
(0.005)***
-0.014                
(0.006)*
-0.014                 
(0.004)***
-0.019                
(0.005)***
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.14 6                 
(0.003)***
0.146                   
(0.003)***
0.144                  
(0.003)***
0.136                   
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Coverage
0.089                  
(0.014)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage
0.077                   
(0.013)***
Flood Insurance Coverage Normalized by 
Population
0.075                   
(0.013)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage 
Normalized by Population
0.079                  
(0.014)***
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over 
Exposures at County Level
-38.291                
(8.077)
-35.955               
(8.043)
-34.284                
(7.972)***
-32.616                
(7.872)***
Log of County Income
0.731                    
(0.022)***
0.748                   
(0.021)***
0.806                    
(0.014)***
0.780                    
(0.014)***
Size
0.427                    
(0.010)***
0.427                  
(0.010)***
0.420                   
(0.010)***
0.395                   
(0.010)***
Return on Equity
0.001                    
(0.001)
0.001                    
(0.001)
0.001                    
(0.001)
0.001                    
(0.002)
Leverage 
0.123                    
(0.005)***
0.123                  
(0.005)***
0.132                    
(0.005)***
0.130                    
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.009                  
(0.029)
-0.010                  
(0.029)
-0.004                  
(0.031)
-0.037                 
(0.031)
Dummy for South Atlantic Area
-0.028                
(0.064)***
-0.276                
(0.064)***
-0.267                
(0.065)***
-0.253                 
(0.067)***
Dummy for Gulf Coast
0.051                  
(0.042)
0.055                   
(0.042)
0.073                  
(0.044)*
0.084                   
(0.045)*
Dummy for Panhandle Area
0.011                   
(0.049)
0.012                   
(0.049)
0.043                   
(0.050)
0.042                   
(0.052)
Observations 17,101 17,054 17,101 17,054
R-squared 0.3671 0.3668 0.3659 0.3667
1. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
2. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable = Log (Homeowner Insurance Exposures)
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Table 8.6 
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Direct Written Premiums 
1998-2007 
 
 
Model E1 Model E2 Model E3 Model E4
Citizens Market Share in Premiums
0.004                        
(0.005)
0.006                        
(0.005)
0.007                       
(0.004)*
0.006                       
(0.005)
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.114                      
(0.015)***
0.133                      
(0.003)***
0.137                      
(0.003)***
0.131                      
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Premiums
0.058                      
(0.014)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Premiums
0.110                       
(0.015)***
Flood Insurance Premiums Normalized by 
Population
0.003                        
(0.001)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Premiums 
Normalized by Population
0.003                      
(0.001)***
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over 
Exposures at County Level
-8.445                       
(7.448)
-7.157                      
(7.426)
-18.718                    
(8.280)**
-21.721                   
(8.462)***
Log of County Income
0.678                        
(0.022)***
0.684                        
(0.022)***
0.785                        
(0.013)***
0.780                      
(0.013)***
Size
0.312                      
(0.011)***
0.312                      
(0.011)***
0.325                       
(0.010)***
0.323                       
(0.011)***
Return on Equity
0.006                       
(0.001)***
0.006                       
(0.001)***
0.003                        
(0.001)**
0.001                        
(0.001)
Leverage 
0.097                       
(0.005)***
0.098                      
(0.005)***
0.125                        
(0.005)***
0.125                       
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.056                      
(0.030)*
-0.057                     
(0.030)*
-0.042                     
(0.031)*
-0.059                     
(0.032)*
Dummy for South Atlantic Area
0.063                        
(0.071)
0.058                        
(0.071)
0.037                        
(0.064)
0.061                       
(0.067)
Dummy for Gulf Coast
0.142                      
(0.046)***
0.143                       
(0.046)***
0.140                        
(0.044)***
0.150                      
(0.046)***
Dummy for Panhandle Area
0.111                        
(0.053)**
0.112                       
(0.053)**
0.136                        
(0.050)***
0.125                        
(0.053)**
Observations 14,327 14,286 14,327 14,286
R-squared 0.3364 0.3368 0.3421 0.3388
1. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
Dependent Variable = Log (Homeowner Insurance Premiums)
Independent Variables
2. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8.7 
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Policy Numbers in Force 
1998-2007 
 
 
Model F1 Model F2 Model F3 Model F4
Citiznes Market Share in Policy Number
-0.001                       
(0.005)
0.001                        
(0.005)
0.001                       
(0.004)
-0.001                      
(0.005)
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.132                       
(0.003)***
0.129                      
(0.003)***
0.132                      
(0.003)***
0.126                       
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Policy Number
0.061                        
(0.013)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy Number
0.056                      
(0.016)***
Flood Insurance Policy 
Numbers/Population in Percentage
0.001                        
(0.001)
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy 
Numbers/Population in Percentage
0.001                        
(0.001)
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over 
Exposures at Firm Level
0.003                       
(0.005)
0.003                        
(0.005)
0.003                        
(0.005)
0.024                        
(0.017)
Log of County Income
0.683                        
(0.020)***
0.715                        
(0.010)***
0.756                       
(0.012)***
0.749                       
(0.012)***
Size
0.229                       
(0.009)***
0.233                        
(0.010)***
0.230                      
(0.009)***
0.219                        
(0.010)***
Return on Equity
0.005                      
(0.001)***
0.009                      
(0.001)***
0.005                       
(0.001)***
0.005                      
(0.001)***
Leverage 
0.115                       
(0.004)***
0.096                       
(0.005)***
0.115                       
(0.004)***
0.115                      
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.058                       
(0.029)**
-0.083                     
(0.027)*
-0.057                     
(0.029)**
-0.086                     
(0.029)**
Dummy for South Atlantic Area
-0.427                     
(0.055)***
-0.395                       
(0.060)***
-0.395                     
(0.056)***
-0.388                     
(0.058)***
Dummy for Gulf Coast
0.076                        
(0.020)*
0.116                      
(0.042)***
0.090                        
(0.040)**
0.090                        
(0.042)**
Dummy for Panhandle Area
0.111                       
(0.046)**
0.090                        
(0.049)
0.114                        
(0.047)**
0.101                       
(0.049)**
Observations 16,028 15,985 16,020 14,524
R-squared 0.3305 0.3303 0.3301 0.3252
1. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
Dependent Variable=Log(Homeowner Insurance Policy Numbers)
Independent Variables
2. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 8.8  
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Exposures with County Dummies 
1998-2007 
 
Model D5 Model D6
Citizens Market Share in Exposures
-0.010                      
(0.006)*
-0.011                      
(0.006)*
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.147                        
(0.003)***
0.146                        
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Coverage
0.339                        
(0.162)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage
-0.011                       
(0.043)
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over Exposures at County Level
8.493                        
(13.242)
12.977                      
(13.057)
Income
0.992                       
(0.403)***
1.261             
(0.380)***
Size
0.430                        
(0.010)***
0.430                        
(0.010)***
Return on Equity
0.002                        
(0.001)
0.001                       
(0.001)
Leverage 
0.123                        
(0.005)***
0.123                        
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.008                        
(0.029)
-0.009                       
(0.029)
Dummy for County Clay 
2.461                         
(1.113)**
1.653                         
(1.080)
Dummy for County Volusia
1.516                         
(0.694)**
1.191                        
(0.691)*
Dummy for County Broward
0.263                        
(0.185)
0.389                         
(0.176)**
Dummy for County Monroe
0.359                         
(1.184)
0.352                         
(1.191)
Dummy for County Hendry 
2.854                         
(1.758)
1.853                         
(1.736)
Dummy for County Sarasota 
2.942                       
(1.005)***
2.571                        
(1.007)**
Dummy for County Franklin 
3.700                        
(2.159)*
3.615                        
(2.176)*
Dummy for County Leon
2.508                       
(1.005)***
1.388                         
(0.904)
Observations 17,101 17,054
R-squared 0.3848 0.3847
1.Miam-Dade is set as the default county in the regression. The other eight county dummies from four risk territories
as reported: 1) North Atlantic area: Clay and Volusia; 2) South Atlantic area: Broward and Monroe; 3) Gulf Coast area:
Hendry and Sarasota; 4) Panhandle area: Franklin and Leon. Most of the remaining county dummies which are not
 reported are statistically significant. 
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable=Log(Homeowner 
Insurance Exposures)
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Table 8.9  
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Premiums with County Dummies 
1998-2007 
 
Model E5 Model E6
Citizens Market Share in Premiums
-0.002                        
(0.007)
-0.001                      
(0.006)
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.135                        
(0.003)***
0.135                       
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Premiums
0.067                       
(0.172)
Lag of Flood Insurance Premiums
0.043                         
(0.064)
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over Exposures at County Level
6.381                        
(15.461)
6.729                         
(15.427)
Income
1.518                         
(0.540)***
1.504                         
(0.536)***
Size
0.313                         
(0.011)***
0.314                         
(0.011)***
Return on Equity
0.006                         
(0.001)***
0.006                         
(0.001)***
Leverage 
0.098                         
(0.005)***
0.098                         
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.055                        
(0.030)*
-0.056                        
(0.030)*
Dummy for County Clay 
1.914                         
(1.595)
1.746                        
(1.523)
Dummy for County Volusia
1.135                         
(0.987)
1.042                         
(0.964)
Dummy for County Broward
0.075                         
(0.204)
0.049                         
(0.202)
Dummy for County Monroe
1.841                         
(1.646)
1.743                         
(1.652)
Dummy for County Hendry 
3.000                         
(2.482)
2.783                         
(2.429)
Dummy for County Sarasota 
2.933                         
(1.445)**
2.808                         
(1.422)**
Dummy for County Franklin 
5.027                         
(3.049)*
4.838                         
(3.056)
Dummy for County Leon
1.601                         
(1.379)
1.443                         
(1.263)
Observations 14,327 14,286
R-squared 0.3519 0.3368
1.Miam-Dade is set as the default county in the regression. The other eight county dummies from four risk territories
as reported: 1) North Atlantic area: Clay and Volusia; 2) South Atlantic area: Broward and Monroe; 3) Gulf Coast area:
Hendry and Sarasota; 4) Panhandle area: Franklin and Leon. Most of the remaining county dummies which are not
 reported are statistically significant. 
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable=Log(Homeowner 
Insurance Premiums)
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Table 8.10  
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Policy Numbers in Force with County 
Dummies, 1998-2007 
 
Model F5 Model F6
Citizens Market Share in Policy Numbers
-0.003                       
(0.007)
-0.003                      
(0.007)
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.131                         
(0.003)***
0.131                        
(0.003)***
Flood Insurance Policy Numbers
0.051                         
(0.081)
Lag of Flood Insurance Policy Numbers
-0.015                        
(0.061)
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over Exposures at Firm Level
0.005                         
(0.005)
0.005                         
(0.005)
Income
1.465                         
(0.495)***
1.478                         
(0.491)
Size
0.235                       
(0.010)***
0.236                        
(0.010)***
Return on Equity
0.009                         
(0.001)***
0.009                        
(0.001)***
Leverage 
0.096                         
(0.005)***
0.096                         
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.079                        
(0.027)***
-0.081                        
(0.027)***
Dummy for County Clay 
2.497                         
(1.376)*
2.220                         
(1.394)
Dummy for County Volusia
1.826                         
(0.868)**
1.711                         
(0.878)**
Dummy for County Broward
0.353                         
(0.185)*
0.377                         
(0.184)**
Dummy for County Monroe
1.671                         
(1.500)
1.574                         
(1.510)
Dummy for County Hendry 
3.320                         
(2.220)
2.987                         
(2.227)
Dummy for County Sarasota 
3.359                         
(1.286)***
3.206                         
(1.300)**
Dummy for County Franklin 
5.421                         
(2.785)*
5.183                         
(2.807)*
Dummy for County Leon
2.143                         
(1.143)*
1.851                         
(1.157)
Observations 14,053 14,012
R-squared 0.3645 0.3644
1.Miam-Dade is set as the default county in the regression. The other eight county dummies from four risk territories
as reported: 1) North Atlantic area: Clay and Volusia; 2) South Atlantic area: Broward and Monroe; 3) Gulf Coast area:
Hendry and Sarasota; 4) Panhandle area: Franklin and Leon. Most of the remaining county dummies which are not
 reported are statistically significant. 
2. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
Independent Variables
Dependent Variable=Log(Homeowner 
Insurance Policy Number in Force)
3. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 151
Table 8.11  
Estimated Coefficients on Homeowners Insurance Exposures with County Dummies and 
Firm Dummies, 1998-2007 
 
Model D7 Model D8
Citizens Market Share in Exposures
-0.013                       
(0.004)***
-0.014                       
(0.004)***
CAT Fund Purchase in Percentage
0.348                         
(0.106)***
0.026                         
(0.005)***
Flood Insurance Coverage
0.026                         
(0.005)***
Lag of Flood Insurance Coverage
-0.054                        
(0.032)
Homeowner Insurance Premiums over Exposures at County level
11.100                       
(9.382)
13.213                      
(9.358)
Income
0.890                         
(0.270)***
1.159                       
(0.255)***
Size
0.075                         
(0.023)***
0.075                        
(0.023)***
Return on Equity
-0.007                        
(0.001)***
-0.007                        
(0.001)***
Leverage 
0.110                         
(0.009)***
0.123                       
(0.005)***
Liquidity
-0.318                        
(0.037)***
-0.319                        
(0.037)***
Dummy for County Clay
1.054                         
(0.417)**
0.674                         
(0.417)
Dummy for County Broward
0.255                         
(0.131)
0.383                         
(0.127)***
Dummy for County Sarasota
3.040                        
(1.495)**
1.223                         
(1.479)
Dummy for County Leon
1.829                         
(0.723)**
1.645                         
(1.728)**
F1=Allstate General Insurance Company
-5.244                        
(30.320)
-1.686                        
(1.820)
F2=Lumbermens Mutual Casulty Company 
-1.155                        
50.036
3.436                        
(1.058)**
F3=Merastar Insurance Company
-2.686                        
(26.042)
0.878                         
(1.065)
F4=Auto Club South Insurance Company
-1.207                        
(36.794)
2.370                        
(1.059)**
Observations 16,032 15,989
R-squared 0.6867 0.6868
1. Four representative insurers are reported in this table as Allstate General Insurance Company (big firm),
Lumbermens Mutual Casulty Company (mid-size firm), Merastar Insurance Company (new entrant since 2000), 
and Auto Club South Insurance Compnay (new entrant since 2005). 
2. Miam-Dade is set as the default county in the regression. The other four county dummies from four risk territories
as reported: Clay in North Atlantic;  Broward in South Atlantic;  Sarasota in Gulf Coast; Leon in Panhandle area.
3. The results of year dummies are not reported in this table. 
Dependent Variable=Log(Homeowner 
Insurance Exposures)
4. * , **  and *** denote significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
Independent Variables
 
 
